Geostrategy
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'''Geostrategy''', a subfield of [[geopolitics]], is a type of [[foreign policy]] guided principally by [[geography|geographical]] factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all [[strategy|strategies]], geostrategy is concerned with matching means to ends<ref name="strategy1">{{cite paper
|author= Dr. John Garafano
|date= 5-9 July 2004
|url=http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Garafano_Alternate_Secutity.pdf
|title=Alternate Security Strategies: The Strategic Feasibility of Various Notions of Security
|publisher=International Peace Research Foundation
|version=
|accessdate=2006-05-19
|format=PDF}}</ref><ref name="strategy2">{{cite paper
|author=Report of the [[United Nations Secretary General|Secretary General]]
|date=[[20 April]] [[2001]]
|url=http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2001/0420sgreport.pdf
|title=No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations
|publisher=[[United Nations Security Council]]
|version=S/2001/394
|accessdate=2006-05-19
|format=PDF}}</ref><ref name="strategy3">{{cite journal
| author = Col. David J. Andre
| year = 1995
| month = Autumn
| title = The Art of War—Part, Present, Future
| journal = Joint Force Quarterly
| volume =
| issue =
| pages = pp. 129
| doi =
| id =
| url = http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2909.pdf
| format = PDF
| accessdate = 2005-05-19
}}</ref><ref name="strategy4">{{cite book |editor=Philip Babcock Gove |title=Webster's Third New International Dictionary |year=1961 |month=September |publisher=Riverside Press |location=Cambridge, MA |quote=strategy: the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace and war }}</ref><ref name="strategy5">{{cite book |last=Gaddis |first=John Lewis |authorlink=John Lewis Gaddis |title=Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security policy |year=1982 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York, NY |isbn=0195030974 |quote=The process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources. }}</ref> — in this case, a country's resources (whether they are limited or extensive) with its geopolitical objectives (which can be local, regional, or global). According to Gray and Sloan, geography is "the mother of strategy."<ref name="mother">{{cite book
| last = Gray
| first = Colin S.
| authorlink = Colin S. Gray
| coauthors = Geoffrey Sloan
| date = [[November 30]], [[1999]]
| title = Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
| publisher = Frank Cass
| location = London and Portland, Oregon
| pages = pp. 3
| id = ISBN 0-7146-8053-2
}}</ref>
Geostrategists, as distinct from geopoliticians, advocate proactive strategies, and approach geopolitics from a [[nationalist]] point-of-view. As with all [[political theory|political theories]], geostrategies are relevant principally to the context in which they were devised: the nationality of the strategist, the strength of his or her country's resources, the scope of their country's goals, the political geography of the time period, and the technological factors that affect military, political, economic, and cultural engagement. Geostrategy can function normatively, advocating foreign policy based on geographic factors, analytical, describing how foreign policy is shaped by geography, or predictive, predicting a country's future foreign policy decisions on the basis of geographic factors.
Many geostrategists are also geographers, specializing in subfields of [[geography]], such as [[human geography]], [[political geography]], [[economic geography]], [[cultural geography]], [[military geography]], and [[strategic geography]]. Geostrategy is most closely related to strategic geography.
Especially following [[World War II]], some scholars divide geostrategy into two [[school of thought|schools]]: the uniquely German [[organic state theory]]; and, the broader [[English American|Anglo-American]] geostrategies.<ref name="parameters">{{cite journal
| last = Hillen
| first = John
| coauthors = Michael P.Noonan
| year = 1998
| month = Autumn
| title = The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement
| journal = Parameters,
| volume = XXVIII
| issue = 3
| pages = 21–34
| url = http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98autumn/hillen.htm
| accessdate = 2006-12-22
| format = subscription required
}}</ref><ref name="Tyner">{{cite journal
| quotes = ...is often divided into
two main schools: the organic state branch and the geostrategy branch...
| last = Tyner
| first = JA
| year = 1998
| title = The Geopolitics of Eugenics and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans
| journal = Antipode
| volume = 30
| issue = 3
| pages = 251
| doi = 10.1111/1467-8330.00077
| url = http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8330.00077
| format = fee required
| accessdate = 2006-12-22
}}</ref><ref name="Russell">{{cite journal
| quotes = Geopolitics, broadly defined, may actually be seen as two distinct schools that comprise the organic state theory and geostrategy.
| last = Russell
| first = Greg
| year = 2006
| title = Theodore Roosevelt, geopolitics, and cosmopolitan ideals
| journal = Review of international studies
| volume = 32
| issue = 3
| pages = 541–559
| doi = 10.1017/S0260210506007157
| url = http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=461176&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=03&aid=461175
| format = PDF
| accessdate = 2006-12-22
}}</ref>
Critics of geostrategy have asserted that it is a [[pseudoscience|pseudoscientific]] gloss used by dominant nations to justify [[imperialism|imperialist]] or [[hegemony|hegemonic]] aspirations, or that it has been rendered irrelevant because of technological advances, or that its [[essentialism|essentialist]] focus on geography leads geostrategists to incorrect conclusions about the conduct of foreign policy.
