McMahon-Hussein Correspondence
266431
226137398
2008-07-17T00:00:48Z
Harlan wilkerson
1000746
/* The Thrice-Promised Land */
<!-- Deleted image removed: [[Image:Sharif H-focus.jpg|thumb|220px|Sharif Hussein as depicted on a [[Jordan]]ian banknote.]] -->
The '''McMahon-Hussein Correspondence'''<ref>Also sometimes known in the literature as the 'Hussein-McMahon Correspondence'.</ref> was a protracted exchange of letters (July 14, 1915 to January 30, 1916)<ref>http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS094.pdf p.8</ref> during [[World War I]], between the [[Sharif of Mecca]], [[Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca|Husayn bin Ali]], and [[Henry McMahon (diplomat)|Sir Henry McMahon]], British [[High Commissioner]] in [[Egypt]], concerning the future political status of the Arab lands under the [[Ottoman Empire]]. The Arab side was already looking toward a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and the [[United Kingdom|British]] encouraged the Arabs to revolt and thus hamper the [[Ottoman Empire]], which had become a German ally in the War after November 1915.<ref>http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS094.pdf p.7</ref>
== Origins and ramifications ==
===The Damascus Protocol===
{{main|Damascus Protocol}}
On his return journey from [[Constantinople]] in 1914, where he had confronted the [[Grand Vizier]] with evidence of an Ottoman plot to depose his father, [[Faisal I of Iraq|Faisal bin Hussein]] visited Damascus to resume talks with the Arab secret societies [[al-Fatat]] and [[Al-'Ahd]] that he had met in March/April. On this occasion Faisal joined their revolutionary movement. It was during this visit that he was presented with the document that became known as the 'Damascus Protocol'. The document declared that the Arabs would revolt in alliance with [[Great Britain]] in return for recognition of Arab independence in an area running from the 37th parallel near the [[Taurus Mountains]] on the southern border of [[Turkey]], to be bounded in the east by [[Persia]] and the [[Persian Gulf]], in the west by the [[Mediterranean Sea]] and in the south by the [[Arabian Sea]].<ref name="paris24">Paris, 2003, p. 24.</ref><ref name="biger">Biger, 2004, p. 47.</ref>
Early in April 1914 [[Abdullah I of Jordan|Abdullah]]
asked the British High Commissioner in Cairo, what would be the British attitude if the
Arab Ottomans revolted. The British response, based on its traditional policy of preserving
"the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" was negative. However, the entry of the Ottomans on Germany's side in World War I on November 11, 1914, brought about an abrupt shift in British political interests concerning an Arab revolt against the Ottomans.<ref>http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS094.pdf p.7</ref>
Following deliberations at [[Ta'if]] between Hussein and his sons in June 1915, during which [[Faisal I of Iraq|Faisal]] counselled caution, [[Ali of Hejaz|Ali]] argued against rebellion and [[Abdullah I of Jordan|Abdullah]] advocated action, the Sharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916 and commenced negotiations with the British High Commissioner in Egypt, [[Sir Henry McMahon]].<ref name="paris24"/>
The letter from McMahon to Hussein dated [[24 October]] [[1915]] is key. It stated on behalf of the Government of Great Britain that:
[[Image:FeisalPartyAtVersaillesCopy.jpg|right|thumb|350px|Emir Faisal's party at [[Versailles]], during the [[Paris Peace Conference of 1919]]. At the center, from left to right: [[Rustum Haidar]], [[Nuri as-Said]], Prince Faisal, Captain Pisani (behind Faisal) [[T. E. Lawrence]], Faisal's slave (name unknown), Captain [[Tahsin Qadri]].]]
<blockquote>
''The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.''
''Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.''
