Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
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{{Infobox nukes |
country_name=United Kingdom|
image_location=Location-UnitedKingdom.PNG|
program_start=[[April 10]], [[1940]]|
first_test=[[October 2]], [[1952]]|
first_fusion=[[May 15]], [[1957]]|
last_test=[[November 26]], [[1991]]|
largest_yield='''3 Mt''' ([[April 28]], [[1958]])|
total_tests='''45''' detonations|
peak_stockpile='''350''' warheads (1970s)|
current_stockpile=c. '''200''' warheads|
maximum_range='''13,000 km''/8,100 mi''' |
NPT_signatory='''Yes''' (1968, one of five recognised powers)|
}}
The '''United Kingdom''' was the third state to test an independently developed [[nuclear weapon]] in October 1952. It is one of the five "[[Nuclear Weapons States]]" (NWS) under the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]], which the UK ratified in 1968. The UK is currently thought to retain a weapons stockpile of around 200 operational nuclear [[warhead]]s.
Since the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]], the [[United States]] and the United Kingdom have cooperated extensively on nuclear security matters. The so-called [[special relationship]] between the two states has involved the exchange of classified scientific information and nuclear materials such as [[plutonium]]. The UK has not run an independent weapons delivery programme since the cancellation of the [[Blue Streak missile]] in the 1960s, instead pursuing joint development of US delivery systems, designed and manufactured by [[Lockheed Martin]], and fitting them with warheads designed and manufactured by the UK's [[Atomic Weapons Establishment|Atomic Weapons Research Establishment]] and its successor the Atomic Weapons Establishment. In 1974 a U.S. proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [Britain's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the US and could not legitimately be passed on without US permission."<ref name=SNIE-4-1-74>{{citation|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf|series=Special National Intelligence Estimate|title=Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|page=40|publisher=[[CIA]]|date=23 August 1974|id=SNIE 4-1-74|accessdate=2008-01-20}}</ref>
In contrast with the other permanent members of the [[United Nations Security Council]], the United Kingdom currently operates only a single nuclear deterrent system since decommissioning its tactical [[WE.177]] free-falling nuclear bombs in 1998. The present system consists of four [[Vanguard class submarine|''Vanguard'' class]] submarines based at [[HMNB Clyde]], armed with up to 16 [[Trident missile]]s, which each carry nuclear warheads in up to 8 [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRVs]], performing both [[strategic]] and [[Tactical nuclear weapon|sub-strategic]] deterrence roles.
While a firm decision has yet to be taken on the replacement of the UK's nuclear deterrent, the manufacturer of the UK's warheads, [[Atomic Weapons Establishment|AWE]], is currently undertaking research which is largely dedicated to providing new warheads<ref>{{cite news | first = Marie | last = Woolf | title = So, minister, are we developing new nuclear weapons or not?; Scientists say they are designing a new warhead design, despite government denials| work = The Independent on Sunday | publisher = Newspaper Publishing plc | page = 6 | date = 2006-10-29 | accessdate = 2006-12-04}}</ref> and on [[4 December]] [[2006]] the then Prime Minister [[Tony Blair]] announced [[British replacement of the Trident system|plans for a new class of nuclear missile submarines]].<ref>{{cite news | title = Blair's Trident statement in full | url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6207584.stm | publisher = BBC News | date = 2006-12-04 | accessdate = 2006-12-04}}</ref>
==Number of warheads==
[[Image:HMNB Clyde.jpg|thumb|right|220px|Faslane Naval Base, [[HMNB Clyde]], [[Scotland]]. Home of the [[Vanguard class submarine]]s which carry the UK's current nuclear deterrent.]]
