Ethical naturalism
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'''Ethical naturalism''', sometimes also called '''moral naturalism''' or '''naturalistic cognitivistic definism''',<ref>Garner and Rosen, p. 228.</ref> is a theory in [[meta-ethics]] which states that:
# [[Ethics|Ethical]] sentences express [[proposition]]s (see [[Cognitivism (ethics)|Cognitivism]]),
# The meanings of ethical sentences can be expressed without the use of ethical terms (e.g., "good" and "right"), and
# These non-ethical terms refer to natural properties.
The first part stands in opposition to [[noncognitivism]], the second to non-definism, and the third to non-naturalistic definitions of "good" and "right", most commonly those which relate the ethical terms to the will of God as in [[divine command theory]].
Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by [[ethical non-naturalist]] [[G. E. Moore]], who formulated the [[Open Question Argument]]. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They also say that a good definition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed."<ref>Garner and Rosen, p. 239.</ref>
It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, [[Cornell realism|Cornell Realism]], from the position that 'what is, is right'. This later view is often criticized by proponents of [[Sociobiology]], as part of a defense of the [[Fact-value distinction]]. However, a sophisticated ethical naturalist does not believe, in any straightforward sense, such a slogan. Moreover, ethical naturalism rejects the fact/value distinction: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge.
==Theory of value==
The [[value theory|theory of value]] — an important branch of [[ethics]] — contains a number of theories of what "good" means or, construed differently, what sorts of things are good. One could look at the theory of value as a way of determining how to reduce goodness to non-ethical properties, for there are many examples of such reductions in value theory. [[Hedonism]], for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just [[pleasure]]. It should be noted, however, that not all philosophers working on value theory would view their theories as "reductions".
== Ethical theories which can be naturalistic ==
*[[Altruism (ethics)|Altruism]]
*[[Cornell realism]]
*[[Ethical egoism]]
*[[Libertarianism|Natural law libertarianism]]
*[[Objectivist ethics|Objectivism]]
*[[Secular ethics#Humanist ethics|Humanistic ethics]]
*[[Utilitarianism]]
==Notes==
<references />
==References==
* {{cite book |last=Garner |first=Richard T. |coauthors=Bernard Rosen |title=Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics |year=1967 |publisher=[[Macmillan Publishers|Macmillan]] |location=New York |id=LOC card number 67-18887}}
== External links ==
*[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/ "Moral Naturalism"], by James Lenman, first published Thu [[June 1]], [[2006]]; substantive revision Mon [[August 7]], [[2006]]
*[http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/naturalism.html Philosophy 302: Naturalistic Ethics]
[[Category:Meta-ethics]]
[[el:Ηθικός νατουραλισμός]]
[[fi:Eettinen naturalismi]]