Family resemblance
3362896
217268228
2008-06-05T09:01:54Z
Richard001
692238
Should have indent too
:''This article is about the philosophical term proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, not about the common observation that offspring resemble parents and one another.''
'''Family resemblance''' (German '''Familienähnlichkeit''' <ref>. In translations of Wittgenstein's works, his term, ''Familienähnlichkeit'' is variously translated as both "family resemblance" and "family likeness" with, often, both versions appearing in the same English translation.</ref>) is a philosophical idea proposed by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], with the most well known exposition being given in the posthumously published book ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' (1953) <ref>{{cite book
| last = Wittgenstein
| first = Ludwig
| authorlink = Ludwig Wittgenstein
| coauthors =
| title = Philosophical Investigations
| publisher = Blackwell Publishing
| date = 1953/2001
| location =
| url =
| doi =
| id = ISBN 0-631-23127-7}}
</ref>. The idea itself takes its name from Wittgenstein's metaphorical description of a type of relationship he argued was exhibited by language.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#Lan |title= Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein |accessdate=2008-05-26}}</ref> Wittgenstein's point was that things which may be thought to be connected by one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all. Games, which Wittgenstein used to explain the notion, have become the paradigmatic example of a group that is related by family resemblances.
Family resemblance features widely in Wittgenstein's later work, and the notion itself is introduced in the ''Investigations'' in response to questions about the general form of propositions and the essence of language - questions which were central to Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical career. This suggests that family resemblance was of prime importance for Wittgenstein's later philosophy, however, like many of his ideas, it is hard to find precise agreement within the secondary literature on either its place within Wittgenstein's later thought or on its wider philosophical significance.
Since the publication of the ''Investigations'' the notion of family resemblance has been discussed extensively not only in the philosophical literature, but also, for example, in works dealing with [[classification]] where the approach is described as 'polythetic', distinguishing it from the traditional approach known now as 'monothetic'. [[Prototype theory]] is a recent development in [[cognitive science]] where this idea has also been explored.
==Philosophical Context==
The local context where the topic of family resemblances appears is
Wittgenstein's critique of language. In ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' §65-71 the plurality of language uses is compared to the plurality of games. Next it is asserted that games have common features but none is found in all of them. The whole argument has become famous under the heading 'language games'.
The larger context in which Wittgenstein's philosophy is seen to develop considers his uncompromising opposition to essences, mental entities
and other forms of idealism which were accepted as a matter of fact in
continental philosophy at the turn of the preceding century. In his
view the main cause for such errors is language and its uncritical use.
In the received view concepts, categories or classes are taken to rely
on necessary features common to all items covered by them. [[Abstraction]] is the procedure which acknowledges this necessity and
derives [[essence]]s but in the absence of a single common feature it
is bound to fail.
==Examples and quotes==
Games are the main example considered by Wittgenstein in his text where
he also mentions numbers and makes an analogy with a thread. He develops
his argument further by insisting that in such cases there is not a
clear cut boundary but there arises some ambiguity if this indefinitness can be separated from the main point.
In §66 Wittgenstein invites us to {{quote|consider for example the proceedings that we call "games"...[to] look and see whether there is anything common to all.}}
The section mentions card games, board games, ball games, games like ring-a-ring-a-roses and concludes:
{{quote|And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; we can see how similarities crop up and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and cries-crossing: sometimes overall
similarities.}}
The following §67 begins by stating:
{{quote|I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than
"'''family resemblances'''"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.- And I shall say: "games" form a family.}}
and extends the illustration
{{quote|for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a direct relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.}}
The problem of boundaries begins in §68
{{quote|I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits ... that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word "game".)}}
==Formal models==
There are some simple [[model]]s <ref name="Needham">Needham R., 1975, [http://www.scribd.com/doc/65935/Rodney-Needham-Polythetic-Classification-Convergence-and-Consequence ''Polythetic classification: Convergence and consequences''], Man 10 (1975) 349</ref><ref>Andersen H.,:2000, ''Kuhn's account of family resemblance'', Erkenntnis 52: 313–337</ref>
which can be derived from the text of §66-9. The most simple one, which fits Wittgenstein's exposition, seems to be the [[sorites]] type. It consists in a collection of items ''Item_1'', ''Item_2'', ''Item_3''... described by features A, B, C, D, ...:
''Item_1'': A B C D <br>
''Item_2'': B C D E <br>
''Item_3'': C D E F <br>
''Item_4'': D E F G <br>
''Item_5'': E F G H <br>
......... . . . . <br>
In this example, which presents an indefinitely extended ordered family, resemblance is seen in shared features: each item shares three features with his neighbors e.g. ''Item_2'' is like ''Item_1'' in respects B, C, D, and like ''Item_3'' in respects C, D, E. Obviously what we call 'resemblance' involves different aspects in each particular case. It is also seen to be of a different 'degree' and here it fades with 'distance': ''Item_1'' and ''Item_5'' have nothing in common.
An other simple model is described as:
''Item_1'': A B C <br>
''Item_2'': B C D <br>
''Item_3'': A C D <br>
''Item_4'': A B D <br>
It exhibits the presence of a constant degree of resemblance and the
absence of a common feature without extending to infinity.
