Analytic philosophy
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/* Logical Positivism */
'''Analytic philosophy''' (sometimes, '''analytical philosophy''') is a term used in two main senses. First, it can be used to denote a specific movement in early 20th century philosophy, led by [[Bertrand Russell]], [[G.E. Moore]], and [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]],<ref>Avrum Stroll ''20th Century Analytic Philosophy'', Columbia University Press, 2000 ISBN 0-231-11220-3</ref> which made substantial contributions to philosophical [[logic]], held that philosophy should apply these logical techniques to the attainment of conceptual clarity, and sought to be consistent with the success of modern [[science]]. Second, “analytic philosophy” can be used as a catch all phrase that includes all branches of contemporary philosophy not focusing on a certain group of [[Continental philosophy|European continental philosophers]].
These two senses of "analytic philosophy" are related. Most of the branches of "analytic philosophy" in its broader sense owe an intellectual debt to the methods and style of the analytic movement proper, and some argue that the diverse fields of contemporary analytic philosophy are unified by a common style,<ref>See, e.g., Brian Leiter [http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp] "'Analytic' philosophy today names a style of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views. Analytic philosophers, crudely speaking, aim for argumentative clarity and precision; draw freely on the tools of logic; and often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities."</ref> deriving from pioneering work at Cambridge in the early 20th century. However, the relation between these two senses of “analytic philosophy” should not be overemphasized. Many branches of contemporary philosophy--for example, [[philosophy of mind]] and [[political philosophy]]--bear remarkably little resemblance to the work of Russell and Moore and make little use of the concepts, methods, and tools they developed. Furthermore, most philosophers since 1960 have rejected the basic precepts that underlay the analytic movement proper, precepts that were decisively challenged by the influential critiques of [[W.V. Quine]] and the later [[Wittgenstein]].
== The Analytic Movement: 1900 - 1960 ==
In its first sense, "Analytic Philosophy" is used to refer to a specific philosophical program that is ordinarily dated from about 1900 to 1960.
=== Key Traits ===
As a historical program, "Analytic Philosophy" can be summarily characterized in three broad strokes:<ref>All three traits can be found in a characteristic paragraph by [[Bertrand Russell]]: "Modern analytical empiricism [...] differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble." ''A History of Western Philosophy'' (Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 834.</ref>
*First, the view that there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. This contrasts with the traditional [[foundationalism]], deriving from [[Aristotle]], that views philosophy as a special sort of science, the highest one, which investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything.<ref>See Aristotle Metaphysics (Book II 993a), Kenny (1973) p. 230.</ref> As a result, analytic philosophers have often considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences.<ref>This is an attitude that goes back to [[John Locke|Locke]], who described his work as that of an "underlaborer" to the achievements of natural scientists such as Newton. In the twentieth century, the most influential advocate of the continuity of philosophy with science was [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]]: see, e.g., his papers "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Epistemology Naturalized".</ref>
*Second, the view that the logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the [[logical form]] of philosophical propositions.<ref>A.P. Martinich, "Introduction," in Martinich & D. Sosa (eds.), ''A Companion to Analytic Philosophy'' (Blackwell, 2001), p. 1: "To use a general name for the kind of analytic philosophy practiced during the first half of the twentieth century, [...] 'conceptual analysis' aims at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components."</ref> The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it (often using the [[formal grammar]] and symbolism of a [[logical system]]) to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language.<ref>Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.111</ref>
*Third, a rejection of sweeping philosophical systems in favour of close attention to detail.<ref>Scott Soames, ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century'' Vol. 1 (Princeton UP, 2003), p. xv: "There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance. What distinguishes twentieth-century analytical philosophy from at least some philosophy in other traditions, or at other times, is not a categorical rejection of philosophical systems, but rather the acceptance of a wealth of smaller, more thorough and more rigorous, investigations that need not be tied to any overarching philosophical view." See also, e.g., "Philosophical Analysis" (cataloged under "Analysis, Philosophical") in ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' , Vol. 1 (Macmillan, 1967), ''esp.'' sections on "Bertrand Russell" at p. 97''ff'', "G.E. Moore" at p. 100''ff'', and "Logical Positivism" at p. 102''ff''.</ref> Among some (but by no means all) analytic philosophers, this rejection of "grand theory" has taken the form of a defense of common sense and ordinary language against the pretensions of metaphysicians.<ref>See, e.g., the works of [[G.E. Moore]] and [[J.L. Austin]].</ref>
=== History ===
The analytic program in philosophy is ordinarily dated to the work of [[England|English]] [[philosophers]] [[Bertrand Russell]] and [[G. E. Moore]] in the early 20th century. They turned away from then-dominant forms of [[Hegelianism]] (objecting in particular to its [[idealism]] and purported obscurity)<ref>See for example Moore's ''[[A Defence of Common Sense]]'' and Russell's critique of the [[Doctrine of internal relations]]</ref><ref>"...analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-Hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings." Peter Jonkers, "Perspectives on twentieth century philosophy: A Reply to Tom Rockmore," [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000129/article.pdf]</ref>, and began to develop a new sort of conceptual analysis, based on new developments in logic.