==Defining geostrategy==
Academics, theorists, and practitioners of geopolitics have agreed upon no standard definition for "geostrategy." Most all definitions, however, emphasize the merger of [[strategy|strategic]] considerations with geopolitical factors. While geopolitics is ostensibly neutral, examining the geographic and political features of different regions, especially the impact of geography on politics, geostrategy involves comprehensive planning, assigning means for achieving national goals or securing assets of [[military]] or political significance.
===Coining the term===
The term "'''geo-strategy'''" was first used by Frederick L. Schuman in his 1942 article "Let Us Learn Our Geopolitics." It was a translation of the [[German language|German]] term "'''''Wehrgeopolitik'''''" as used by German geostrategist [[Karl Haushofer]]. Previous translations had been attempted, such as "'''defense-geopolitics'''." [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]] had coined and popularized "'''war geopolitics'''" as another alternate translation.<ref name="gyorgy">{{cite journal
| last = Gyorgy
| first = Andrew
| year = 1943
| month = November
| title = The Geopolitics of War: Total War and Geostrategy
| journal = The Journal of Politics
| volume = 5
| issue = 4
| pages = 347–362
| doi = 10.2307/2125293
| url = http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3816(194311)5%3A4%3C347%3ATGOWTW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
| format = fee required
| accessdate = 2006-12-22
}}</ref>
===Modern definitions===
*"[T]he words ''geopolitical, strategic,'' and ''geostrategic'' are used to convey the following meanings: ''geopolitical'' reflects the combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or region, and emphasizing the impact of geography on politics; ''strategic'' refers to the comprehensive and planned application of measures to achieve a central goal or to vital assets of military significance; and '''geostrategic''' merges strategic consideration with geopolitical ones."
:—[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], ''Game Plan'' (emphasis in original)<ref name"gameplan">{{cite book
| last = Brzezinski
| first = Zbigniew
| authorlink = Zbigniew Brzezinski
| year = 1986
| title = Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.–Soviet Contest
| publisher = The Atlantic Monthly Press
| location = Boston
| pages = pp. xiv
| id =
}}</ref>
* "For the [[United States]], [[Eurasia]]n geostrategy involves the purposeful management of geostrategically dynamic states and the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states, in keeping with the twin interests of America in the short-term preservation of its unique global power and in the long-run transformation of it into increasingly [[institutionalism in international relations|institutionalized]] global cooperation. To put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of [[Imperialism|imperial]] geostrategy are to prevent [[collusion]] and maintain [[collective defense|security dependence]] among the [[vassal]]s, to keep [[tributary|tributaries]] [[compliance|pliant]] and protected, and to keep the [[barbarian]]s from coming together."
:—Zbigniew Brzezinski, ''The Grand Chessboard''<ref name"chessboard">{{cite book
| last = Brzezinski
| first = Zbigniew
| authorlink = Zbigniew Brzezinski
| year = 1997
| title = The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
| publisher = Basic Books
| location = New York
| pages = pp. 40
| id = ISBN 0-465-02725-3
}}</ref>
*''Geostrategy'' is the geographic direction of a state's foreign policy. More precisely, geostrategy describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity. The underlying assumption is that states have limited resources and are unable, even if they are willing, to conduct a ''tous asimuths'' foreign policy. Instead they must focus politically and militarily on specific areas of the world. Geostrategy describes this foreign-policy thrust of a state and does not deal with motivation or decision-making processes. The geostrategy of a state, therefore, is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors. A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader.
:—[[Jakub J. Grygiel]], ''Great Powers and Geopolitical Change'' (emphasis in original)<ref name="gpagc">{{cite book
| last = Grygiel
| first = Jakub J.
| year = 2006
| title = Great Powers and Geopolitical Change
| publisher = The Johns Hopkins University Press
| location = Baltimore
| pages = pp. 23
| id = ISBN 0-8018-8480-2
}}</ref>
*"It is recognized that the term ''' 'geo-strategy' ''' is more often used, in current writing, in a global context, denoting the consideration of global land-sea distribution, distances, and accessibility among other geographical factors in strategic planning and action... Here the definition of geo-strategy is used in a more limited regional frame wherein the ''sum of geographic factors interact to influence or to give advantage to one adversary, or intervene to modify strategic planning as well as political and military venture.''"
