Fact 58617 222621457 2008-06-30T08:50:55Z 125.60.243.87 {{selfref|For the Wikipedia Template, see [[Template:Fact]].}} {{For|the trade organisation|Federation Against Copyright Theft}} {{Wiktionary|fact}} Generally, a '''fact''' is defined as something that is true, something that actually exists, or something that can be verified according to an established standard of evaluation.<ref>Chamber's Dictionary, ninth edition.</ref><ref>[http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/fact?view=uk Concise OED definition]</ref> There is a range of other uses, depending on the context. For example, fact may be [[argument|argued]] under [[authority]] of a [[particular|specific]] [[pedagogy]], such as ''scientific facts'' or ''historical facts''. [[Rhetorical]] assertion of fact is often forwarded without an implied or express basis of authority. == Etymology and usage == The word ''fact'' derives from the [[Latin]] ''Factum'', and was first used in English with the same meaning: "a thing done or performed", a use that is now obsolete.<ref>"Fact". OED_2d_Ed_1989, (but note the conventional uses: ''after the fact'' and ''before the fact'').</ref> The common usage of, "something that has really occurred or is the case", dates from the middle of the sixteenth century.<ref>"Fact" (1a). OED_2d_Ed_1989 Joye ''Exp. Dan.'' xi. Z vij b, ''Let emprours and kinges know this godly kynges fact. 1545''</ref> Fact is also synonymous with ''truth'' or ''reality'', as distinguishable from conclusions or opinions. This use is found for instance in the phrase ''Matter of fact'',<ref>"Fact" (4a) OED_2d_Ed_1989</ref> and in "...&nbsp;not history, nor fact, but imagination." Fact also indicates a ''matter under discussion'' deemed to be true or correct, such as to emphasize a point or prove a disputed issue; (e.g., "...&nbsp;the ''fact'' of the matter is ...").<ref>"Fact" (6c). OED_2d_Ed_1989</ref><ref>(See also "Matter" (2,6). Compact_OED)</ref> Alternatively, "fact" may also indicate an ''allegation or stipulation'' of something that may or may not be a "true fact",<ref>"Fact" (5). OED_2d_Ed_1989</ref> (e.g., "the author's facts are not trustworthy"). This alternate usage, although contested by some, has a long history in standard English.<ref>According to the ''American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language'', "Fact has a long history of usage in the sense 'allegation'" AHD_4th_Ed. The OED dates this use to 1729.</ref> Fact may also indicate findings derived through a ''process of evaluation'', including review of testimony, direct observation, or otherwise; as distinguishable from matters of inference or speculation.<ref>"Fact" (6a). OED_2d_Ed_1989</ref> This use is reflected in the terms "fact-find" and "fact-finder" (e.g., "set up a fact-finding commission").<ref>"Fact" (8). OED_2d_Ed_1989</ref> ==Fact in philosophy== In [[philosophy]], the concept ''fact'' is considered in [[epistemology]] and [[ontology]]. Questions of [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] and [[truth]] are closely associated with questions of fact. A "fact" can be defined as something which is the case, that is, the [[state of affairs]] reported by a [[truth|true]] [[proposition]].<ref>"A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true". -- ''Fact'' in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy</ref><ref>"A fact, it might be said, is a state of affairs that is the case or obtains" -- [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. ''States of Affairs'']</ref> Facts may be understood as that which makes a true sentence true. For example, the statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is ''made true by'' the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system. Facts may also be understood as those things to which a true sentence refers. The statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is ''about'' the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system.<ref> Alex Oliver, ''Fact'', in {{cite book | title = Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy | first = Edward | last = Craig | publisher = Routledge, Oxford | year = 2005 | id = ISBN 0415324955 }} </ref> ===Correspondence and the slingshot argument=== Some versions of the [[correspondence theory of truth]] hold that what makes a sentence true is that it ''corresponds'' to a fact.<ref> {{cite book | title = Truth | first = Pascal | last = Engel | publisher = McGill-Queen's Press- MQUP | year = 2002 | id = ISBN 0773524622 }}</ref> This theory presupposes the existence of an [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] world. The [[Slingshot argument]] claims to show that all true statements stand for the same thing - the truth value ''true''. If this argument holds, and facts are taken to be what true statements stand for, then we reach the counter-intuitive conclusion that there is only one fact - "the truth".