====Origins: Frege====
Russell in his early career, along with collaborator [[Alfred North Whitehead]], was deeply influenced by [[Gottlob Frege]]. <!-- Unsourced image removed: [[Image:Bertrand Russell.jpg|100px|thumb|[[Bertrand Russell]]]] --> Most importantly [[Gottlob Frege]] helped to develop [[predicate logic]]. This permitted a much wider range of sentences to be parsed into logical form. Frege was also a key figure in [[philosophy of mathematics]] in Germany at the turn of the 20th century. In contrast to Husserl's ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'', which attempted to show that the concept of the [[cardinal number]] derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them,<ref>{{cite journal|author=Willard, Dallas|title=Husserl on a Logic that Failed|journal=Philosophical Review|pages=52–53|volume=89|issue=1}}</ref> Frege sought to show that mathematics and logic have their own validity, independent of the judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians (which were the foundation of arithmetic in Husserl's "psychologism"). Frege's own work, the ''[[Begriffsschrift]]'', developed the concepts of a specific form of modern logic by making use of the notions of the ''sense'' and ''reference''. Frege further developed his philosophy of logic and mathematics in [[The Foundations of Arithmetic]] and [[The Basic Laws of Arithmetic]] where he provides an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number.
Like Frege, [[Bertrand Russell]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead]] attempted to show that mathematics is reducible to fundamental logical principles. Their ''[[Principia Mathematica]]'' (1910-1913) encouraged many philosophers to take a renewed interest in the development of [[symbolic logic]]. In addition, [[Bertrand Russell]] adopted Frege's predicate logic as his primary philosophical tool, a tool he thought could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. For example, the English word “is” can be parsed in three distinct ways:
* in 'the cat ''is'' asleep: the ''is'' of predication says that 'x is P': P(x)
* in 'there ''is'' a cat”: the ''is'' of existence says that there is an x: ∃(x)
* in 'three ''is'' half of six': the ''is'' of identity says that x is the same as y: x=y
Russell sought to resolve various philosophical issues by applying such clear and clean distinctions, most famously in the case of the [[definite description|Present King of France]].
====Ideal Language Analysis====
From about 1910 to 1930, analytic philosophers like Russell and [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] focused on creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their view, often got philosophers into trouble. This philosophical trend can be called "ideal-language analysis" or "formalism." In this phase, Russell and Wittgenstein sought to understand language, and hence philosophical problems, by making use of [[logic|formal logic]]. That is, in one way or another they sought to formalize the way in which philosophical [[statement]]s are made. [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in a brief book, the ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]''. The argument therein suggests that the world is the existence of certain states of affairs and these states of affairs can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic. So a ''picture'' of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions, and linking them using [[logical operator]]s.