:—[[Lim Joo-Jock]], ''Geo-Strategy and the South China Sea Basin.'' (emphasis in original)<ref name="joo-jock">{{cite book
| last = Joo-Jock
| first = Lim
| year = 1979
| title = Geo-Strategy and the South China Sea Basin
| publisher = Singapore University Press
| location = Singapore
| pages = pp. 4
| id =
}}</ref>
* "A science named "geo-strategy" would be unimaginable in any other period of history but ours. It is the characteristic product of turbulent twentieth-century world politics."
:-[[Andrew Gyorgi]], ''The Geopolitics of War: Total War and Geostrategy'' (1943).<ref name="gyorgy" />
*"'Geostrategy,'—a word of uncertain meaning—has... been avoided."
:—[[Stephen B. Jones]], "The Power Inventory and National Strategy"<ref name="jones">{{cite journal
| last = Jones
| first = Stephen B.
| year = 1954
| title = The Power Inventory and National Strategy
| journal = World Politics
| volume = VI
| pages = 422
| id =
}}</ref>
==History of geostrategy==
===Precursors===
As early as [[Herodotus]], observers saw strategy as heavily influenced by the geographic setting of the actors. In ''[[The History|History]]'', Herodotus describes a clash of civilizations between the [[Ancient Egypt|Egyptians]], [[Achaemenid Empire|Persians]], [[Scythia]]ns, and [[Ancient Greece|Greeks]]—all of which he believed were heavily influenced by the physical geographic setting.<ref name="Herodotus">{{cite book
| last = Herodotus
| authorlink = Herodotus
| others = trans. David Grene
| title = [[The History]]
| publisher = University of Chicago Press
| location = Chicago
}}</ref>
[[Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow]] proposed a geometrical science of strategy in the 1799 ''[[The Spirit of the Modern System of War]].'' His system predicted that the larger states would swallow the smaller ones, resulting in eleven large states. Mackubin Thomas Owens notes the similarity between von Bülow's predictions and the map of Europe after the [[unification of Germany]] and [[unification of Italy|of Italy]].<ref name="owens">{{cite journal
| author = Mackubin Thomas Owens
| year = 1999
| month = Autumn
| title = In Defense of Classical Geopolitics
| journal = Naval War College Review
| volume = LII
| issue = 4
| pages =
| doi =
| id =
| url = http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/autumn/art3-a99.htm
| accessdate = 2004-01-11
| format = {{Dead link|date=May 2008}}
}}</ref>
===Golden age===
Between [[1890]] and [[1919]] the world became a geostrategist's paradise, leading to the formulation of the classical geopolitical theories. The international system featured rising and falling [[great power]]s, many with global reach. There were no new [[frontier]]s for the great powers to [[exploration|explore]] or [[colonization|colonize]]—the entire world was divided between the empires and colonial powers. From this point forward, international politics would feature the struggles of state against state.<ref name="owens" />
Two strains of geopolitical thought gained prominence: an Anglo-American school, and a German school. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford J. Mackinder outlined the American and British conceptions of geostrategy, respectively, in their works ''[[The Problem of Asia]]'' and ''[[Heartland (geopolitics)|Heartland]]''. Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellén developed an [[organic state theory]] which laid the foundation for Germany's unique school of geostrategy.<ref name="owens" />
===World War II===
[[Image:Edmund A. Walsh and Gen. MacArthur, Tokyo, 1948.jpg|thumb|left|Fr. Edmund A. Walsh, SJ]]
The most prominent [[Germany|German]] geopolitician was General [[Karl Haushofer]]. After [[World War II]], during the [[Allied Control Council|Allied occupation of Germany]], the [[United States]] investigated many officials and public figures to determine if they should face charges of [[war crimes]] at the [[Nuremberg trials]]. Haushofer, an academic primarily, was interrogated by Father [[Edmund A. Walsh]], a professor of geopolitics from the [[Georgetown University|Georgetown]] [[Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service|School of Foreign Service]], at the request of the U.S. authorities. Despite his involvement in crafting one of the justifications for Nazi aggression, Fr. Walsh determined that Haushofer ought not stand trial.<ref name="walsh">{{cite book
| last = Walsh
| first = Edmund A.
| authorlink = Edmund A. Walsh
| year = 1949
| title = Total Power: A Footnote to History
| publisher = Doubleday & Company, Inc.
