Nathan Salmon 2083364 225255864 2008-07-12T18:51:06Z 96.251.13.52 {{Infobox_Philosopher | <!-- Scroll down to edit this page --> <!-- Philosopher Category --> region = Western Philosophy| era = [[20th-21st Century philosophy]]| color = #B0C4DE| <!-- Information --> |name = '''Nathan U. Salmon'''| |birth = [[January 2]], [[1951]], [[Los Angeles]], California| |death = | |religion = [[Flying Spaghetti Monster|Church of FSM]]| |school_tradition = [[Analytic philosophy]]| |main_interests = [[Philosophy of language]]; [[metaphysics]]; [[philosophy of logic]]| |influences = [[Alonzo Church]]; [[Gottlob Frege]]; [[David Kaplan (philosopher)|David Kaplan]]; [[Saul Kripke]]; [[Bertrand Russell]] |notable_ideas = Millianism; Impossible worlds; Invalidity of S4 modal logic; Existence as a property; Mythical objects; Identity is universally determinate.|}} '''Nathan U. Salmon''' (né Nathan Salmon Ucuzoglu, [[1951]]-) is an American [[philosophy|philosopher]] in the [[analytic philosophy|analytic]] tradition, specializing in [[philosophy of language]], [[metaphysics]], and [[philosophy of logic]]. ==Biography== Salmon was born [[January 2]], [[1951]] in [[Los Angeles, California|Los Angeles]] to a [[Bohemianism|bohemian]] and dysfunctional family of [[Sephardi Jews]] of Spanish-Turkish heritage. He is grandson of archivist Emily Sene (née Emily Perez) and [[oud]] player Isaac Sene. A self-taught, semi-professional guitarist, Salmon learned much of what he knows of music theory while in middle school from his boyhood friend, music prodigy [[James Newton Howard]]. During his youth Salmon tried unsuccessfully to believe in the [[Judeo-Christian]] [[God]]. Finding [[Russell's teapot]] spiritually unfulfilling as an alternative to [[theism]], he eventually converted to the [[Flying Spaghetti Monster|Church of FSM]]. The first in his family to go to college, Salmon attended [[El Camino College]] and the [[University of California, Los Angeles]] (UCLA). At UCLA he studied with leading [[philosophy|philosophers]]/[[logic|logician]]s [[Tyler Burge]], [[Alonzo Church]], [[Keith Donnellan]], [[Donald Kalish]], [[David Kaplan (philosopher)|David Kaplan]], [[Saul Kripke]], and [[Yiannis Moschovakis]]. Salmon earned his [[Doctor of Philosophy|Ph.D.]] in 1979 while he was assistant professor of philosophy at [[Princeton University]]. His first book, ''[[Reference]] and [[Essence]]'' (his UCLA [[doctoral dissertation]]) won the 1984 Gustave O. Arlt Award in the [[Humanities]], awarded by the Council of Graduate Schools in the United States. Salmon is currently distinguished professor of philosophy at the [[University of California, Santa Barbara]], where he has taught since 1984. ==Work== ===Overview=== In [[philosophy of language]] Salmon defends Millianism, an extreme version of the controversial theory of [[direct reference]]. Millianism is the doctrine that the semantic content of a [[proper name]] is simply its bearer, so that co-designative names are [[synonym|synonyms]] and [[Empty name|empty names]] lack semantic content altogether. Salmon has provided Millian accounts both of [[propositional attitude]]s and of [[Frege's Puzzle|Frege's puzzle]] about true identifications, i.e., truths of the form "''a'' = ''b''" (in his books, ''Frege's Puzzle'' and ''Content, [[Cognition]], and [[Communication]]''). Salmon maintains that co-designative proper names are inter-substitutable with preservation of [[semantic]] content. Thus, on Salmon's view the sentence "Samuel Clemens was witty" expresses exactly the same content as "Mark Twain was witty", whether or not the competent user of these sentences recognizes it. Therefore one who believes that [[Mark Twain]] was witty ''ipso facto'' believes that [[Samuel Clemens]] was witty--even if he or she also believes, inconsistently, that Clemens was not witty. Salmon argues that this is made palatable by recognizing that to believe a proposition is to be cognitively disposed in a particular manner toward that proposition when taking it by means of some ''proposition-guise'' or other, and that one may be so disposed relative to one proposition-guise while not being so disposed relative to another. Salmon applies this apparatus to solve a variety of famous philosophical puzzles, including Frege's puzzle, Kripke's