====Logical Positivism====
{{main|Logical Positivism}}
In the late 1920s, '30s, and '40s, Russell and Wittgenstein's formalism was picked up by a group of thinkers in Vienna and Berlin, who formed the [[Vienna Circle]] and [[Berlin Circle]] and developed a doctrine known as [[logical positivism]] (or logical empiricism). Logical positivism used formal logical tools to underpin an empiricist account of our knowledge of the world.<ref>{{cite book|author=Carnap, R.|title=''The Logical Structure of the World''|publisher=?|date=1928}}</ref> Philosophers such as [[Rudolf Carnap]] and [[Hans Reichenbach]], along with other members of the [[Vienna Circle]], held that the truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and that tautologies, together with verifiable empirical claims, constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was, strictly speaking nonsense (including, for example, the claims of ethics, aesthetics and theology). [[Karl Popper]]'s insistence upon the role of falsification in the philosophy of science was a reaction to the logical positivists.<ref>{{cite book|author=Popper, Karl R.|title=''The Logic of Scientific Discovery''|publisher=Routledge|date=2002}} ISBN 0-415-27844-9 </ref> With the rise of [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[National Socialism]] in Germany and Austria, many members of the Vienna and Berlin Circles were forced to flee [[Germany]], on account of their leftist sympathies. Most commonly, they fled to Britain and America, which helped to reinforce the dominance of logical positivism and analytic philosophy in the Anglophone world.<ref>Prominent amongst these were [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]]. [[Karl Popper]] might also be included, since despite his rejection of the label his method bears many of the hallmarks of the analytic tradition. </ref>
Logical positivists typically saw philosophy as having a very narrow role. For them, philosophy concerned the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own. The positivists typically adopted some type of [[verification principle|verificationism]], according to which every meaningful [[Analytic proposition|non-analytic]] statement is capable of being verified in terms of more basic statements about experiences or observables. This led the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy, especially those of [[metaphysics]] or [[ontology]], as meaningless.
====Ordinary Language Analysis====
{{main|Ordinary language philosophy}}
After [[World War II|war]] in the late 40s and 50s, analytic philosophy took a turn toward [[ordinary language philosophy|ordinary-language analysis]]. This movement followed in the wake of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which totally departed from his earlier work. In contrast to earlier analytic philosophers (including early Wittgenstein) who thought philosophers should avoid the deceptive trappings of natural language by constructing ideal languages, ordinary language philosophers held that ordinary language already reflected a large number of subtle distinctions that had gone unrecognized in the formulation of traditional philosophical theories or problems. While schools such as logical positivism focus on logical terms, supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors (such as culture, language, historical conditions), ordinary language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. It may be argued, then, that ordinary language philosophy is of a more sociological grounding, as it essentially focuses on the use of language within social contexts. The most prominent ordinary language philosophers in the 1950s were [[J. L. Austin|Austin]] and [[Gilbert Ryle|Ryle]]. In some ways, this movement also marked a return to common sense philosophy, which had long been emphasized by [[G.E. Moore]].
Ordinary language philosophy was often used to disperse philosophical problems, by exposing them as results of fundamental misunderstandings regarding the ordinary usage of the pertinent linguistic terms. Indeed, this is apparent in Ryle (who attempted to dispose of "[[Ghost in the machine|Descartes' myth]]"), as well as Wittgenstein, among others.
====1960 and Beyond====
In the 1950s and 1960s, analytic philosophy as it had existed came under heavy attack. In the early 1950s, logical positivism was critically challenged by [[Wittgenstein]] in ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'', [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]] in ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]'', and Sellars in ''[[Wilfrid Sellars|Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind]]''. By 1960, these critiques had been widely read and were generally received favorably.
Following 1960, both logical positivism and natural language philosophy fell rapidly out of fashion. Many philosophers in Britain and America (although not all) began to move away from the distinctive ''linguistic'' analysis that had characterized analytic philosophy until this point. Far more than it had in the previous half-century, Anglophone philosophy began to incorporate wide range of interests, views, and methods, and has perhaps entered an age of eclecticism or pluralism, in which philosophers tend to specialize in very narrow and detached subfields.