| location = Garden City, New York
| id =
}}</ref>
===Cold War===
After the [[World War II|Second World War]], the term "geopolitics" fell into disrepute, because of its association with [[Nazism|Nazi]] ''[[geopolitik]]''. Virtually no books published between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s used the word "geopolitics" or "geostrategy" in their
titles, and geopoliticians did not label themselves or their works as such. German theories prompted a number of critical examinations of ''geopolitik'' by American geopoliticians such as [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]], [[Derwent Whittlesey]], and [[Andrew Gyorgy]].<ref name="owens" />
As the [[Cold War]] began, [[N.J. Spykman]] and [[George F. Kennan]] laid down the foundations for the U.S. policy of [[containment]], which would dominate [[Western world|Western]] geostrategic thought for the next forty years.<ref name="owens" />
<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: [[Image:Alexander P. de Seversky.jpg|thumb|Alexander de Seversky]] -->
[[Alexander Procofieff de Seversky|Alexander de Seversky]] would propose that airpower had fundamentally changed geostrategic considerations and thus proposed a "geopolitics of airpower." His ideas had some influence on the administration of President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], but the ideas of Spykman and Kennan would exercise greater weight.<ref name="owens" /> Later during the Cold War, [[Colin Gray]] would decisively reject the idea that airpower changed geostrategic considerations, while [[Saul B. Cohen]] examined the idea of a "shatterbelt", which would eventually inform the [[domino theory]].<ref name="owens" />
===Post-Cold War===
{{Expand-section|date=August 2007}}
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, for most [[NATO]] or former [[Warsaw Pact]] countries, Geopolitical strategies have generally followed the course of either solidifying security obligations or accesses to global resources; however, the strategies of other countries have not been as palpable.
==Notable geostrategists==
The below geostrategists were instrumental in founding and developing the major geostrategic [[doctrine]]s in the discipline's history. While there have been many other geostrategists, these have been the most influential in shaping and developing the field as a whole.
===Alfred Thayer Mahan===
[[Image:AlfredThayerMahan.jpeg|thumb|left|Alfred Thayer Mahan]]
'''[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]''' was an [[United States Navy|American Navy]] officer and president of the [[U.S. Naval War College]]. He is best known for his ''[[The Influence of Sea Power upon History|Influence of Sea Power upon History]]'' series of books, which argued that naval supremacy was the deciding factor in [[great power]] warfare. In 1900, Mahan's book ''[[The Problem of Asia]]'' was published. In this volume he laid out the first geostrategy of the modern era.
The ''Problem of Asia'' divides the continent of Asia into 3 zones:
*A northern zone, located above the 40th parallel, characterized by its cold climate, and dominated by land power;
*The "Debatable and Debated" zone, located between the 40th and 30th parallels, characterized by a temperate climate; and,
*A southern zone, located below the 30th parallel, characterized by its hot climate, and dominated by sea power.<ref name="mahan">{{cite book |last=Mahan |first=Alfred Thayer |authorlink=Alfred Thayer Mahan |title=The Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon International Politics |year=1900 |publisher=Little, Brown, and Company |location= |id=ISBN 0-7658-0524-3 }}</ref>
The Debated and Debatable zone, Mahan observed, contained two [[peninsula]]s on either end ([[Asia Minor]] and [[Korean peninsula|Korea]]), the [[Suez Canal|Isthmus of Suez]], [[Palestine]], [[Syria]], [[Mesopotamia]], two countries marked by their mountain ranges ([[Persia]] and [[Afghanistan]]), the [[Pamir Mountains]], the [[Tibet]]an [[Himalayas]], the [[Yangtze Valley]], and [[Japan]].<ref name="mahan" /> Within this zone, Mahan asserted that there were no strong states capable of withstanding outside influence or capable even of maintaining stability within their own borders. So whereas the political situations to the north and south were relatively stable and determined, the middle remained "debatable and debated ground."<ref name="mahan" />
North of the 40th parallel, the vast expanse of Asia was dominated by the [[Russian Empire]]. Russia possessed a central position on the continent, and a wedge-shaped projection into [[Central Asia]], bounded by the [[Caucasus mountains]] and [[Caspian Sea]] on one side and the mountains of Afghanistan and Western China on the other side. To prevent Russian expansionism and achievement of predominance on the Asian continent, Mahan believed pressure on Asia's flanks could be the only viable strategy pursued by sea powers.<ref name="mahan" />
South of the 30th parallel lay areas dominated by the sea powers—[[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]], the [[United States]], [[Germany]], and [[Japan]]. To Mahan, the possession of [[India]] by Britain was of key strategic importance, as India was best suited for exerting balancing pressure against Russia in Central Asia. Britain's predominance in [[Egypt]], [[China]], [[Australia]], and the [[Cape of Good Hope]] was also considered important.<ref name="mahan" />