<ref> The argument is presented in many places, but see for example [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Davidson]], ''Truth and Meaning'', in {{cite book | title = Truth and Interpretation | first = Donald | last = Davidson | publisher = Clarendon Press, Oxford | year = 1984 | id = ISBN 019824617x }}</ref> ===Compound facts=== Any non-trivial true statement about reality is necessarily an [[abstraction]] composed of a complex of [[object (philosophy)|objects]] and [[property (philosophy)|properties]] or [[logic of relatives|relations]].<ref>"Facts possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations" Oxford Companion to Philosophy</ref> For example, the fact described by the true statement "[[Paris]] is the [[capital city]] of [[France]]" implies that there is such a place as Paris, that there is such a place as France, that there are such things as capital cities, as well as that France has a government, that the government of France has the power to define its capital city, and that the French government has chosen Paris to be the capital, that there is such a thing as a "place" or a "government", etc.. The verifiable accuracy of all of these assertions, if facts themselves, may coincide to create the fact that Paris is the capital of France. Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to identify the constituent parts of [[negation|negative]], [[modal logic|modal]], [[disjunction|disjunctive]], or [[morality|moral]] facts.<ref>"Fact", in ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy'', Ted Honderich, editor. (Oxford, 1995) ISBN 0-19-866132-0</ref> ===The fact-value distinction=== {{main|fact-value distinction}} [[Ethics|Moral philosophers]] since [[David Hume#the is-ought problem|David Hume]] have debated whether values are [[Moral objectivism|objective]], and thus factual. In ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' Hume pointed out that there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ''ought'' to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what ''is'' the case. Those who insist that there is a logical gulf between [[Fact-value distinction|facts and values]], such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include [[G. E. Moore]], who called attempting to do so the [[Naturalistic fallacy]]. ===The factual-counterfactual distinction=== {{main|counterfactual conditional}} Factuality &mdash; what has occurred &mdash; can also be contrasted with counterfactuality &mdash; what ''might have'' occurred, but did not. A [[counterfactual conditional]] or [[subjunctive mood|subjunctive]] conditional is a [[conditional sentence|conditional (or "if-then") statement]] indicating what ''would be'' the case if events had been other than they actually are. For example, "If Alexander had lived, his empire would have been greater than Rome". This is to be contrasted with an [[indicative conditional]], which indicates what ''is'' (in fact) the case if its antecedent ''is'' (in fact) true &mdash; for example, "if you drink this, it will make you well". Such sentences are important to [[Modal logic]], especially since the development of [[Possible world]] semantics. ==Fact in science== {{see|scientific method|philosophy of science}} Just as in philosophy, the [[Science|scientific]] concept of fact is central to fundamental questions regarding the nature, methods, scope and validity of [[Philosophy of science|scientific reasoning]]. In the most basic sense, a scientific ''fact'' is an [[Objectivity (science)|objective]] and [[verifiable]] [[observation]]; in contrast with a ''[[hypothesis]]'' or ''[[theory]]'', which is intended to explain or interpret facts.<ref name="Gower000">{{cite book | title = Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction | first = Barry | last = Gower | publisher = Routledge | year = 1997 | id = ISBN 0415122821 }}</ref> Various scholars have offered significant refinements to this basic formulation, some of which are detailed below. Also, rigorous scientific use of the term "fact" is careful to distinguish: 1) ''states of affairs'' in the external world; from 2) ''assertions'' of fact that may be considered relevant in scientific analysis. The term is used in both senses in the philosophy of science.<ref name="Ravetz000">{{cite book | title = Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems | first = Jerome Raymond | last = Ravetz | publisher = Transaction Publishers | year = 1996 | id = ISBN 1560008512 }}</ref> === Scholarly inquiry regarding scientific fact === Scholars and clinical researchers in both the [[social science|social]] and [[natural sciences]] have forwarded numerous questions and theories in clarifying the fundamental nature of scientific fact.