Whether philosophy in general in this period should still be called "analytic" is a question of some dispute. [[Peter Hacker]]<ref>Hacker, P. M. S. (1996) Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy . Oxford : Blackwell, .</ref>, for one, contends that much contemporary philosophy that calls itself analytic does not deserve the title. As he argues, philosophy’s center of gravity shifted from Britain to the US in the mid 70s (mostly for economic reasons), where, under the influence of the growing prestige of certain exciting scientific and technological developments, like computers, [[neurophysiology]] and [[Chomskyan]] linguistics, Wittgenstein’s arguments against his original [[Tractatus]] position were disregarded in the face of a somewhat vulgarised revival of that very position. This now calls itself analytic philosophy, though writers such as Hacker dispute its right to that title. “What from Wittgenstein’s perspective were diseases of the intellect, to many of which he had succumbed as a young man and which he had laboured long to extirpate, broke out afresh in mutated virulent forms’.<ref>Hacker p272</ref>
However, in general, most philosophers in Britain and America (who do not specialize in [[continental philosophy]]) still consider themselves to be "analytic philosophers." <ref>See, e.g., [http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp], where [[Brian Leiter]] notes: "''All'' the Ivy League universities, ''all'' the leading state research universities, ''all'' the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that ''overwhelmingly'' self-identify as "analytic": it is hard to imagine a "movement" that is more academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy." See also [[John Searle]]'s judgment (in Bunnin & Tsui-James (eds.), ''The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy'' (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1): "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers."</ref> Largely, they have done so by expanding the notion of "analytic philosophy" from the specific programs that dominated Anglophone philosophy before 1960 to a much more general notion of an "analytic" style, characterized by precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic. Often the analytic style is thought to be opposed to "imprecise or cavalier discussions of broad topics."<ref>http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/analytic.htm</ref> The state of so-called "analytic philosophy" after 1960 will be the focus of the next section.
== Contemporary Analytic Philosophy ==
In Britain and America, most philosophers who do not specialize in [[continental philosophy]] still call themselves "analytic philosophers,"<ref>See, e.g., [http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp], where [[Brian Leiter]] notes: "''All'' the Ivy League universities, ''all'' the leading state research universities, ''all'' the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that ''overwhelmingly'' self-identify as "analytic": it is hard to imagine a "movement" that is more academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy." See also [[John Searle]]'s judgment (in Bunnin & Tsui-James (eds.), ''The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy'' (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1): "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers."</ref> in spite of the many differences from the work that defined analytic philosophy before 1960 (see the previous section). In the way these philosophers are using the term, "analytic philosophy" is not unified by any particular interests, premises, or methods (in all three areas, analytic philosophers have widely divergent positions). Instead, analytic philosophy, in its contemporary state, is usually taken to be defined by a particular style <ref>See, e.g., Brian Leiter [http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp] "'Analytic' philosophy today names a style of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views. Analytic philosophers, crudely speaking, aim for argumentative clarity and precision; draw freely on the tools of logic; and often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities."</ref> characterized by precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic, and resistance to "imprecise or cavalier discussions of broad topics."<ref>http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/analytic.htm</ref>
Given this scope, it is difficult to identify non-trivial philosophical claims that would be common to all analytic philosophy. The term "analytic philosophy" may mark merely a [[family resemblance]] across disparate philosophical views, or historical lines of influence.<ref>See, e.g., Avrum Stroll, ''Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy'' (Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 5: "[I]t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems." Also, see ibid., p. 7: "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. [...] [W]e are dealing with a family resemblance concept."</ref><ref>See [[Hans-Johann Glock]], ''What Is Analytic Philosophy'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 205: "The answer to the title question, then, is that analytic philosophy is a tradition held together ''both'' by ties of mutual influence ''and'' by family resemblances."</ref> Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophy is defined by its emphasis on clarity and argument, often achieved via modern [[formal logic]] and analysis of [[language]], and a respect for the [[natural sciences]].<ref>H. Glock, "Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?", ''Metaphilosophy'', 35:4 (2004), pp. 419-444.</ref><ref>[[Colin McGinn]], ''The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey through Twentieth-Century Philosophy'' (HarperCollins, 2002), p. xi. : "analytical philosophy [is] too narrow a label, since [it] is not generally a matter of taking a word or concept and analyzing it (whatever exactly that might be). [...] This tradition emphasizes clarity, rigor, argument, theory, truth. It is not a tradition that aims primarily for inspiration or consolation or ideology. Nor is it particularly concerned with 'philosophy of life,' though parts of it are. This kind of philosophy is more like science than religion, more like mathematics than poetry -- though it is neither science nor mathematics."</ref><ref>[[A.C. Grayling]], ''Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject'' (Oxford UP, 1998), p. 5: "Analytic philosophy is not so much a school of thought as a style or method. It is a style of philosophizing which seeks to be rigorous and careful, which at times makes use of ideas and techniques from logic, and which is aware of what is happening in science. It is, in particular, alert to linguistic considerations, not because of an interest in language for its own sake, but because it is through language that we grasp the concepts we use, and it is by means of language that we express our beliefs and assumptions. One of the principal methods of analytic philosophy is analysis of the concepts we employ in thinking about ourselves and the world."</ref>
A few of the most important and active fields and subfields in analytic philosophy are summarized in the following sections.
