First strike
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/* Likely first strike weapons systems */ Added section explaining certain terms used in the article.
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In [[nuclear strategy]], a '''first strike''' is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force. '''First strike capability''' is a country's ability to defeat another [[nuclear power]] by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the opposing side is left unable to continue war. The preferred methodology is to attack the opponent's launch facilities and storage depots first. The strategy is called [[counterforce]].
==Overview==
During the [[Cold War]], both [[superpowers]], the [[U.S.]], and the [[U.S.S.R.]], built massive nuclear arsenals, aimed, to a large extent, at each other. However, they were never used, as after a time, leaders on both sides of the [[Iron Curtain]] realized that global thermonuclear war would not be in either power's national interest, as it would probably lead to the destruction of both nations, and possibly [[nuclear winter]] or other [[extinction level event]]s. Therefore, at times, both sides refrained from deploying systems capable of unanswerable nuclear strikes against either side. However, in both nations, there were interests that benefited from the development and maintenance of first-strike weapons systems—what [[Dwight Eisenhower]] termed the [[military-industrial complex]]; these forces encouraged the constant development of weapons systems of greater accuracy, power, and destruction. In addition, each side doubted the other side's commitment to not deploy first-strike weapons, or even in the event of their deployment, to not strike first. Some first-strike weapons were deployed; however, they were never used.
Of the nuclear powers, only the [[People's Republic of China]] and the [[Republic of India]] have declarative, unqualified, unconditional no-first-use policies. In 1982, at a special session of General Assembly of [[United Nations]], the [[USSR]] pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, regardless of whether its opponents possessed nuclear weapons or not. This pledge was later abandoned by post-Soviet [[Russia]]. The [[United States]] has a partial, qualified no-first-use policy, stating that they will not use nuclear weapons against states without nuclear weapons or other [[weapons of mass destruction]].
Large scale missile defense systems are not first-strike weapons, however, critics view them as first-strike enabling weapons. [[Ronald Reagan]]'s proposed [[Strategic Defense Initiative]], if it had ever been deployed, would have undermined one of the fundamental premises of [[mutual assured destruction]], and removed the incentive for the U.S. not to strike first. These proposed defense systems, intended to lessen the risk of devastating [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]], would lead to it, according to critics.
According to [[game theory]], the non-missile defense side, seeing that a nation was building a defense against a first strike and believing that the other could launch a first strike if it dared, would then launch a [[pre-emptive]] first strike while they still had a chance.
==Historical background==
''First-strike attack'', the use of a nuclear first strike capability, was greatly feared during the [[Cold War]] between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]]. At various points, fear of a first strike attack existed on both sides. Misunderstood changes in posture and well understood changes in technology used by either side were usually fuel on the fire of speculation regarding the enemy's intentions.
In the immediate aftermath of the [[Great Patriotic War]], the Soviet Union feared the United States would use its nuclear superiority to devastate the Socialist [[Motherland]], as from 1945-1948, the U.S. was the only state possessing nuclear weapons. The [[USSR]] countered by rapid development of their own nuclear weapons, with a test first occurring in 1949., and the U.S. was taken by surprise. In turn, the U.S. countered by developing the vastly more powerful thermonuclear weapon, testing their first hydrogen bomb in 1952 at [[Ivy Mike]], but the USSR quickly countered by testing their own thermonuclear weapons, with a test in 1953 of a semi-thermonuclear weapon of the [[Sloika]] design, and in [[1956]], with the testing of [[Sakharov's Third Idea]] - equivalent to the [[Castle Bravo]] device. Meanwhile, tensions between the two nations rose as 1956 saw the brutal suppression of Hungary by the Red Army; the U.S. and European nations drew certain obvious and inevitable conclusions from that event, while in the U.S., full scale hysteria was afoot, prompted by [[Joseph McCarthy]], [[HUAC]], and [[Julius Rosenberg|Julius]] and [[Ethel Rosenberg]], two atomic spies. This atmosphere was further inflamed by the 1957 launch of [[Sputnik]], which led to wild fears of [[Communists]] attacking from [[space]], as well as very real fears about the fact that if the Soviets could launch something over one's head, they could launch something else that could hit one's head. John F. Kennedy capitalized on this situation by emphasizing the [[Bomber Gap]] and the [[Missile Gap]], areas which the Soviets were (inaccurately) perceived as leading the United States in, while heated Soviet rhetoric, including [[Nikita Khruschev]]'s famous threat that "[[We will bury you]]!" to Western ambassadors didn't help to cool tensions. The [[U-2]] incident, involving [[Francis Gary Powers]], as well as the [[Berlin Crisis]], along with the test of the [[Tzar Bomba]], escalated tensions to unheard of levels.