<ref>(Gower 1996)</ref> Some pertinent issues raised by this inquiry include: * the process by which "established fact" becomes recognized and accepted as such;<ref>(see e.g., Ravetz, p. 182 fn. 1)</ref> * whether and to what extent "fact" and "theoretic explanation" can be considered truly independent and separable from one another;<ref>Ravetz, p. 185</ref><ref>Gower, p. 138</ref> * to what extent are "facts" influenced by the mere act of observation;<ref>Gower, p. 138</ref> and * to what extent are factual conclusions influenced by [[Path dependence|history]] and [[Consensus theory of truth|consensus]], rather than a strictly systematic methodology.<ref>Gower, p. 7</ref> Consistent with the theory of [[confirmation holism]], some scholars assert "fact" to be necessarily "theory-laden" to some degree. [[Thomas Kuhn]] and others pointed out that knowing what facts to measure, and how to measure them, requires the use of some other theory (e.g., age of [[fossils]] is based on [[radiocarbon dating]] which is justified by reasoning that radioactive decay follows a [[Poisson process]] rather than a [[Bernoulli process]]). Similarly, [[Percy Williams Bridgman]] is credited with the methodological position known as [[Operationalization|operationalism]], which asserts that all observations are not only influenced, but necessarily ''defined'' by the means and assumptions used to measure them. === Fact and the scientific method === Apart from the fundamental inquiry in to the nature of scientific fact, there remain the practical and social considerations of how fact is investigated, established, and substantiated through the proper application of the scientific method.<ref>Ravetz p. 181 et. seq. (Chapter Six: "Facts and their evolution")</ref> Scientific facts are generally believed to be independent from the observer in that no matter which scientist observes a phenomenon, all will reach the same necessary conclusion.<ref name="The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine">Cassell, Eric J. [http://books.google.com/books?id=K1kjFYrliTMC&pg=PA181&ots=3V6-UmUFmP&dq=%22scientific+fact&sig=YtQTgNbisFSQ1QfV-JNkmW7D0n4#PPA181,M1 The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine] ''[[Oxford University Press]]''. Retrieved [[16 May]] [[2007]].</ref> In addition to these considerations, there are the social and institutional measures, such as [[peer review]] and [[accreditation]], that are intended to promote ''factual accuracy'' (among other interests) in scientific study.<ref>(Ravetz 1996)</ref> Fact does not always mean the same thing as truth. Fact is a generally agreed-upon and seemingly obvious observation. It is a fact that things stick to the earth, without regard to why that happens. It was once a fact that the planets changed direction from time to time, and that the sun, planets and stars circled the earth once daily. This seemed obvious, and was generally agreed to be the case. In time, the fact was changed, and it was then said that the earth circles the sun, and the planets only appear to change direction as they are passed by the earth in their orbits, or vice versa. Misunderstanding of this difference sometimes leads to fallacy in rhetoric, in which persons will say that they have fact, while others have only theory. Such statements indicate confusion as to the meanings of both words, suggesting they believe that fact means "truth," and theory means "speculation." == Fact in History == {{see|Historiography}} A common rhetorical [[cliche]] states, ''"History is written by the winners."'' This phrase suggests but does not examine the use of facts in the writing of history. [[E. H. Carr]] in his 1961 volume, ''What is History?'', argues that the inherent biases from the gathering of facts makes the [[objective]] truth of any historical [[perspective]] [[idealistic]] and impossible. Facts are, "like fish in the Ocean," that we may only happen to catch a few, only an indication of what is below the surface. Even a dragnet cannot tell us for certain what it would be like to live below the Ocean's surface. Even if we do not discard any facts (or fish) presented, we will always miss the majority; the site of our fishing, the methods undertaken, the weather and even luck play a vital role in what we will catch. Additionally, the composition of history is inevitably made up by the compilation of many different bias of fact finding - all compounded over time. He concludes that for a historian to attempt a more objective method, one must accept that history can only aspire to a conversation of the present with the past - and, that one's methods of fact gathering should be openly examined. As with science, historical truth and facts will