Wittgenstein rejects the [[disjunction]] of features or 'properties', i.e. the set {A,B,C,D,..}, as something shared by all items. He admits that a 'sharing' is common to all but deems that it is only verbal:
{{quote|if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties" - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".}}
==Notable Applications==
*[[Morris Weitz]] first applied family resemblances in an attempt to describe [[art]] <ref> Weitz M., ''The Role of Theory in Aesthetics'', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (1953): 27.</ref> which opened a still continuing debate.<ref>Rfs needed</ref>
*[[Aristotelian_Society#List_of_Past_Presidents| Renford Bambrough ]] proposed that 'Wittgenstein solved what is known as “the [[problem of universals]]”' and said of his solution (as Hume said of Berkeley’s treatment of the same topic), that it is “one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters”.<ref name="Bambrough">Bambrough, R.: 1961, ''Universals and Family Resemblance'', Proc. Aris. Soc. 61, 207–22 </ref> His view provided the occasion for numerous further comments <ref>a recent summary in Blair D. (2006), ''Wittgenstein, Language and Information'', p.118 (note 117); see also Dilman, I.: ''Universals: Bambrough on Wittgenstein'', Aris. Soc. Proc., 79 (1978): 35–58; reprinted in John V. Canfi ed., ''The Philosophy of Wittgenstein'', Vol. 5, Method and Essence, pp. 305–328. New York: Garland Publishing, 1986.)</ref>.
*[[Rodney Needham]] explored family resemblances in connection with the problem of [[alliance]] and noted their presence in taxonomy where they are known as a polythetic classification <ref name="Needham"/>
*[[Eleanor Rosch]] used family resemblances in her cognitivist studies <ref>
Rosch E. and Mervis, C. (1975) ''Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories'', Cognitive Psychology '''7''', 573-605;<br>
Rosch, E. (1987),'' Wittgenstein and categorization research in cognitive psychology'', in M. Chapman & R. Dixon (Eds.), ''Meaning and the growth of understanding. Wittgenstein's significance for developmental Psychology'', Hillsdale, NJ.: Erlbaum.</ref>
==Criticism and comments==
[[Image:US-hoosier-family.jpg|thumb|300px|right|What do all the people in a family have in common? Perhaps the answer is ''nothing''.]]
''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' are the primary text used in discussing family resemblances even though the topic appears also in
other Wittgenstein's works, notably ''The Brown Book''<ref>Wittgenstein
L., ''The Blue and Brown Books'', London: Blackwell (1958);I 68, 17, 73 </ref>.Most contributions to the discussion are by people involved in philosophical research but concern with more pragmatic questions such as [[taxonomy]]<ref>Winsor M., 2003, ''Non-essentialist methods in pre-Darwinian taxonomy'', Biology and Philosophy 18 (2003) 387–400</ref> or information processing<ref> Blair D., Wittgenstein, Language and Information, Berlin:Springer, 2006, ISBN 978-1402041129 </ref> sometimes motivates the comments.
The main focus for criticism is the notion of similarity which is
instrumental for family resemblance. A similarity is always found for
two arbitrarily selected objects or a series of intermediaries can link
them into a family. This problem has been known as underdeterminacy or
open ended texture. Admittedly infinity is only potential but for any
finite family some common element can be pointed especially if
relational properties are taken in consideration.
Wittgenstein insistence that boundaries do not really exist but can
be traced arbitrarily has been described as [[conventionalism]] and more generally the acceptance of his conception has been seen to present a refined [[nominalism]].
==Notes and References==
''Remarks in Part I of ''Investigations'' are preceded by the symbol ''"§"''. Remarks in Part II are referenced by their Roman numeral or their page number in the third edition.
<references/>
*{{cite book
| last = Wittgenstein
| first = Ludwig
| authorlink = Ludwig Wittgenstein
| coauthors =
| title = Philosophical Investigations
| publisher = Blackwell Publishing
| date = 1953/2001
| location =
| url =
| doi =
| id = ISBN 0-631-23127-7}}
*Andersen H.,:2000, ''Kuhn's account of family resemblance'', Erkenntnis 52: 313–337
*Bambrough, R.: 1961, ''Universals and Family Resemblance'', Proc. Aris. Soc. 61, 207–22
*Beardsmore, R. W.: 1992, ''The Theory of Family Resemblance'', Philosophical Investigations 15, 131–146
*Bellaimey, J. E.: 1990, ''Family Resemblances and the Problem of the Under-Determination of Extension'', Philosophical Investigations 13, 31–43.
*Griffin, N.: 1974, ''Wittgenstein, Universals and Family Resemblance'', Canadian Journal of Philosophy III, 635–651.
*Gupta, R. K.: 1970, ''Wittgenstein’s Theory of “Family Resemblance”, in his Philosophical Investigations (Secs. 65–80)'', Philosophia Naturalis 12, 282–286
*Huff D.:(1981), ''Family Resemblances and rule governed behavior'', Philosophical Investigations 4 (3) 1–23
*Prien B.: ''[http://www.sbg.ac.at/kriterion/documents/18/18prien.pdf Family Resemblances-A Thesis about the Change of Meaning over Time]'', Kriterion 18 (2004), pp. 15-24.
*Wennerberg, H.: 1967, ''The Concept of Family Resemblance in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy'', Theoria 33, 107–132.
===See also===
* [[Prototype Theory]]
* [[Polythetic term]]
===External Links===
Lois Shawver's comments on ''Philosophical Investigations'' §65-9 [http://users.rcn.com/rathbone/lw65-69c.htm]
[[Category:Philosophical terminology]]
[[Category:Philosophy of language]]
[[Category:Ludwig Wittgenstein]]
[[de:Familienähnlichkeit]]
[[ja:家族的類似]]
[[fi:Perheyhtäläisyys]]
[[sv:Familjelikhet]]