This escalating situation came to a head with the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962. The arrival of Soviet missiles in [[Cuba]] was ostensibly aimed to protect Cuba from further planned attacks from the United States after the failed [[Bay of Pigs invasion]]. The movement of missiles was conducted by the Soviets on the basis that the US already had nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey. The [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] resulted in Khrushchev publicly agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba, while America secretly agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey. During the crisis, [[Fidel Castro]] wrote Khrushchev a letter about the prospect that the US might follow an invasion of Cuba with a first strike against the USSR. The following quotation from the letter suggests to some writers that Castro was calling for a Soviet first strike against the US.
:"If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba--a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law--then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other." <ref>
{{cite web
|url=http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_castro_khrushchev.html
|title=Letter to Nikita Khrushchev from Fidel Castro regarding defending Cuban air space
|accessdate=2008-07-10
|author=[[Fidel Castro|Castro, Fidel]]
|authorlink=
|coauthors=
|date=1962-10-26
|format=Orig. paper, converted to HTML
|work=The World On the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis
|publisher=John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
}}
</ref>
Luckily, rational minds prevailed. Both sides in the Cold War realized how close they came to nuclear war over Cuba, and decided to seek a reduction of tensions, resulting in US-Soviet [[detente]] for most of the 1960s and 1970s.
However, tensions were inflamed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the decision of NATO to deploy the new [[Pershing II]] [[IRBM]] as well as the [[Tomahawk]] [[Ground-Launched Cruise Missile]], along with [[Ronald Reagan]]'s talk of 'limited' nuclear war. This increased Soviet fears that NATO was planning an attack. NATO's deployment of these missiles was a response to the Soviet deployment of the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20 Pioneer]], which could hit most European NATO bases within minutes of launch. These mutual deployments led to a destabilizing strategic situation, which was exacerbated by malfunctioning U.S. and Soviet missile launch early warning systems, a Soviet intelligence gap that prevented the Soviets from getting a "read" on the strategic intentions of U.S. leaders, as well as overheated U.S. rightist rhetoric combined with classical Soviet paranoia. This culminated in a war scare that occurred during 1983 due to the inopportune timing of a NATO exercise called [[Able Archer]], which was a simulation of a NATO nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; this exercise happened to occur during a massive Soviet intelligence mobilization called [[VRYAN]], that was designed to discover intentions of NATO to initiate a nuclear first-strike. This poor timing drove the world very close to nuclear war, possibly even closer than the Cuban Missile Crisis over 20 years before.
But rational minds once again prevailed, and both sides retreated from the brink of the abyss of nuclear war.
Subsequent events caused the fears of nuclear attack on both sides to diminish significantly, as the tensions between the superpowers decreased, and have remained—at least in nuclear terms—comparatively low, to this day; indeed, at least on the official level, the U.S. and Russia no longer see each other as enemies, though some believe that the large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and high alert levels that both retain means that that belief might not be shared by certain interests in their military-industrial complexes.
===Historical analysis===
Both sides never sought nuclear conflict, even though it threatened to break out on multiple occasions. What both sides had, however, was a deep and continuing fear—one might even call it a paranoia—that the other nation was seeking to start a nuclear conflict, or, at least, thought such a conflict was "winnable" and would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear war. This led to both sides adopting aggressive, confrontational military and nuclear strategies that were misinterpreted and countered by the other side, furthering distrust. These strategies led to destabilization of the strategic situation to the point where the two major war scares of the Cold War occurred: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis. Though neither side intended to start a [[nuclear war]], and, in fact, were mortally terrified of the possibility of it, neither side adopted strategies to calm things down, so sure were they of their adversaries' [[bad faith]].