=== Philosophy of mind and cognitive science ===
{{main|Philosophy of mind}}
Motivated by the logical positivists' interest in verificationism, [[behaviorism]] was the most prominent theory of mind in analytic philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century. Behaviorists tended to hold either that statements about the mind were equivalent to statements about behavior and dispositions to behave in particular ways or that mental states were equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave. Behaviorism later became far less popular, in favor of [[identity theory|type physicalism]] or [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]], theories which identified mental states with brain states. During this period, topics in the philosophy of mind were often in close contact with issues in [[cognitive science]] such as [[modularity of mind|modularity]] or [[Psychological nativism|innateness]]. Finally, analytic philosophy has featured many philosophers who were [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualists]], and recently forms of property dualism have had a resurgence, with [[David Chalmers]] as perhaps the most prominent representative.<ref>{{sep entry|dualism|Dualism}}</ref>
=== Ethics in analytic philosophy ===
As a side-effect of the focus on logic and language in the early years of analytic philosophy, the tradition initially had little to say on the subject of ethics. The attitude was widespread among early analytics that these subjects were unsystematic, and merely expressed personal attitudes about which philosophy could have little or nothing to say. Wittgenstein, in the ''Tractatus'', remarks that values cannot be a part of the world, and if they are anything at all they must be beyond or outside the world somehow, and that hence language, which describes the world, can say nothing about them. One interpretation of these remarks found expression in the doctrine of the [[logical positivist]]s that statements about [[Value (ethics)|value]] — including all ethical and aesthetic judgments — are, like metaphysical claims, literally meaningless and therefore [[Cognitivism (ethics)|non-cognitive]]; that is, not able to be either true ''or'' false. Social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and various more specialized subjects like [[philosophy of history]] thus moved to the fringes of English-language philosophy for some time.
By the 1950s debates had begun to arise over whether — and if so, how — ethical statements really were non-cognitive. [[Charles Stevenson]] argued for [[expressivism]], [[R. M. Hare]] advocated a view called [[universal prescriptivism]]. [[Phillipa Foot]] contributed several essays attacking all these positions, and the collapse of logical positivism as a cohesive research programme led to a renewed interest in ethics. Perhaps most influential in this area was [[Elizabeth Anscombe]], whose landmark monograph "Intention" was called by [[Donald Davidson]] "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle", and is widely regarded as a masterpiece of moral psychology. A favorite student and close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, her 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" introduced the term "consequentialism" into the philosophical lexicon, declared the "is-ought" impasse to be a dead end, and led to a revival in virtue ethics.
=== Analytic philosophy of religion ===
As with the study of ethics, early analytic philosophy avoided the study of [[philosophy of religion]], dismissing the subject as part of metaphysics and meaningless. The collapse of logical positivism renewed interest in philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers such as [[William Alston]], [[J. L. Mackie|John Mackie]], [[Alvin Plantinga]], [[Robert Merrihew Adams]], [[Richard Swinburne]], [[David Alan Johnson]] and [[Antony Flew]] to not only introduce new problems, but to re-open classical ones, such as the nature of [[miracle]]s and the arguments for and against the [[existence of God]].<ref>Peterson, Michael et al. (2003). ''Reason and Religious Belief''</ref>
Plantinga, Mackie and Flew debated the logical validity of the ''free will defense'' as a way to solve the [[problem of evil]].<ref>Mackie, John L. (1982). ''The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God''</ref> Alston, grappling with the consequences of analytic [[philosophy of language]], worked on the nature of religious language. Adams worked on the relationship of faith and morality.<ref>Adams, Robert M. (1987). ''The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology''</ref>
Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] and his interpretation of [[Søren Kierkegaard]]'s philosophy of religion.<ref>Creegan, Charles. (1989). ''Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method''</ref> Using first-hand remarks (which would later be published in ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'', ''Culture and Value'', and other works), philosophers such as [[Peter Winch]] and [[Norman Malcolm]] developed a [[Fideism|fideist]] interpretation of Wittgenstein.<ref>{{sep entry|fideism|Fideism}}</ref> Responding to this interpretation, [[Kai Nielsen]] and [[D.Z. Phillips]] became two of the most prominent philosophers on Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.<ref>Nielsen, Kai and D.Z. Phillips. (2005). ''Wittgensteinian Fideism?''</ref>
=== Political philosophy ===
Current analytic political philosophy owes much to [[John Rawls]], who, in a series of papers from the 1950s onward (most notably "Two Concepts of Rules" and "Justice as Fairness") and his 1971 book ''[[A Theory of Justice]]'', produced a sophisticated and closely argued defence of a [[Liberalism|liberal]] [[welfare state]]. This was followed in short order by Rawls's colleague [[Robert Nozick]]'s book ''[[Anarchy, State, and Utopia]]'', a defence of [[free-market]] [[libertarianism]]. [[Isiah Berlin]] has had a notable influence on analytic political philosophy with his lecture entitled : [[Two Concepts of Liberty]].