''As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally France, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:''
''That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.''<ref>[http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eb39ca1bfead52dd852570c00079484e!OpenDocument October 24 1915 letter from Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Egypt, to Sherif Husayn of Mecca], archived at UNISPAL.</ref>
</blockquote>
===The Arab Revolt===
{{Main|Arab Revolt}}
Although the correspondence did not result in a written treaty, McMahon's promises were seen by the Arabs as a formal agreement between them and Great Britain. On this understanding the Arabs established a military force under the command of Hussein's son [[Faisal I of Iraq|Faisal]] which fought, with inspiration from '[[T. E. Lawrence|Lawrence of Arabia]]', against the Ottoman Empire during the [[Arab Revolt]].<ref name="biger"/> In an intelligence memo written in January 1916 Lawrence described the Arab Revolt as
<blockquote>
beneficial to us, because it marches with our immediate aims, the break up of the Islamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire, and because ''the states [Sharif Hussein] would set up to succeed the Turks would be … harmless to ourselves'' … The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. ''If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of cohesion'' (emphasis in original).<ref name="oup">Waïl S. Hassan "Lawrence, T. E." '' The Oxford Encyclopedia of British Literature''. David Scott Kastan. Oxford University Press 2005.</ref>
</blockquote>
The Arab Revolt began in June 1916, when an Arab army of around 70,000 men moved against Ottoman forces. They captured [[Aqaba]]h and cut the [[Hejaz railway]], a vital strategic link through the Arab peninsula which ran from Damascus to [[Medina]]. This enabled the [[Egyptian Expeditionary Force]] under the command of [[Edmund Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby|General Allenby]] to advance into the Ottoman territories of Palestine and Syria.<ref>"Arab Revolt" ''A Dictionary of Contemporary World History''. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.</ref>
The British advance culminated in the [[Battle of Megiddo (1918)|Battle of Megiddo]] in September 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey on [[31 October]], 1918.
===The Hogarth Message===
In January 1918 Commander [[David George Hogarth|David Hogarth]], head of the [[Arab Bureau]] in Cairo, was dispatched to [[Jeddah]] to deliver a letter written by Sir [[Mark Sykes]] on behalf of the British Government to Hussein (now King of [[Hejaz]]). The message assured Hussein that
<blockquote>
The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex F.</ref>
</blockquote>
and with respect to Palestine and in the light of the Balfour Declaration that
<blockquote>
Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that insofar as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal.<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex F.</ref>
</blockquote>
The meaning of the Hogarth message, and in particular whether it modified the commitments made in the Balfour Declaration is still debated,<ref>Friedman, 2000, p. 328.</ref><ref>Kedourie, 2002, p. 257.</ref> although Hogarth reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain".<ref>Huneidi, 2001, p. 66.</ref>
===Declaration to the Seven===
{{main|Declaration to the Seven}}
In the wake of the [[Balfour Declaration of 1917|Balfour Declaration]] and the publication by the [[Bolshevik]]s of the secret [[Sykes-Picot Agreement]] seven [[Syria]]n notables in Cairo who were members of the newly-formed [[Party of Syrian Unity]] issued a memorandum requesting from the British Government a "guarantee of the ultimate independence of [[Arabia]]". The Declaration to the Seven issued on [[16 June]], 1918 in response stated the British policy that the future government of the regions of the [[Ottoman Empire]] occupied by [[Allies of World War I|Allied forces]] in [[World War I]] should be based on the consent of the governed.<ref>Friedman, 2000, pp. 195-197.</ref><ref>Choueiri, 2000, p. 149.</ref>
===Allenby's assurance to Faisal===
On [[19 October]] [[1918]], General Allenby reported to the British Government that he had given Faisal,
<blockquote>
official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during the period of military administration they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice the final settlement by the peace conference, at which no doubt the Arabs would have a representative. I added that the instructions to the military governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found any of them contravening these orders. I reminded the Amir Faisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endeavour to reach a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith.<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex H.</ref>
</blockquote>
===Anglo-French Declaration of 1918===
{{main|Anglo-French Declaration}}
In the Anglo-French Declaration of [[7 November]] [[1918]] the two governments stated that
<blockquote>
The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex I.</ref>
</blockquote>
According to civil servant [[Eyre Crowe]] who saw the original draft of the Declaration, "we had issued a definite statement against annexation in order (1) to quiet the Arabs and (2) to prevent the French annexing any part of Syria".<ref>Hughes, 1999, pp. 116-117.</ref>
===Following World War I===