U.S. military strategy (at least in Europe) was confined to responses to potential Soviet aggression against NATO countries. Soviet military theory was dominated by the theory of the "[[deep operation]]" - a large scale [[combined-arms]] offensive into enemy-held territory - rather than a nuclear offensive. Soviet conventional superiority, shown by the fact that the Soviet Union certainly was prepared for war in Europe, having massed armored, mechanized, artillery, and air forces poised along the [[Inner German Border|Inner German]] and [[Czechoslovakian_border_fortifications_during_the_Cold_War|Czech borders]], led by the dread [[3rd Shock Army (Soviet Union)|Third Shock Army of the Soviet Union]], caused NATO to consider the use of [[tactical nuclear weapons]] to stop the "steamroller" of the Red Army if they decided to take a drive through the [[Fulda Gap]] or an amble through the [[North German Plain]]. NATO's position changed in the 1970s and 80s, in favor of trying to stop a Soviet offensive through the employment, at least initially, of a doctrine involving non-nuclear [[AirLand Battle]] to try to buy time to either throw back the invader or work out the issues at hand through diplomacy. Both sides, however, were willing to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to win the war at hand. Although neither side was actively pursuing a first-strike policy—since the time of Khrushchev, the leaders of orthodox [[communism]] believed that "[[peaceful coexistence]]" with the "[[imperialist]]" powers was possible—both sides relied on military strategies that could have still caused a general nuclear war.
Ideological determinism also played a role. President [[Ronald Reagan]] of the United States, at least before the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis, believed that everybody, including the Soviet Union, was completely aware of the United States' good intentions, even when he bellicosely declared that the USSR was an "evil empire" and (more jokingly) that the "bombing begins in 5 minutes" while encouraging the military to conduct threatening exercises, such as sneaking a [[Carrier Battle Group]] through the [[GIUK]] Gap and sending nuclear-capable bombers towards the territory of the USSR. [[Chairman]] [[Andropov]] of the Soviet Union had similar, distorted views; he believed that the Western Allies, and the U.S., in particular, were [[fascist]] states, whose leaders had territorial designs against the Soviet [[Motherland]] on the scale of [[Napoleon]], at the least, and [[Hitler]], at the worst; in addition, to counter the "fascists", he incited his [[military-industrial complex]] to build weapons such as the [[SS-20]] [[MIRV]] [[IRBM]] and the [[SS-18|SS-18 Satan]] [[MIRV]] [[ICBM]], which the NATO countries reasonably viewed as a Soviet sword against their throats, and caused reaction through development of equivalent or superior weapons systems.
Luckily for the world, when the superpowers drew close to the edge of the abyss during both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Able Archer/VRYAN Crisis, they took the time to stare intently into its depths, and came away knowing that the abyss stared back into them. They learned and grew from their mistakes and miscalculations that led them to be within view of [[mutual assured destruction]]. Andropov was followed by [[Gorbachev]], and Gorbachev helped to bring about the end of the Cold War. Reagan had a figurative [[Conversion on the Way to Damascus|conversion on the road to Damascus]] regarding nuclear weapons and (especially) ICBMs, following the Able Archer/VRYAN Crisis. This, combined with similar efforts by Gorbachev, nearly brought about the disarmament and destruction of ICBMs, long-range SLBMs, and, possibly even nuclear weapons themselves at a groundbreaking disarmament [[Reykjavik Summit|summit]] between Gorbachev and Reagan at [[Reykjavik]] in [[1986]]. (The sticking point causing agreement to be unreachable was the [[Strategic Defense Initiative|SDI Program]], just as [[missile defense]] continues to be a thorn in the side of the Russians today.) However, progress was made; the [[INF Treaty]], the [[Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty]], and the [[START Treaty]] could be said to be the result of the change in leaders and leaders' attitudes that the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis facilitated, just as the [[Non-Proliferation Treaty]] and the [[Partial Test Ban Treaty]], as well as U.S.-Soviet [[detente]], could be considered to be the sons and daughters of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Still, both crises were dangerous times catalyzed by dangerous political and military mistakes caused by dangerous policies instituted by leaders who let their fear get the better of their judgment and reasoning. Thankfully for those who lived, and those who now live, these mistakes never caused a first strike to come to pass.
==Terms used==
*CEP - [[circular error probable]]; the radius within which a weapon aimed at a given point will land with a 50% confidence; for example, a CEP of 150 m indicates that 50% of the time, the weapon will impact within 150 m of the target. This measure of accuracy assumes that everything up to the point of impact works correctly.