In the Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998, the [[United Kingdom government]] stated that once the Vanguard submarines became fully operational (the fourth and final one, [[HMS Vengeance (S31)|''Vengeance'']], entered service on [[27 November]] [[1999]]), it would "maintain a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads".<ref>Point 64, [http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf Strategic Defence Review], Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, July 1998</ref> The [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] has estimated the figure as about 165, consisting of 144 deployed weapons plus an extra 15 percent as spares.<ref>[http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/uk.pdf SIPRI project on nuclear technology and arms]</ref>
At the same time, the UK government indicated that warheads "required to provide a necessary processing margin and for technical surveillance purposes" were not included in the "fewer than 200" figure.<ref>[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansard/vo980714w19.htm#80714w19.html_spnew0 House of Commons Written Answers], Hansard, 14 July 1998 : Column:171</ref> However, as recently declassified archived documents on [[Chevaline]] make clear, the 15% excess (referred to by SIPRI as for spares) is normally intended to provide the 'necessary processing margin', and 'surveillance rounds do not contain any nuclear material, being completely inert. These surveillance rounds are used to monitor deterioration in the many non-nuclear components of the warhead, and are best compared with inert training rounds. The SIPRI figures correspond accurately with the official announcements and are likely to be the most accurate. The [[Natural Resources Defense Council]] speculates that a figure of 200 is accurate to within a few tens,<ref>[http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp Table of Global Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002], National Resources Defense Council, 25 November 2002</ref> and the [[World Almanac]] speculates there is a potentially much higher quantity of 200-300, but does not provide hard evidence. Experience with earlier weapons has shown speculation in this area to be inaccurate and has invariably been proved wrong.
==Weapons tests==
Different sources give the number of test explosions that the UK has conducted as either 44<ref>[http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/China/China.txt Press Release], Verification Technology Information Centre, 17 August 1995</ref><ref>[http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/8/3/1 Weapons around the world], Jon Wolfsthal, physicsweb, August 2005</ref> or 45.<ref>[http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/tests/wrjp205a.html Nuclear Weapons Milestons (Part 1-B)], compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston, 3 June 2005</ref><ref>[http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/nukes/ctbt/read9.html History of Nuclear Weapons Testing], [[Greenpeace]], April 1996</ref> The 23 or 24 tests from December 1962 onwards were in conjunction with the United States at their Nevada test site<ref>[http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/tests/UK-ntests1.html Database of nuclear tests, United Kingdom], compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston, last modified 19 June 2005</ref> with the final test being the [[Julin Bristol]] shot which took place on [[26 November]] [[1991]].<ref>[http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/UK/UKArsenalDev.html History of the British Nuclear Arsenal], Last changed 30 April 2002</ref> The apparently low numbers of UK tests is misleading when compared to the large numbers of tests carried out by the US, the [[Soviet Union]], [[China]], and especially [[France]]; because the UK has had extensive access to US test data, obviating the need for UK tests: and an added factor is that many tests required are for 'weapon effects tests'; tests not of the nuclear device itself, but of the nuclear effects on hardened components designed to resist ABM attack. Numerous such 'effects' tests were done in support of the Chevaline programme especially; and there is some evidence that some were permitted for the French programme to harden their RVs and warheads; because most French tests being under the ocean floor, access to measure 'weapon effects' was nigh impossible.<ref> Public Record Office, London, DEFE 19/180, E66. Declassified Jan 2006 using the FOI Act.</ref> An independent test programme would see the UK numbers soar to French levels. The UK government signed the [[Partial Test Ban Treaty]] on [[5 August]] [[1963]]<ref>[http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/atosuw.pdf Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes], Center for Nonproliferation Studies.</ref> along with the United States and the [[Soviet Union]] which effectively restricted it to underground nuclear tests by outlawing testing in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. The UK signed the [[Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]] on [[24 September]] [[1996]]<ref>[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo971106/debtext/71106-22.htm#71106-22_head0 House of Commons Debate, Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Bill], Hansard, 6 Nov 1997 : Column 455</ref> and ratified it on [[6 April]] [[1998]],<ref>[http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/CTBT/status.htm Status of CTBT Ratification], British American Security Information Council, last updated on 14 June 2001</ref> having passed the necessary legislation on [[18 March]] [[1998]] as the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998.
==Nuclear defence==
===Warning systems===
[[Image:Spliced.fylingdales.jpg|thumb|right|220px|This solid-state [[phased array]] [[radar]] in [[North Yorkshire]] is a UK-controlled early warning station and part of the American-controlled [[Ballistic Missile Early Warning System]].]]