therefore change over time and reflect only the present consensus (if that). Others have argued{{Fact|date=March 2008}} that an approach to facts such as Carr's is [[relativism]] and they lament the loss of a [[transcendent]] or fixed moral framework. However, his views together with the popular rise of historiographical narratives and [[meta]]-narratives may comprise a consensual view{{Fact|date=March 2008}}. ==Fact in law== {{see|Evidence (law)|Trier of fact}} In most [[common law]] jurisdictions,<ref>Ed. note: this section of the article emphasizes common law jurisprudence (as primarily represented in Anglo-American based [[Law|legal tradition]]). Nevertheless, the principles described herein have analogous treatment in other legal systems (such as [[Civil law (legal system)|civil law]] systems) as well.</ref> the general concept and analysis of fact reflects fundamental principles of [[Jurisprudence]], and is supported by several well-established standards.<ref name="Estrich000">{{cite book | title = American Jurisprudence: A Comprehensive Text Statement of American Case Law | first = Willis Albert | last = Estrich | publisher = Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company | year = 1952 | id = }}</ref><ref name="Elkouri000">{{cite book | title = How Arbitration Works | first = Frank | last = Elkouri | publisher = BNA Books | year = 2003 | id = ISBN 157018335X }}p. 305</ref> Matters of fact have various formal definitions under common law jurisdictions. These include: * an element required in legal [[pleading]]s to demonstrate a [[cause of action]];<ref name="Bishin000">{{cite book | title = Law Language and Ethics: An Introduction to Law and Legal Method | first = William R. | last = Bishin | publisher = Foundation Press | year = 1972 | id = Original from the University of Michigan Digitized [[March 24]], [[2006]] }}p. 277</ref><ref name="Yale001">{{cite book | title = The Yale Law Journal: Volume 7 | publisher = Yale Law Journal Co | year = 1898 }}</ref> * the [[Question of fact|determinations]] of the [[finder of fact]] after evaluating admissible evidence produced in a trial or hearing;<ref>''Per'' Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, ''Clarke v. Edinburgh and District Tramways Co''., 1919 S.C.(H.L.) 35, at p 36.</ref> * a potential ground of [[reversible error]] forwarded on [[appeal]] in an [[Court of Appeals|appellate court]];<ref name="Houston000">{{cite book | title = The American and English Encyclopedia of Law | first = John Houston | last = Merrill | publisher = E. Thompson | year = 1895 | id = Original from Harvard University Digitized [[April 26]], [[2007]] }}</ref> and * any of [[Corpus delicti|various matters subject to investigation]] by official authority to establish whether a [[crime]] has been perpetrated, and to establish culpability.<ref name="Bennett000">{{cite book | title = Criminal Investigation | first = Wayne W. | last = Bennett | publisher = Thomson Wadsworth | year = 2003 | id = ISBN 0534615244 }}</ref> === Legal pleadings === A party to a [[civil suit]] generally must clearly state all relevant allegations of fact upon which a claim is based. The requisite level of precision and particularity of these allegations varies depending on the rules of [[civil procedure]] as well as the jurisdiction. Parties who face uncertainties regarding the facts and circumstances attendant to their side in a dispute may sometimes invoke [[alternative pleading]].<ref>Roy W. McDonald, ''Alternative Pleading in the United States: I'' Columbia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Apr., 1952), pp. 443-478</ref> In this situation, a party may plead separate facts that (when considered together) may be contradictory or mutually exclusive. This (seemingly) logically-inconsistent presentation of facts may be necessary as a safeguard against contingencies (such as [[res judicata]]) that would otherwise preclude presenting a claim or defense that depends on a particular interpretation of the underlying facts.<ref>(McDonald 1952)</ref> ==See also== * [[De facto]] * [[Reality]] * [[State of affairs]] * [[Truth]] * [[Counterfactual history]] * [[Belief]] ==Notes and references== {{reflist|2}} ==External links== * [http://www.FoolQuest.com/metaphysics_for_dummies.htm Metaphysics for dummies] [[Category:Philosophical concepts]] [[Category:Reality]] [[Category:Epistemology]] [[Category:Units of information (cognitive processes)]] [[bg:Факт]] [[cs:Fakt]] [[da:Kendsgerning (videnskab)]] [[de:Faktum]] [[et:Fakt]] [[es:Faktum]] [[eo:Fakto]] [[ko:사실]] [[id:Fakta]] [[is:Staðreynd]] [[it:Fatto]] [[he:עובדה]] [[lt:Faktas]] [[hu:Tény]] [[mk:Факт]] [[nl:Feit]] [[ja:事実]] [[no:Faktum]] [[pl:Fakt]] [[ru:Факт]] [[scn:Fattu]] [[simple:Fact]] [[sk:Fakt]] [[fi:Tosiasia]] [[sv:Faktum]] [[yi:פאקט]]