*Range - the maximum distance from a target a weapon can be fired to successfully hit the point where it is targetted at. (When range is used without qualifiers, like maximum or minimum, it is assumed that it refers to maximum; however, many of these described weapons have minimum ranges as well, though they are not mentioned, or, in all likelihood, even known to the public.)
*kt/mt - [[kiloton]]/[[megaton]] of [[tri-nitro toluene]] (TNT) equivalent; kt refers to thousands of tons; mt refers to millions of tons; tri-nitro toluene is a common [[high explosive]] used in weapons manufacture as well as commercial blasting, and possesses far more explosive energy than, for example, [[gunpowder]]. A ton is equivalent to a mass of 1000 [[kilogram|kilograms]] or approximately ~2200 American pounds. This is an approximate measure of how much energy is released by the [[detonation]] of a nuclear weapon; a 100 kt nuclear device, therefore, liberates as much [[energy]] as does the [[explosion]] of 100,000 tons of TNT. This is a large quantity of energy. In addition, unlike TNT, the detonation of a nuclear device also emits [[ionizing radiation]] that can harm living organisms, including humans; the prompt radiation from the blast itself and the [[fallout]] can persist for a long period of time, though within hours to weeks, the radiation from a single nuclear detonation will drop enough to permit humans to remain at the site of the blast indefinitely without incuring acute fatal exposure to radiation (however, exposure to any radiation above a certain point increases the risk of [[cancer]].)
==Likely first strike weapons systems==
* [[Pershing missile|Pershing II]] [[IRBM]]. Single warhead, variable yield 5-50 Kt, CEP 50 m with active radar terminal guidance. Short, 7-minute flight-time and range of 1,800 km, designed to strike [[Command, control, and communications|C<sup>4</sup>ISTAR]] installations, bunkers, air fields, air defense sites, and ICBM silos in the European part of the Soviet Union. Decommissioned.
* [[SS-18 Satan]] [[MIRV]]--Believed to be a first-strike weapon by some in the West, due to high accuracy, and high throw-weight; could deliver at least 10 warheads of at least 500 Kt to independent, separate targets. Each warhead could probably take out even hardened nuclear silos, such as those used by the [[Minuteman III]]. Deployed in 1976, aimed at [[CONUS]]. Still in service.
* [[LGM-118A|MX Missile (Peacekeeper)]]--Similar in capability to the SS-18 Satan, the Peacekeeper boasted 10 MIRVed warheads of 300 kt each, as well as a [[Circular Error Probable|CEP]] of 120 meters. Deployed in the mid-1980s. Decommissioned; however, guidance systems and re-entry vehicles moved to [[Minuteman III]] missiles.
* [[SS-20 Saber]] [[MIRV]] [[IRBM]]--Deployed by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, this MIRVed IRBM could hide out behind the Urals in Asian Russia and strike [[NATO]] C<sup>4</sup>ISTAR facilities in Europe with scarcely any warning, due to very short flight time, high accuracy, and MIRV payload (rare on an intermediate-range missile). Decommissioned.
==First-strike enabling weapons systems==
* Any [[missile defense]] system capable of wide-area (e.g. continental) coverage, and especially those enabling destruction of missiles in the boost phase, are first-strike-enabling weapons. The reason for this is that they allow for a nuclear strike to be launched with reduced fear of [[mutual assured destruction]]. Such a system has never been deployed, although a limited continental missile defense capability has been deployed by the U.S., but is only capable of defending against a handful of missiles.
** This does not apply, in general, to terminal missile defense systems, such as the former U.S. [[Safeguard Program]] or the Russian [[A-35]]/[[A-135]] systems. Limited-area terminal missile defense systems, defending such targets as ICBM fields, or C<sup>4</sup>ISTAR facilities may, in fact, be stabilizing, because they ensure survivable retaliatory capacity, and/or survivable de-escalation capacity.