{{seealso|Four minute warning|RAF Fylingdales|Ballistic Missile Early Warning System|National Missile Defense}}
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
The UK has relied on the [[Ballistic Missile Early Warning System]] (BMEWS) and, in later years, [[Defense Support Program]] (DSP) satellites for warning of a nuclear attack. Both of these systems are owned and controlled by the United States, although the UK has joint control over UK based systems. One of the four component radars for the BMEWS is based at [[RAF Fylingdales]] in [[North Yorkshire]].
In 2003 the UK government stated that it will consent to a request from the US to upgrade the radar at Fylingdales for use in the US [[National Missile Defense]] system.<ref>[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030115/debtext/30115-07.htm Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence], Hansard 15 Jan 2003 : Column 697</ref>
Nevertheless, missile defence is not currently a significant political issue within the UK. The ballistic missile threat is perceived to be less severe, and consequently less of a priority, than other threats to its security.<ref>[http://www.rusi.org/militarysciences/capabilities/commentary/ref:C42528744B491A/ Royal United Services Institute - Ballistic Missile Defence and the UK] April 2005</ref>
[[Image:ProtectAndSurvive.jpg|thumb|left|108px|[[Civil defence]] booklet produced in the UK.]]
===Attack scenarios===
During the [[cold war]] a significant effort by government and academia was made to assess the effects of a nuclear attack on the UK. A major government exercise, [[Square Leg]], was held in September 1980 and involved around 130 warheads with a total yield of 200 megatons. This is probably the largest attack that the apparatus of the nation state could survive in some limited form. Observers have speculated that an actual exchange would be much larger with one academic describing a 200 megaton attack as an "extremely low figure and one which we find very difficult to take seriously".<ref name="rogers">Possible Nuclear Attack Scenarios on Britain, Paul Rogers, Proceedings of Conference on Nuclear Deterrence: Implications and Policy Options for the 1980s, September 1981</ref> In the early 1980s it was thought an attack causing almost complete loss of life could be achieved with the use of less than 15% of the total nuclear yield available to the Soviets.<ref name="rogers"/>
===Civil defence===
{{main|civil defence|Protect and Survive}}
During the cold war, various governments developed [[civil defence]] programmes aimed to prepare civilian and local government infrastructure for a nuclear strike on the UK. A series of seven [[Civil Defence Bulletin]] films were produced in 1964; and in the 1980s the most famous such programme was probably the series of booklets and [[public information film]]s entitled ''[[Protect and Survive]]''. But no UK government has ever put more than a minimal effort into [[civil defence]], recognising the reality that deep shelter for a protracted period of time for more than a tiny part of the population is not a practical proposition for any state, and especially a small, heavily-populated group of islands such as the UK.{{Fact|date=May 2008}} Such efforts as were made were merely a gesture to popular sensibilities.{{Fact|date=May 2008}}
{{cquote|If the country was ever faced with an immediate threat of nuclear threat, a copy of this booklet would be distributed to every household as part of a public information campaign which would include announcements on television and radio and in the press. The booklet has been designed for free and general distribution in that event. It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to know what they would be advised to do at such a time.<ref>[http://ukcoldwar.simplenet.com/protect/online/ Protect and Survive], prepared for the Home Office by the Central Office of Information, May 1980</ref>}}
The booklet contained information on building a [[Fallout shelter|nuclear refuge]] within a so-called 'fall out room' at home, sanitation, limiting fire hazards and descriptions of the audio signals for attack warning, fallout warning and all clear. It was anticipated that families might need to stay within the fall-out room for up to fourteen days after an attack almost without leaving it at all.
==Weapons programmes==
''See also [[History of nuclear weapons]]''
[[Image:Trinity shot color.jpg|thumb|right|220px|The United Kingdom worked in partnership with the [[United States]] and [[Canada]] on the [[Manhattan Project]], resulting in the development of the first nuclear weapons, and the first-ever nuclear detonation at the [[Trinity test]] of [[16 July]] [[1945]].]]
