Intension
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: ''Not to be confused with the homophone [[intention]]; or the related concept of [[intentionality]]. For the song "Intension" by Tool, see ''[[10,000 Days|10,000 Days]]''.''
In [[linguistics]], [[logic]], [[philosophy]], and other [[field of study|field]]s, an '''intension''' is any [[property (philosophy)|property]] or [[quality]] connoted by a [[word]], [[phrase]] or other symbol. In the case of a word, it is often implied by its [[definition]]. The term may also refer to the complete [[set]] of meanings or properties that are implied by a concept, although the term ''[[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]]'' is technically more correct for this.
Intension is generally discussed with regard to [[extension (semantics)|extension]] (or ''[[denotation]]''). Intension refers to the set of all ''possible'' things a word or phrase ''could'' describe, extension to the set of all ''actual'' things the word describes. For example, the intension of a [[car]] is the all-inclusive concept of a [[car]], including, for example, mile-[[length|long]] cars made of [[chocolate]] that may not actually exist. But the extension of 'car' is all actual instances of cars ([[past]], present, and future), which will amount to [[million]]s or [[1000000000 (number)|billions]] of cars, but probably does not include any mile-long cars made of chocolate.
The meaning of a word can be thought of as the bond between ''the idea or thing the word refers to'' and ''the word itself''. [[Switzerland|Swiss]] linguist [[Ferdinand de Saussure]] contrasts three concepts:
*the ''signified'' — the [[concept]] or [[idea]] that a sign evokes.
*the ''signifier'' — the "sound image" or string of [[letters]] on a page that one [[recognition|recognizes]] as a [[sign]].
*the ''referent'' — the actual [[Object (philosophy)|thing]] or set of things a sign refers to. See ''[[Sign (semiotics)#Dyadic signs|Dyadic signs]]'' and ''[[Reference#Semantics|Reference (semantics)]]''.
Intension is [[analogy|analogous]] to the signified, extension to the referent. The intension thus links the signifier to the sign's extension. Without intension of some sort, words can have no meaning.
In philosophical arguments about [[dualism]] versus [[monism]], it is noted that thoughts have intensionality and physical objects do not (S.E. Palmer, 1999)
''Intension'' and ''intensionality'' (the state of having intension) should not be confused with ''intention'' and ''[[intentionality]]'', which are [[pronunciation|pronounced]] the same and occasionally arise in the same [[philosophy|philosophical]] context. Where this happens, the letter '[[s]]' or '[[t]]' is sometimes [[Italic type|italicized]] to [[emphasis|emphasize]] the [[distinct]]ion.
==See also==
* [[Comprehension (logic)|Comprehension]]
* [[Description Logic]]
* [[Intensional definition]]
* [[Intensional statement]]
== References ==
* Ferdinand De Saussure: ''Course in General Linguistics''. Open Court Classics, July 1986. ISBN 0-812-69023-0
**S. E. Palmer, Vision Science: From Photons to Phenomenology, 1999. MIT Press, ISBN 78-0262161831
[[Category:Logic]]
[[Category:Semantics]]
[[Category:Philosophical terminology]]
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