==Other possible first-strike weapons systems==
*[[Trident missile|Trident II]]. Up to 14 warheads, 100/475 kt yield each, CEP 90 m (using GPS guidance). Main purpose is second-strike [[countervalue]] retaliation, but the excellent [[Circular error probable|CEP]] and much shorter flight-time due to submarine launch makes it an ideal first-strike weapon. However, this neglects the probability that GPS would likely be destroyed by orbital nuclear-detonation-induced electromagnetic loading of the ionosphere during any significant nuclear conflict (through high-altitude nuclear explosions—see [[Starfish Prime]] and [[Electromagnetic pulse]] for more information), or disabled, so as to avoid [[OPFOR]] use, forcing reliance on the significantly-less-accurate inertial guidance systems. In addition, these factors may be exacerbated by the fact that [[SSBN]]s are usually deep underwater for their mission, and can only receive very low rate data communications via [[VLF]] or [[ELF]], causing slow reception and verification of strike orders, and the one-missile at a time fire rate of a nuclear missile submarine.
*[[SS-18 Satan]] 20 Mt variant. Although it is widely accepted that USSR never had a first-strike strategy (due to its conventional arms superiority in Europe), some experts believed that the single-warhead 20 Mt version of R36-M (SS-18, CEP 250 m.) was a first-strike weapon, targeted against Minuteman III silos. However, a much more logical explanation comes from retired Soviet military officers who report that the 20 Mt SS-18 was targeted against heavily fortified command and control facilities. The reason for this is that a single 20Mt warhead could only take out one hardened missile silo if the silos are sufficiently separated—probably by only 2-4 km, depending on the amount of hardening. This is due to the [[inverse square law]], which predicts that the amount of energy dispersed from a single point release of energy (such as a thermonuclear blast) dissipates by the inverse of the square of distance from the single point of release. The result is that the power of a nuclear explosion to rupture hardened structures is greatly decreased by the distance from the impact point of the nuclear weapon. So a near-direct hit is generally necessary, as only diminishing returns are gained by increasing bomb power. The only purpose for gigantic nuclear weapons, like the SS-18 20 Mt variant, is to take out extremely hardened targets, like command and control facilities, such as [[NORAD]], located at [[Cheyenne Mountain]]; [[FEMA]], located at [[Mount Weather]]; or Site R, located at [[Raven Rock Mountain Complex|Raven Rock]]. (It should be noted that the amount of energy needed to rupture missile silos is orders of magnitude greater than the amount necessary to destroy cities, making the SS-18 20 Mt variant effective for the destruction of large urban centers, as well.) This could be a useful weapon for a decapitation strike—however, a decapitation strike is a very risky move, and both the U.S. and Russia have extensive countermeasures against such methods.
==Anti-first-strike countermeasures==
For both the U.S. and Russia, as well as the other nuclear powers, full [[countervalue]] retaliation would be the likely fate for anyone who unleashed a first strike. So as to ensure that this is the case, the nuclear-weapons states have taken measures to ensure that their retaliatory strikes will get through.
===Increasing SSBN(РПКСН) deployment===
[[Nuclear submarine|Nuclear-powered submarines]] carrying [[submarine-launched ballistic missiles]], called SSBNs (Russian:РПКСН), and commonly known as "boomers", are widely considered the most survivable component of the [[nuclear triad]]. The depths of the ocean are extremely large, and nuclear submarines are highly mobile, very quiet, have virtually unlimited range, and can generate their own oxygen and potable water; in essence, their undersea endurance is limited only by food supply. It is unlikely that any conceivable opponent of any nuclear power deploying SSBNs could locate and neutralize every ballistic missile submarine before it could launch a retaliatory strike, in the event of war. Therefore, to increase the percentage of nuclear forces surviving a first strike, a nation can simply increase SSBN deployment, as well as deployment of reliable communications links with SSBNs.
===Hardening or mobilizing land-based nuclear assets===
In addition, land-based ICBM(МБР) silos(ШПУ) can be hardened. No silo can really defend against a direct nuclear hit, but a sufficiently hardened silo could defend against a near miss. In addition, ICBMs can be placed on road or rail-mobile launchers, which can then be moved around; as an enemy has nothing fixed to aim at, this increases their survivability.
===Increasing alert state and readiness===
By adopting a [[launch on warning]] nuclear posture, the possibility of a first-strike can be significantly mitigated. Of course, the possibility of an accidental nuclear war is vastly increased, as early-warning system malfunctions (which have occurred several times), especially in periods of politico-military tension, could easily lead to nuclear war.