puzzle about so-called ''de dicto'' belief, and [[W. V. O. Quine]]'s puzzle about ''de re'' belief. For example, Quine describes a scenario in which Ralph believes that Ortcutt is no spy, yet Ralph also believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy, when unbeknownst to Ralph the man in the hat is none other than Ortcutt. Under these circumstances, is Ortcutt believed by Ralph to be a spy? The grounds for an affirmative or negative judgment seem equally balanced. On Salmon's account Ortcutt is believed by Ralph to be a spy, since Ralph is appropriately cognitively disposed toward the proposition about Ortcutt that he is a spy when taking that proposition by means of one proposition-guise, even though Ralph is not so disposed relative to an alternative, equally relevant proposition-guise. In addition Salmon has provided direct-reference accounts of problems of [[nonexistence]] and of names from [[fiction]]. In particular Salmon is known for his solution, compatible with direct reference, to the traditional problem of true, negative existentials, i.e., truths of the form "''a'' does not exist" (''[[Metaphysics]], [[Philosophy of mathematics|Mathematics]], and [[linguistic meaning|Meaning]]''). Salmon argues, directly contrary to [[Immanuel Kant]], that [[existence]] is a property, one that particular individuals have and other individuals lack. According to Salmon, the English verb "exist" is (along with its literal tranlsations into other languages), among other things, a term for this alleged property, and a sentence of the form "''a'' exists" is true if and only if the subject term designates something with the property, and is false (and "''a'' does not exist" is true) if and only if the subject term designates something with the complementary property of nonexistence. Thus Russell's example, "The present king of France exists", is neither true nor false, since France is not presently a monarchy, and therefore "the present king of France" does not designate; whereas "Napoleon exists" is simply false, since although [[Napoleon]] once existed, the moment he died he took on the property of nonexistence. By contrast, Salmon maintains that "Sherlock Holmes exists" is literally true, whereas "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is literally false. According to Salmon, [[Sherlock Holmes]] is an [[abstract entity]] created by author [[Arthur Conan Doyle]], and the fiction is a story, or a collection of stories, which are about that very character but are literally false. Holmes really exists, but is only depicted as a detective in the fiction. In the fiction, Holmes is a detective; in reality, Holmes is merely a fictional detective. Salmon extends this view to what he calls ''mythical objects'', like the hypothetical planet, [[Vulcan (hypothetical planet)|Vulcan]]. Vulcan really exists, but it is not a real planet. It is an abstract entity that is only depicted as a planet in the myth. Salmon's account of fiction and myth thus has direct application to the philosophy of religion. Salmon has also applied his account of mythical objects to [[Peter Geach]]'s famous problem of uncovering the logical form of the particular sentence, "Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow". Salmon's account shows how the problematic sentence can be true even though there are no witches, and even if Hob and Nob do not know about each other, and there is no one whom they think is a witch. Salmon maintains, again contrary to Kant, that it is perfectly legitimate to invoke existence in a term's definition. Thus "God" might be legitimately defined as ''the conceivable individual that is divine and also exists''. According to Salmon, the [[ontological argument]] for God's existence fallaciously assumes that "The ''F'' is ''F''" is a truth of [[logic]], or an [[analytic truth]]. What is true by logic is a significantly weaker variant: "If anything is uniquely ''F'', then the ''F'' is ''F''". The strongest conclusion that [[validity|validly]] follows from the proposed definition is that ''if'' any conceivable individual actually is uniquely both divine and existent, ''then'' God actually exists. This same conclusion is also a trivial logical consequence of the [[atheism|atheist]]'s contention that no