====Analytical Marxism====
Another interesting development in the area of political philosophy has been the emergence of a school known as [[Analytical Marxism]]. Members of this school seek to apply the techniques of analytic philosophy, along with tools of modern social science such as [[rational choice theory]] to the elucidation of the theories of [[Karl Marx]] and his successors. The best known member of this school, is Oxford University philosopher [[G.A. Cohen]], whose 1978 work, ''[[Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence]]'' is generally taken as representing the genesis of this school. In that book, Cohen attempted to apply the tools of logical and linguistic analysis to the elucidation and defense of Marx's materialist conception of history. Other prominent Analytical Marxists include the economist [[John Roemer]], the social scientist [[Jon Elster]], and the sociologist [[Erik Olin Wright]]. All these people have attempted to build upon Cohen's work by bringing to bear modern social science methods, such as rational choice theory, to supplement Cohen's use of analytic philosophical techniques in the interpretation of Marxian theory.
Cohen himself would later engage directly with Rawlsian political philosophy in attempt to advance a [[socialist]] theory of justice that stands in contrast to both traditional Marxism and the theories advanced by Rawls and Nozick. In particular, he points to Marx's principle of [[from each according to his ability, to each according to his need]].
==== Communitarianism ====
[[Communitarian]]s such as [[Alasdair MacIntyre]], [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]], [[Michael Walzer]] and [[Michael Sandel]] advance a critique of Liberalism that uses analytic techniques to isolate the key assumptions of Liberal individualists, such as Rawls, and then challenges these assumptions. In particular, Communitarians challenge the Liberal assumption that the individual can be viewed as fully autonomous from the community in which he lives and is brought up. Instead, they push for a conception of the individual that emphasizes the role that the community plays in shaping his or her values, thought processes and opinions.
===Analytic Metaphysics===
One striking break with early analytic philosophy was the revival of metaphysical theorizing in the second half of the twentieth century. Philosophers such as [[David Lewis]] and [[David Armstrong]] developed elaborate theories on a range of topics such as universals, causation, possibility and necessity, and abstract objects.
Among the developments that led to the revival of metaphysical theorizing were [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine's]] attack on the [[analytic proposition|analytic-synthetic distinction]], which was generally taken to undermine [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap's]] distinction between existence questions internal to a framework and those external to it.<ref>S. Yablo and A. Gallois, ''Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?'', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 72, (1998), pp. 229-261+263-283 [http://www.mit.edu/%7Eyablo/om.pdf first part]</ref>
==Further reading==
*The [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/ London Philosophy Study Guide] offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/FRW.htm Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein]
==External links==
*[http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/analytic.htm ''Analytic Philosophy''; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html ''Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy''; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
*[http://www.dif.unige.it/esap/ European Society for Analytic Philosophy]
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
== References ==
*Aristotle, ''Metaphysics''
*Geach, P., ''Mental Acts'', London 1957
*Kenny, A.J.P., ''Wittgenstein'', London 1973.
*{{iep|/a/analytic.htm|Analytic philosophy|Aaron Preston}}
*Wittgenstein, ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''
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[[pt:Filosofia analítica]]
[[ro:Filosofie analitică]]
[[ru:Аналитическая философия]]
[[sk:Analytická filozofia]]
[[sr:Аналитичка филозофија]]
[[sh:Analitička filozofija]]
[[fi:Analyyttinen filosofia]]
[[sv:Analytisk filosofi]]
[[tr:Analitik felsefe]]
[[uk:Аналітична філософія]]
[[zh:分析哲學]]