===Maintaining survivable C<sup>4</sup>ISTAR links===
[[Looking Glass (airplane)|Looking Glass]], [[Boeing E-4B|Nightwatch]], and [[TACAMO]] are U.S. airborne nuclear command posts, and represent survivable communication links with U.S. nuclear forces. In the event of significant political-military tensions between the nuclear powers, they would take to the skies, and provide survivable communications in the event of enemy attack. They are capable of the full exercise of all available [[Single Integrated Operations Plan|MAOs (Major Attack Options)]], as well as the full [[SIOP]], in the event of a first strike, or the destruction of the [[National Command Authority|NCA]]. They can directly initiate launch of all U.S. ICBMs via radio and satellite communication, signal SLBMs to launch, and send bombers on their strike missions. In addition to these airborne assets, the U.S. government has several command and control [[bunkers]], the most famous of which is [[NORAD]], tunneled a few thousand feet into the [[granite]] of [[Cheyenne Mountain]], outside of [[Colorado Springs]], [[Colorado]], which is believed to be capable of surviving a direct nuclear hit. Other U.S. C<sup>4</sup>ISTAR bunkers include an installation called [[Site R]], located at [[Raven Rock]], [[Maryland]], which is believed to be the [[Pentagon|Pentagon's]] relocation site if [[Washington, D.C.]] is destroyed, as well as [[Mount Weather]], in [[Virginia]], which is believed to be the relocation site for top [[Executive Branch]] officials. The [[Greenbriar]] in [[West Virginia]] was once the site of the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] and [[Congress of the United States|Congress']] relocation bunker; however, it is no longer a secret and is now a tourist attraction.
The Russians also have equivalent or superior capabilities in this area; they have a system called СПРН, which is capable of detecting nuclear launches and providing early warning, so that any such strike would not be undetected until it is too late. But their unique and special capability can be found with their [[Dead Hand (nuclear war)|Dead Hand]] [[fail-deadly]] computerized nuclear release system, based at [[Mount Yamantaw]] in the [[Urals]]. Apparently, Dead Hand, named for either the [[Dead Man's Hand]] in poker, or the [[Dead Man's Switch]] in dangerous or deadly machinery, can be turned on in the event that the Russian leadership fears a nuclear attack. Allegedly, once Dead Hand is activated, if it detects a loss of communications with [[Moscow]] as well as nuclear detonations inside of Russian territory, it can give final authority for the release of nuclear weapons to military officers in a bunker under Mt. Yamantaw, who can then, if they so determine, launch Russia's arsenal. Mt. Yamantaw is believed to be able to withstand multiple direct nuclear detonations.
===Decreasing tensions by mutual adoption of a minimum credible deterrent posture===
Instead of relying on sophisticated communications links and launch-on-warning postures, the French, British, and Chinese have chosen to assume different nuclear postures more suited to minimum credible deterrence, or the capability to inflict of unacceptable losses so as to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them, rather than pursuing types of nuclear weapons suitable to first-strike use.
The [[People's Republic of China]] is believed to pursue a [[minimum credible deterrent]]/[[second strike]] strategy with regards to the United States. This may or may not be true with regards to the PRC's stance vis a vis [[Russia]], as the majority of Chinese nuclear platforms are non-intercontinental, and are deployed on the Russian-Chinese border. Unlike the relations of the United States and the PRC, the PRC and Russia have had military conflicts in the past. In recent years, the PRC has improved its early-warning systems and renovated certain of its platforms for intercontinental strike; this may be due to the U.S. missile defense system (it may not be, however). In general, it appears that the PRC's leaders do not greatly fear a first strike (due to their posture of merely inflicting unacceptable losses upon an adversary as opposed to the U.S./Russian policy of trying to "win" a nuclear war); in any event, the Chinese arsenal is considered sufficient to ensure that such a first strike would not go unavenged.
[[France]] & [[Great Britain]] possess sophisticated nuclear weapons platforms; however their nuclear strategies are believed to be [[minimum credible deterrent]]-based as well, due to the small number of weapons they possess and lack of major adversaries they have.
===Eliminating nuclear weapons===
Ultimately, the best countermeasure against a nuclear first-strike, or a nuclear strike of any sort, is to eliminate nuclear weapons, in a universal, comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible fashion. Of course, this is more easily said then done, but, under the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]], the [[nuclear weapons states]] have obligated themselves to at least try.