The strategy of sea powers, according to Mahan, ought to be to deny Russia the benefits of commerce that come from sea commerce. He noted that both the [[Dardanelles]] and [[Danish straits|Baltic straits]] could be closed by a hostile power, thereby denying Russia access to the sea. Further, this disadvantageous position would reinforce Russia's proclivity toward expansionism in order to obtain wealth or [[warm water port]]s.<ref name="mahan" /> Natural geographic targets for Russian expansionism in search of access to the sea would therefore be the Chinese seaboard, the [[Persian Gulf]], and Asia Minor.<ref name="mahan" />
In this contest between land power and sea power, Russia would find itself allied with [[France]] (a natural sea power, but in this case necessarily acting as a land power), arrayed against Germany, Britain, Japan, and the United States as sea powers.<ref name="mahan" /> Further, Mahan conceived of a unified, modern state composed of [[Turkey]], Syria, and Mesopotamia, possessing an efficiently organized army and navy to stand as a counterweight to Russian expansion.<ref name="mahan" />
Further dividing the map by geographic features, Mahan stated that the two most influential lines of division would be the Suez and [[Panama canal]]s. As most developed nations and resources lay above the [[North-South divide|North-South division]], politics and commerce north of the two canals would be of much greater importance than those occurring south of the canals. As such, the great progress of historical development would not flow from north to south, but from east to west, in this case leading toward Asia as the locus of advance.<ref name="mahan" />
[[Image:Mahan Problem of Asia 1900.png|thumb|center|600px|This map depicts the world as divided by geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his 1900 piece ''The Problem of Asia''. Asia is divided along the 30 north and 40 north parallels, represented here by green lines. In between the 30th and 40th parallel is what Mahan termed the "Debatable and debated ground," subject to competition between the land powers and sea powers.
{{legend|#FF3333|The two allied land powers, the Russian Empire and France}}
{{legend|#FF6666|The portions of Asia above the 40th parallel under effective influence of Russian land power}}
{{legend|#3399FF|The four allied sea powers, Great Britain, the German Empire, Japan, and the United States}}
{{legend|#99CCFF|The portions of Asia below the 30th parallel subject to effective control by sea power}}
{{legend|#4CFF79|Key isthmuses identified by Mahan: the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Dardanelles, Straits of Gibraltar, and Baltic Straits.}}]]
<br style="clear:both" />
===Halford J. Mackinder===
[[Image:Halford Mackinder.jpg|thumb|Halford J. Mackinder]]
'''[[Halford J. Mackinder]]'''
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
<br style="clear:both" />
===Friedrich Ratzel===
[[Image:Friedrich Ratzel.jpg|thumb|left|Friedrich Ratzel]]
Influenced by the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, as well as the German geographers [[Karl Ritter]] and [[Alexander von Humboldt]], '''[[Friedrich Ratzel]]''' would lay the foundations for ''[[geopolitik]]'', [[Germany]]'s unique strain of [[geopolitics]].
Ratzel wrote on the natural division between [[land power]]s and [[sea power]]s, agreeing with Mahan that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from [[international trade|trade]] would support the development of a [[merchant marine]].<ref name="dorpalen">{{cite book
| last = Dorpalen
| first = Andreas
| year = 1984
| title = The World of General Haushofer
| publisher = Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.
| location = New York
| id =
}}</ref> However, his key contribution were the development of the concepts of ''[[lebensraum|raum]]'' and [[organic state theory]]. He theorized that states were [[organic (model)|organic]] and growing, and that [[border]]s were only temporary, representing pauses in their natural movement.<ref name="dorpalen" /> ''Raum'' was the land, [[spirituality|spiritual]]ly connected to a [[nation]] (in this case, the German peoples), from which the people could draw sustenance, find adjacent inferior nations which would support them,<ref name="dorpalen" /> and which would be fertilized by their ''kultur'' (culture).<ref name="mattern">{{cite book
| last = Mattern
| first = Johannes
| year = 1942
| title = Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire
| publisher = The Johns Hopkins Press
| location = Baltimore
| id =
}}</ref>
Ratzel's ideas would influence the works of his student Rudolf Kjellén, as well as those of General Karl Haushofer.<ref name="dorpalen" />
===Rudolf Kjellén===
<!-- Unsourced image removed: [[Image:Rudolf Kjellen.jpg|thumb|Rudolf Kjellén]] -->
'''[[Rudolf Kjellén]]''' was a [[Sweden|Swedish]] political scientist and student of Friedrich Ratzel. He first coined the term "geopolitics."<ref name="mattern" /> His writings would play a decisive role in influencing [[General Karl Haushofer]]'s ''geopolitik'', and indirectly the future [[Nazism|Nazi]] foreign policy.<ref name="mattern" />