During the Revolt Faisal had commanded the northern Arab army in Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. In 1920 he was chosen as King of Syria by the Syrian National Congress but was expelled by France, now the [[French Mandate of Syria|mandatory power]], following the [[Battle of Maysalun]].<ref>"Faisal I" ''A Dictionary of World History''. Oxford University Press, 2000.</ref> During the war, thousands of proclamations were dropped in all parts of Palestine, which carried a message from the Sharif Hussein on one side and a message from the British Command on the other, to the effect 'that an Anglo-Arab agreement had been arrived at securing the independence of the Arabs.'<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex A, paragraph 19.</ref>
The Arabs believed that Great Britain's undertaking to them was violated by the region's subsequent partition into British and French [[League of Nations mandate]]s under the secret [[Sykes-Picot Agreement]] between Britain, France and Russia of May 1916 (made public by the [[Bolshevik]]s after the [[Russian Revolution of 1917|Russian Revolution]])<ref>Federal Research Division, 2004, p. 41.</ref><ref>Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 57.</ref> and by the [[Balfour Declaration 1917|Balfour Declaration]] of November 1917 which favoured the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Even though the Sykes-Picot Agreement did not call for Arab sovereignty, it did call for 'suzerainty of an Arab chief' and 'an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, '''and the representatives of the sheriff of mecca'''.<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm The Sykes-Picot Agreement : 1916, Avalon Project]</ref>
====Lawrence's post-war advocacy====
Lawrence became increasingly guilt-ridden by the knowledge that Britain did not intend to abide by the commitments made to the Sharif, but still managed to convince Faisal that it would be to the Arabs' advantage to go on fighting the Ottomans. At the [[Paris Peace Conference, 1919|Versailles peace conference]] in 1919 and the Cairo conference in 1921 Lawrence lobbied for Arab independence, but his belated attempts to maintain the territorial integrity of Arab lands, which he had promised to Hussein and Faisal, and in limiting [[France]]'s influence in what later became [[Syria]] and [[Lebanon]] were fruitless. However, as Churchill's adviser on Arab affairs (1921–2) Lawrence was able to lobby for a considerable degree of autonomy for [[Mesopotamia]] and [[Transjordan]]. The British placed Palestine, promised to the Zionist Federation in 1917, under mandate with a civilian administration headed by [[Herbert Samuel, 1st Viscount Samuel|Herbert Samuel]], and divided their remaining territory in the Middle East into the kingdoms of [[Iraq]] and Transjordan, assigning them to Faisal and his brother [[Abdullah I of Jordan|Abdullah]], respectively. <ref name="oup"/><ref>"Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 'Lawrence of Arabia'" ''A Dictionary of Contemporary World History''. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003.</ref>
==The Thrice-Promised Land==
The debate regarding Palestine derived from the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. The Arab position was that "''portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo...''" could not refer to Palestine since that lay well to the south of the named places. In particular, the Arabs argued that the ''vilayet'' (province) of Damascus did not exist and that the district (''sanjak'') of Damascus covered only the area surrounding the city itself and furthermore that Palestine was part of the ''vilayet'' of 'Syria A-Sham', which was not mentioned in the exchange of letters.<ref>Biger, 2004, p. 48.</ref> The British position, which it held consistently at least from 1916, was that Palestine was intended to be included in the phrase. Each side produced supporting arguments for their positions based on fine details of the wording and the historical circumstances of the correspondence. For example, the Arab side argued that the phrase "cannot be said to be purely Arab" did not apply to Palestine, while the British pointed to the Jewish and Christian minorities in Palestine.<!--that's what they said, but most of the Christians were Arab, hmmm.-->
Balfour came under criticism in the House of Commons, when the Liberals and Labor Socialists moved a resolution 'That secret treaties with the allied governments should be revised, since, in their present form, they are inconsistent with the object for which this country entered the war and are, therefore, a barrier to a democratic peace.'<ref>[http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9905E6DD173EE433A25752C2A9609C946996D6CF No Peace Basis Yet, Balfour Asserts, 21 June 1918]</ref>
In response to growing criticism arising from the mutually irreconcilable commitments undertaken by the United Kingdom in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour declaration<ref>Zachary Lockman "Balfour Declaration" ''The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World'', 2e. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001.</ref> the [[Churchill White Paper, 1922]] stated that
<blockquote>
it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/brwh1922.htm British White Paper of June 1922], The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.</ref>
</blockquote>
In a 1922 letter to Sir John Shuckburgh of the British Colonial Office, McMahon wrote the following: "It was my intention to exclude Palestine from independent Arabia, and I hoped that I had so worded the letter as to make this sufficiently clear for all practical purposes. My reasons for restricting myself to specific mention of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo in that connection in my letter were: 1) that these were places to which the Arabs attached vital importance and 2) that there was no place I could think of at the time of sufficient importance for purposes of definition further South of the above. It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the more Northern coastal tracts of Syria."