conceivable individual actually is uniquely both divine and existent. According to Salmon's critique, the ontological argument thus shows nothing. Salmon argues that natural-language sentences that are representable as λ-converts of one another (in the sense of Church's [[lambda-calculus]]) are, although logically equivalent by λ-conversion, typically not strictly synonymous, i.e., they typically differ in semantic content--as for example "''a'' is large and also ''a'' is seaworthy" and "''a'' is a thing that is both large and seaworthy". Salmon maintains a sharp division between [[semantics]] and [[pragmatics]] ([[speech acts]]). He argues that in uttering a sentence, a speaker typically asserts a good deal more than the words' semantic content, and that, consequently, it is a mistake to identify the semantic content of a sentence with what is said by its speaker. Salmon maintains that such an identification is an instance of a mistaken form of argument in the philosophy of language, "the pragmatic fallacy." Salmon is also known in [[metaphysics]] for, among other things, his analysis of arguments for [[essentialism]]--the doctrine that some properties of things are properties that those things could not fail to have (except perhaps by not existing). In particular, Salmon is known for his development and defense of a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]'' argument, using a [[Paradox of the heap|sorites]]-like problem ([[slippery slope]]), against nearly universally accepted [[modal logic]] systems S4 and S5, which he argues commit "the fallacy of necessity iteration," sanctioning the invalid inference from the observation that a proposition ''p'' is a necessary truth to the conclusion that it is a necessary truth that ''p'' is a necessary truth (''[[Reference]] and [[Essence]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics]], [[Philosophy of mathematics|Mathematics]], and [[linguistic meaning|Meaning]]''). He defends his view by exposing a mistake in a standard argument favoring S5, while arguing that there are not only [[possible worlds]]--thought of as maximal scenarios that might have obtained--but in addition classically consistent ''[[impossible world|impossible worlds]]'': maximal scenarios that could not obtain. Salmon also provided a controversial ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]'' "disproof" of indeterminate [[identity (philosophy)|identity]], i.e., the philosophically popular idea that for some pairs of things there is no fact of the matter concerning whether those things are one and the very same. (''[[Reference]] and [[Essence]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics]], [[Philosophy of mathematics|Mathematics]], and [[linguistic meaning|Meaning]]''). Salmon argues that if there were such a pair of things, ''x'' and ''y'', then this pair would have to be different from the reflexive pair of ''x'' with itself, since there is a fact concerning whether ''x'' and ''x'' are the same. It would then follow by set theory that ''x'' and ''y'' are not the same, and in that case there would be a fact of the matter after all concerning whether ''x'' and ''y'' are the same: they are not. Therefore, there cannot be a pair of things for which there is no fact concerning their identity. On the other hand, Salmon maintains that not all vagueness is due to language and some indeterminacy results from how things themselves are, i.e., that for some things and some attributes, independently of language, there is no fact of the matter concerning whether those things have those attributes. Critics of Salmon's alleged proof respond that the putative difference between <''x'', ''y''> and <''x'', ''x''>--that there is a fact whether the elements of the latter, but not of the former, are the same thing--is not the sort of difference from which it is legitimate to infer that those pairs are not the same. Salmon's primary influences are [[Gottlob Frege]], [[Bertrand Russell]], and former teachers [[Alonzo Church]], [[David Kaplan (philosopher)|David Kaplan]], and [[Saul Kripke]]. ===Publications=== ====Books==== *''Content, [[Cognition]], and [[Communication]]'' (2007). Oxford University Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-928272-2 *''[[Frege's Puzzle]] (Second Edition)'' (1986). Ridgeview, Atacadero, California. ISBN 0-924922-05-2 *''[[Metaphysics]], [[philosophy of mathematics|Mathematics]], and [[linguistic meaning|Meaning]]'' (2005). Oxford University Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-928471-7 *''[[Proposition]]s and [[Propositional attitude|Attitude]]s'' (1988), (co-edited with [[Scott Soames]]). Oxford University Press, New York. ISBN 0-19-875091-9 *''[[Reference]] and [[Essence]] (Second Edition)'' (1981). Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York. ISBN 1-59102-215-0 ====Selected Articles==== *"Analyticity and Apriority" (1993) in ''Philosophical Perspectives, 7: Language and Logic'', James Tomberlin, (ed). Ridgeview, Atascadero. *"Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions" (1982) ''Philosophical Studies'' 42: 37-46. *"Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt" (1995) ''Noûs'' 29 (1): 1-20. *"Demonstrating and Necessity" (2002) ''Philosophical Review'' 111 (4): 497-537 *"Existence" (1987) in ''Philosophical Perspectives'', James Tomberlin (ed). Ridgeview, Atascadero. *"The Fact That x = y" (1987) ''Philosophia'' 17: 517-518. *"How ''Not'' to Become a Millian Heir" (1991) ''Philosophical Studies'' 165-177. *"How ''Not'' to Derive Essentialism From the Theory of Reference" (1979) ''[[Journal of Philosophy]]'' 76: 703-725. *"How to Become a Millian Heir" (1989) ''Noûs'' 23: 211-220. *"How to Measure the Standard Metre" (1988) ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 88: 193-217. *"Identity Facts" (2002) ''Philosophical Topics'' 30: 237-267. *"Illogical Belief" (1989) in ''Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory''. Ridgeview, Atascadero. *"Impossible Worlds" (1984) in ''Analysis'' 44: 114-117. *"The Limits of Human Mathematics" (2001) ''Noûs'' 15: 93-117. *"The Logic of What Might Have Been" (1989) ''Philosophical Review'' 98: 3-34. *"Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints" (1986) ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' 11: 75-120. *"Mythical Objects" (2002) in Campbell, O'Rourke, and Shier, ''Meaning and Truth''. *"Naming, Necessity, and Beyond" (2003) ''Mind'' 112 (447): 475-492. *"Nonexistence" (1998) ''Noûs'' 32 (3): 277-319. *"On Content" (1992) ''Mind'' 101 (404): 733-751. *"On Designating" (2005) ''Mind'' 114 (456): 1069-1133. *"The Pragmatic Fallacy" (1991) ''Philosophical Studies'' 83-97. *"A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and Denotation" (1993) ''Noûs'' 27(2): 158-166. *"Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions" (1989) in ''Handbook of Philosophical Logic'', D. Gabbay (ed). Kluwer, Dordrecht. *"Reflections on Reflexivity" (1992) ''Linguistics and Philosophy'' 15(1): 53-63. *"Reflexivity" (1986) ''Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic'' 27: 401-429. *"Relational Belief" (1995) in ''On Quine: New Essays'', Paolo Leonardi (ed). Cabridge University Press, New York. *"Relative and Absolute Apriority" (1993) ''Philosophical Studies'' 69(1): 83-100. *"Review of ''Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity'' by [[Scott Soames]]" (2003) ''Mind'' 112(447): 475-492. *"Tense and Intension" (2003) in ''Time, Tense, and Reference'', Aleksander Jokic and Quentin Smith (eds). MIT Press, Cambridge. *"Tense and Singular Propositions" (1989) in ''Themes From Kaplan''. Oxford University Press, New York. *"A Theory of Bondage" (2006) ''The Philosophical Review'' 115 (4): 415-448. *"Trans-World Identification and Stipulation" (1996) ''Philosophical Studies'' 84(2-3): 203-223. *"Wholes, Parts, and Numbers" (1997) in ''Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World'', James Tomberlin (ed). Blackwell, Boston. ==External links== *[http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/people/profiles/faculty/salmon.html Nathan Salmon's web page at UCSB] {{DEFAULTSORT:Salmon, Nathan}} [[Category:1951 births]] [[Category:Living people]] [[Category:20th century philosophers]] [[Category:21st century philosophers]] [[Category:American philosophers]] [[Category:Analytic philosophers]] [[Category:Metaphysicians]] [[Category:Philosophers of language]] [[Category:University of California, Santa Barbara faculty]] [[Category:University of California, Los Angeles alumni]] [[fr:Nathan Salmon]]