== Destabilizing role of land-based MIRVed ICBMs ==
MIRVed land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike or a counterforce strike, due to:
# Their high accuracy, compared to submarine-launched ballistic missiles which are less accurate, and more prone to defects;
# Their fast response time, compared to bombers which are considered too slow;
# Their ability to carry multiple warheads at once, useful for destroying a whole missile field with one missile.
Unlike a [[decapitation strike]] or a [[countervalue strike]], a [[counterforce strike]] might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed with 3 warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included the [[SS-18 Satan]] which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threaten [[Minuteman III]] silos, which led [[Team B|some]] [[neocons]] to conclude a [[Soviet]] first strike was being prepared for. This led to the development of the aforementioned [[Pershing II]], the [[Trident I]] and [[Trident II]], as well as the [[MX missile]], and the [[B-1 Lancer]].
[[MIRV]]ed land-based [[ICBM]]s are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many [[warheads]] (3 to 14 in existing U.S. missiles; 3 to 12 in existing Soviet missiles) and deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was intended to be banned under the [[START II]] agreement, however the [[START II]] agreement was never activated, and neither Russia nor the USA has adhered to the agreement.
==Bertrand Russell and the merit of a first strike on the USSR==
In an exchange of letters in ''[[The Economist]]'' magazine in 2001, [[Nigel Lawson]], the former British Chancellor, and Nicholas Griffin, of [[McMaster University]], discussed a speech given in 1948 at [[Westminster School]] by the celebrated philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]].<ref>[http://www.economist.com/books/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=699582 A philosopher’s letters | Love, Bertie | Economist.com<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> In answer to a question from the audience, Bertrand Russell said that if the USSR's aggression continued, it would be morally worse to go to war after the USSR possessed an atomic bomb than before they possessed one, because if the USSR had no bomb the West's victory would come more swiftly and with fewer casualties than if there were atom bombs on both sides.
To put this into context, only the USA possessed an atomic bomb at that time, and the USSR was pursuing an extremely aggressive policy towards the countries in [[Eastern Europe]] which it was absorbing into its [[sphere of influence]].
Many understood Russell's comments to mean that Russell approved of a First Strike war with the USSR, including Lawson, who was present when Russell spoke. Others, including Griffin who obtained a transcript of the speech, have argued that he was merely explaining the usefulness of America's atomic arsenal in deterring the USSR from continuing its domination of Eastern Europe. In short, one group of people believe Russell wanted to use the atomic bomb militarily before it was too late, and the other group believe he wanted to use the bomb diplomatically before it was too late. Whatever Russell really meant, it soon became of only historical interest as the USSR successfully detonated its own atomic device a year later in 1949.
== Iran ==
In the [[April 17]], [[2006]] issue of ''The New Yorker'',<ref>[http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060417fa_fact Annals of National Security: The Iran Plans: The New Yorker<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist [[Seymour Hersh]] reported on the [[George W. Bush administration|Bush Administration]]'s purported plans for an air strike within [[Iran]]. Of particular note in his article is that an American nuclear first strike (possibly using the [[B61 nuclear bomb|B61]]-11 bunker-buster [[nuclear weapon]]) is under consideration to eliminate underground Iranian [[uranium enrichment]] facilities. In response, President Bush cited Hersh's reporting as "wild speculation"<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/10cnd-prexy.html Bush Calls Reports of Plan to Strike Iran 'Speculation' - New York Times<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> but did not deny its veracity. It should be noted though the President had commented earlier in 2006 that while the use of nuclear weapons should indeed be a last resort, it should still always be an option on the table.
==Movies about first strike==
*[[Dr. Strangelove]] by [[Stanley Kubrick]]
*[[Miracle Mile (movie)|Miracle Mile]]
*[[Fail-Safe (1964 film)]]
*[[First Strike (1979 PBS Docudrama)]][http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlPEBROvR9w]
*[[First Strike (1979 PBS Docudrama) (complete)]][http://stage6.divx.com/Sd-Kfz-182/video/1804823/First-Strike-(Documentary)]
==See also==
* [[Counterforce nuclear weapon]]
* [[Decapitation strike]]
* [[Second strike]]
*[[13 Days]]
==References==
<references/>
==External links==
*[http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence.shtml Robert McNamara's "Mutual Deterrence" speech from 1962]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]
[[Category:Military strategy]]
[[Category:Nuclear strategies]]
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