<ref>http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/viewanswers.asp?questionID=499</ref>
A committee established by the British in 1939 to clarify the various arguments observed that many commitments had been made during and after the war - and that all of them would have to be studied together. The Arab representatives submitted a statement to the committee from Sir Michael McDonnell<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, Annex C.</ref> which explained that whatever McMahon had intended to mean was of no legal consequence, since it was his actual statements that constituted the pledge from His Majesty's Government. The Arab representatives also pointed out that McMahon had been acting as an intermediary for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grey. Speaking in the House of Lords on the 27th March, 1923, Lord Grey had made it clear that, for his part, he entertained serious doubts as to the validity of the Churchill White Paper's interpretation of the pledges which he, as Foreign Secretary, had caused to be given to the Sharif Husain in 1915. The Arab representatives suggested that a search for evidence in the files of the Foreign Office might throw light on the Secretary of State's intentions. In a speech delivered in the House of Lords on the 27th March, 1923, late Lord Grey had said:
<blockquote>" A considerable number of these engagements, or some of them, which have not been officially made public by the Government, have become public through other sources. Whether all have become public I do not know, but I seriously suggest to the Government that the best way of clearing our honour in this matter is officially to publish the whole of the engagements relating to the matter, which we entered into during the war."<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL, enclosure to Annex A.</ref></blockquote>
The committee concluded:<blockquote>'It is beyond the scope of the Committee to express an opinion upon the proper interpretation of the various statements mentioned in paragraph 19 and such an opinion could not in any case be properly expressed unless consideration had also been given to a number of other statements made during and after the war. '''In the opinion of the Committee it is, however, evident from these statements that His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which—upon any interpretation of the Correspondence—His Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the Correspondence.'''"<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c!OpenDocument Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916], UNISPAL</ref></blockquote>
Years later, historians and scholars searching through the declassified files in the National Archives discovered evidence that Palestine had been pledged to Hussein. The Eastern Committee of the Cabinet, previously known as the Middle Eastern Committee, had met on 5 December 1918 to discuss the government's commitments regarding Palestine. Lord Curzon chaired the meeting. General Jan Smuts, Lord Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and representatives of the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, the Wax Office, and the Treasury were present. T. E. Lawrence also attended. According to the minutes Lord Curzon explained:
<blockquote>"The Palestine position is this. If we deal with our commitments, there is first the general pledge to Hussein in October 1915, under which '''Palestine was included in the areas as to which Great Britain pledged itself that they should be Arab and independent in the future''' . . . Great Britain and France - Italy subsequently agreeing - committed themselves to an international administration of Palestine in consultation with Russia, who was an ally at that time . . . A new feature was brought into the case in November 1917, when Mr Balfour, with the authority of the War Cabinet, issued his famous declaration to the Zionists that Palestine 'should be the national home of the Jewish people, but that nothing should be done - and this, of course, was a most important proviso - to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. Those, as far as I know, are the only actual engagements into which we entered with regard to Palestine."<ref>Palestine Papers 1917-1922, Doreen Ingrams, page 48 and UK Archives PRO. CAB 27/24</ref></blockquote>
== See also ==
{{Portal|Military history of the Ottoman Empire|image=Topcu_arma.jpg}}
*[[Pan-Arabism]]
*[[McMahon letters]]
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
==References==
*Biger, Gideon. (2004). ''[http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0714656542 The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840-1947]''. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714656542
*Choueiri, Youssef M. (2000). ''Arab Nationalism: A History''. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0631217290
*Cleveland, William L. (2004). ''A History of the Modern Middle East''. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-4048-9 (see pp. 157-160).
*Federal Research Division (2004). ''[http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN1419150227 Syria: A Country Study]''. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1419150227
*Friedman, Isaiah (2000). ''Palestine, A Twice-Promised Land. Transaction Publishers''. ISBN 156000391X
*Hughes, Matthew (1999). ''Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919''. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714649201
*Huneidi, Sahar (2000). ''A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920-1925''. IB Tauris. ISBN 1860641725
*Kedourie, Elie (2000). ''In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939''. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714650978
*Mansfield, Peter (2004). ''A History of the Middle East''. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303433-2 (see pp. 154-155).
*Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2006). ''Contemporary Politics in the Middle East''. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0745635946
*Paris, Timothy J. (2003). ''Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920-1925: The Sherifian Solution''. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714654515
==External links==
*[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence] at the [[Jewish Virtual Library]].
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