His writings focused on five central concepts that would underlie German ''geopolitik'':
#''Reich'' was a territorial concept that was composed of ''Raum'' (''[[Lebensraum]]''), and strategic military shape;
#''[[Volk]]'' was a racial conception of the state;
#''Haushalt'' was a call for [[autarky]] based on land, formulated in reaction to the vicissitudes of [[international trade|international markets]];
#''Geselleschaft'' was the social aspect of a nation’s organization and cultural appeal, Kjellén [[anthropomorphize|anthropomorphizing]] inter-state relations more than Ratzel had; and,
#''Regierung'' was the form of [[government]] whose [[bureaucracy]] and [[army]] would contribute to the people’s pacification and coordination.<ref name="mattern" />
===General Karl Haushofer===
[[Image:Karl Haushofer.jpg|thumb|left|General Haushofer]]
'''[[Karl Haushofer]]''''s geopolitik expanded upon that of Ratzel and Kjellén. While the latter two conceived of geopolitik as the state-as-an-organism-in-space put to the service of a leader, Haushofer's Munich school specifically studied geography as it related to war and designs for empire.<ref name="dorpalen" /> The behavioral rules of previous geopoliticians were thus turned into dynamic [[normative]] [[doctrine]]s for action on lebensraum and world power.<ref name="dorpalen" />
Haushofer defined geopolitik in 1935 as "the duty to safeguard the right to the soil, to the land in the widest sense, not only the land within the frontiers of the Reich, but the right to the [[Volksdeutsche|more extensive Volk]] and cultural lands."<ref name="walsh" /> Culture itself was seen as the most conducive element to dynamic expansion. Culture provided a guide as to the best areas for expansion, and could make expansion safe, whereas solely military or commercial power could not.<ref name="dorpalen" />
To Haushofer, the existence of a state depended on living space, the pursuit of which must serve as the basis for all policies. Germany had a high [[population density]], whereas the old colonial powers had a much lower density: a virtual mandate for German expansion into resource-rich areas.<ref name="dorpalen" /> A buffer zone of territories or insignificant states on one's borders would serve to protect Germany.<ref name="dorpalen" /> Closely linked to this need was Haushofer's assertion that the existence of small states was evidence of political regression and disorder in the international system. The small states surrounding Germany ought to be brought into the vital German order.<ref name="dorpalen" /> These states were seen as being too small to maintain practical autonomy (even if they maintained large colonial possessions) and would be better served by protection and organization within Germany. In Europe, he saw [[Belgium]], the [[Netherlands]], [[Portugal]], [[Denmark]], [[Switzerland]], [[Greece]] and the "mutilated alliance" of [[Austro-Hungary]] as supporting his assertion.<ref name="dorpalen" />
Haushofer and the Munich school of geopolitik would eventually expand their conception of lebensraum and autarky well past a restoration of the [[German Empire|German borders of 1914]] and "a place in the sun." They set as goals a New European Order, then a New Afro-European Order, and eventually to a Eurasian Order.<ref name="mattern" /> This concept became known as a [[pan-region]], taken from the American [[Monroe Doctrine]], and the idea of national and continental self-sufficiency.<ref name="mattern" /> This was a forward-looking refashioning of the [[colonialism|drive for colonies]], something that geopoliticians did not see as an economic necessity, but more as a matter of prestige, and of putting pressure on older colonial powers. The fundamental motivating force was not be economic, but cultural and spiritual.<ref name="dorpalen" />
Beyond being an economic concept, pan-regions were a strategic concept as well. Haushofer acknowledged the strategic concept of the [[Heartland]] put forward by the Halford Mackinder.<ref name="dorpalen" /> If Germany could control [[Eastern Europe]] and subsequently [[European Russia|Russian territory]], it could control a strategic area to which hostile [[sea power]] could be denied.<ref name="mackinder">{{cite book
| last = Mackinder
| first = Halford J.
| authorlink = Halford J. Mackinder
| year = 1942
| title = [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201979%20and%20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201942/DIR.pdf Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction]
| publisher = National Defense University Press
| location = Washington D.C.
| id =
}}</ref> Allying with [[Italy]] and [[Japan]] would further augment German strategic control of Eurasia, with those states becoming the naval arms protecting Germany's insular position.<ref name="walsh" />
===Nicholas J. Spykman===
'''[[Nicholas J. Spykman]]''' was an [[Netherlands|Dutch]]-American geostrategist, known as the "godfather of [[containment]]." His geostrategic work, ''The Geography of the Peace'' (1944), argued that the balance of power in [[Eurasia]] directly affected United States security.
N.J. Spykman based his geostrategic ideas on those of Sir Halford Mackinder's Heartland theory. Spykman's key contribution was to alter the strategic valuation of the Heartland vs. the "Rimland" (a geographic area analogous to Mackinder's "Inner or Marginal Crescent").<ref name="spykman">{{cite book
| last = Spykman
| first = Nicholas J.
| authorlink = Nicholas J. Spykman
| year = 1944
| title = The Geography of the Peace
| publisher = Harcourt, Brace
| location = New York
| id =
}}</ref> Spykman does not see the heartland as a region which will be unified by powerful [[transport]] or [[communication]] infrastructure in the near future. As such, it won't be in a position to compete with the United States' [[sea power]], despite its uniquely defensive position.<ref name="spykman" /> The rimland possessed all of the key resources and populations—its domination was key to the control of Eurasia.<ref name="spykman" /> His strategy was for Offshore powers, and perhaps Russia as well, to resist the consolidation of control over the rimland by any one power.<ref name="spykman" /> Balanced power would lead to peace.
===George F. Kennan===
[[Image:Kennan.jpeg|thumb|George F. Kennan]]
'''[[George F. Kennan]]''', U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, laid out the seminal Cold War geostrategy in his ''[[Long Telegram]]'' and ''[[The Sources of Soviet Conduct]]''. He coined the term "[[containment]]",<ref name="kennan-x">{{cite journal
| author = "X"
| year = 1947
| month = July
| title = The Sources of Soviet conduct
| journal = [[Foreign Affairs]]
| volume =
| issue = XXV
| pages = 575–576
| doi =
| id =
| url =
| accessdate =
}}</ref> which would become the guiding idea for U.S. grand strategy over the next forty years, although the term would come to mean something significantly different from Kennan's original formulation.<ref name="kennan-m">{{cite book
| last = Kennan
| first = George F.
| authorlink = George F. Kennan
| coauthors =
| year =
| title = Memoirs: 1925-1950
| publisher =
| location =
| pages = pp. 354-367
| id =
}}</ref>
Kennan advocated what was called "strongpoint containment." In his view, the United States and its allies needed to protect the productive industrial areas of the world from Soviet domination. He noted that of the five centers of industrial strength in the world—the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, and Russia—the only contested area was that of Germany. Kennan was concerned about maintaining the [[balance of power]] between the U.S. and the [[USSR]], and in his view, only these few industrialized areas mattered.
Here Kennan differed from [[Paul Nitze]], whose seminal Cold War document, [[NSC-68]], called for "undifferentiated or global containment," along with a massive military buildup.<ref name="LaFeber">{{cite book
| last = LaFeber
| first = Walter
| year = 2002
| title = America, Russia, and the Cold War
| publisher =
| location = New York
| pages = pp. 69
| id =
}}</ref> Kennan saw the Soviet Union as an [[ideology|ideological]] and political challenger rather than a true military threat. There was no reason to fight the Soviets throughout [[Eurasia]], because those regions were not productive, and the Soviet Union was already exhausted from [[World War II]], limiting its ability to project power abroad. Therefore, Kennan disapproved of U.S. involvement in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], and later spoke out critically against [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]]'s military buildup.
===Henry Kissinger===
[[Image:Henry Kissinger.jpg|thumb|left|Henry Kissinger]]
'''[[Henry Kissinger]]''' implemented two geostrategic objectives when in office: the deliberate move to shift the [[polarity in international relations|polarity]] of the international system from bipolar to tripolar; and, the designation of regional stabilizing states in connection with the [[Nixon Doctrine]]. In Chapter 28 of his long work, ''[[Diplomacy (Kissinger)|Diplomacy]]'', Kissinger discusses the "[[opening of China]]" as a deliberate strategy to change the [[balance of power in international relations|balance of power]] in the international system, taking advantage of the [[Sino-Soviet split|split within the Sino-Soviet bloc]].<ref name"kissdip">{{cite book
| last = Kissinger
| first = Henry
| authorlink = Henry Kissinger
| year =
| title = Diplomacy
| publisher =
| location =
| pages = pp. 723
| id =
}}</ref> The regional stabilizers were pro-American states which would receive significant U.S. aid in exchange for assuming responsibility for regional stability. Among the regional stabilizers designated by Kissinger were [[Zaire]], [[Iran]], and [[Indonesia]].<ref name="ampros">Stephen Kinzer. "[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=10824 Turkey, a longtime U.S. ally, now pursues its own path. Guess why.]" ''[[American Prospect]]'', [[5 February]] [[2006]]</ref>
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
===Zbigniew Brzezinski===
'''[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]]''' laid out his most significant contribution to post-[[Cold War]] geostrategy in his [[1997]] book ''The Grand Chessboard''. He defined four regions of [[Eurasia]], and in which ways the United States ought to design its policy toward each region in order to maintain its global primacy. The four regions (echoing Mackinder and Spykman) are:
*Europe, the Democratic Bridgehead
*Russia, the Black Hole
*The Middle East, the Eurasian Balkans
*Asia, the Far Eastern Anchor
In his subsequent book, ''The Choice'', Brzezinski updates his geostrategy in light of [[globalization]], [[September 11, 2001 attacks|9/11]] and the intervening six years between the two books.
==Criticisms of geostrategy==
:"Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romatically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of 'geopolitics.'"
::—Charles Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland"<ref name="clover">{{cite journal
| author = Charles Clover
| year = 1999
| month = March/April
| title = Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland
| journal = Foreign Affairs
| volume = 78
| issue = 9
| url = http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990301facomment963/charles-clover/dreams-of-the-eurasian-heartland-the-reemergence-of-geopolitics.html
}}</ref>
Geostrategy encounters a wide variety of criticisms. It has been called a crude form of [[geographic determinism]]. It is seen as a gloss used to justify international aggression and [[expansionism]]—it is linked to [[Nazi]] war plans, and to a perceived U.S. creation of Cold War divisions through its containment strategy. [[Marxist international relations theory|Marxists]] and [[Critical international relations theory|critical theorists]] believe geostrategy is simply a justification for [[American imperialism]].<ref name="owens" />
Some political scientists argue that as the importance of [[non-state actor]]s rises, the importance of geopolitics concomitantly falls.<ref name="owens" /> Similarly, those who see the rise of economic issues in priority over security issues argue that [[geoeconomics]] is more relevant to the modern era than geostrategy.<ref name="demko">{{cite book
| editor = George J. Demko and William B. Wood
| title = Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century
| year = 1994
| publisher = Westview
| location = Boulder, Colorado
| id =
| pages = pp. 10-11
}}</ref>
Most [[international relations theory]] that is critical of [[realism in international relations]] is likewise critical of geostrategy because of the assumptions it makes about the hierarchy of the international system based on [[power in international relations|power]].<ref name="owens" />
Further, the relevance of geography to international politics is questioned because advances in technology alter the importance of geographical features, and in some cases make those features irrelevant. Thus geography does not have the permanent importance that some geostrategists ascribe to it.<ref name="owens" />
{{seealso|Critical geopolitics}}
==Institutions on geostrategy==
*Instytut Geopolityki (Institute of Geopolitics) located in Czestochowa (Poland).
Institute is a non-governmental organization, founded in July 2007. IG promotes and popularizes geopolitics and its subfields: geostrategy, geohistory, geoeconomics, astropolitics and astrostrategy.
==See also==
[[Image:Homer Lea.jpg|thumb|Homer Lea]]
''Other geostrategists:''
{| class="toccolours" border="1px" cellpadding="3px" style="border-collapse: collapse;"
|- style="background-color:#ddd"
!|Name||Nationality
|-
|[[Brooks Adams]]||United States
|-
|[[Thomas Barnett]]||United States
|-
|[[Saul B. Cohen]]||United States
|-
|[[Julian Corbett]]||British
|-
|[[Aleksandr Dugin]]||Russian
|-
|[[Colin S. Gray]]||United States
|-
|[[Andrew Gyorgy]]||United States
|-
|[[Homer Lea]]||United States
|-
|[[Otto Maull]]||German
|-
|[[Alexander de Seversky]]||United States
|-
|[[Robert Strausz-Hupé]]||United States
|-
|[[Ko Tun-hwa]]||Republic of China (Taiwan)
|-
|[[Derwent Whittlesey]]||United States
|}
''Geostrategy by country:''
*[[British geostrategy]]
*[[Chinese geostrategy]]
*[[French geostrategy]]
*[[Geopolitik|German geostrategy]]
*[[Indian geostrategy]]
*[[Japanese geostrategy]]
*[[Russian geostrategy]]
*[[United States geostrategy]]
''Geostrategy by region:''
*[[Geostrategy in Central Asia]]
*[[Geostrategy in East Asia]]
*[[Geostrategy in Europe]]
''Geostrategy by topic:''
*[[Oil geostrategy]]
*[[Naval geostrategy]]
*[[Space geostrategy]]
''Related fields:''
*[[Geoeconomics]]
==References==
<references />
===Further reading===
*Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ''The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives.'' New York: Basic Books, 1997.
*Gray, Colin S. and Geoffrey Sloan. ''Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy.'' Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999.
*Mackinder, Halford J. [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201979%20and%20earlier/Democratic%20Ideals%20and%20Reality%20-%201942/DIR.pdf ''Democratic Ideals and Reality.''] Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
*Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ''The Problem of Asia: Its Effects Upon International Politics.'' New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
*Daclon, Corrado Maria. ''Geopolitics of Environment, A Wider Approach to the Global Challenges.'' Italy: Comunità Internazionale, SIOI, 2007.
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