===Tube Alloys and Manhattan Project===
{{main|Tube Alloys|Manhattan Project}}
The United Kingdom's nuclear weapons had their genesis in the [[Second World War]] when the UK worked on development of an atomic bomb, initially on their own under the cover name of ''[[Tube Alloys]]'' but later as a partner in the American [[Manhattan Project]]. The Manhattan Project resulted in the [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|two nuclear weapons dropped on Japan]] which led to that country's unconditional surrender.
===Post-war development programme===
The United Kingdom started independently developing nuclear weapons again shortly after the war. [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour]] [[Prime Minister]] [[Clement Attlee]] set up a cabinet sub-committee, the [[Gen 75 Committee|Gen 75 Committee (GEN.75)]] (known informally as the "Atomic Bomb Committee"), to examine the feasibility as early as [[29 August]] [[1945]]. It was US refusal to continue nuclear cooperation with the UK after World War II (due to the [[McMahon Act]] of 1946 restricting foreign access to US nuclear technology) which eventually prompted the building of a bomb:
{{cquote|In October 1946, Attlee called a small cabinet sub-committee meeting to discuss building a gaseous diffusion plant to enrich uranium. The meeting was about to decide against it on grounds of cost, when [[Ernest Bevin|[Ernest] Bevin]] arrived late and said "We've got to have this thing. I don't mind it for myself, but I don't want any other [[Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs|Foreign Secretary]] of this country to be talked at or to by the [[James F. Byrnes|Secretary of State of the US]] as I have just been... We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs." <ref>Sir M. Perrin, who was present, ''[[The Listener]]'', 7 October 1982. Also quoted in ''How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made'', p.137, 1986, Oxford Research Group.</ref>}}
A nuclear program started in 1946 under the control of the [[Atomic Energy Research Establishment]] (incorporate into the [[United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority]] (UKAEA) in 1954), that was civilian in character, but was also tasked with the job of producing the fissile material, initially only plutonium 239, that was expected to be required for a military programme. It was based on a former airfield, [[Harwell, Oxfordshire|Harwell]], (then in [[Berkshire]] now in [[Oxfordshire]]); and a former [[Royal Ordnance Factory]], [[Risley, Warrington|Risley]] in [[Cheshire]]. Risley became the headquarters of the Industrial Division of UKAEA, and there were other sites under its control, notably the Calder Hall reactors at Windscale (later [[Sellafield]]) used to produce weapons grade Pu-239. The first nuclear pile in the UK, [[GLEEP]], went critical at Harwell on [[15 August]] [[1947]]. AWRE was established at Aldermaston by the [[Ministry of Supply]]; later becoming the Weapons Division of the (civilian) UKAEA, before being subsumed into the Ministry of Defence in the 1970s.
[[William George Penney|William Penney]], a [[physicist]] specialising in [[hydrodynamics]] was asked in October 1946 to prepare a report on the viability of building a UK weapon. Joining the Manhattan project in 1944, he had been in the observation plane [[Big Stink]] over [[Nagasaki, Nagasaki|Nagasaki]], and had also done damage assessment on the ground following [[Japan]]'s surrender. He had subsequently participated in the American [[Operation Crossroads]] test at [[Bikini Atoll]]. As a result of his report, the decision to proceed was formally made on [[8 January]] [[1947]] at a meeting of the GEN.163 committee of six cabinet members, including [[Prime Minister]] [[Clement Attlee]] with Penney appointed to take charge of the programme.
The project was hidden under the name High Explosive Research or HER and was based initially at the [[Ministry of Supply]]'s Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) at [[Fort Halstead]] in Kent,<ref> Arnold, Lorna (2001).''Britain and the H-Bomb: the official history''. Published by Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-94742-8 in North America, ISBN 0-312-23518-6 elsewhere. p71</ref> but in 1950 moved to a new site at [[Atomic Weapons Establishment|AWRE Aldermaston]] in [[Berkshire]]. A particular problem was the McMahon Act. Although British scientists knew the areas of the Manhattan Project in which they had worked well, they only had the sketchiest details of those parts which they were not directly involved in. With the start of the [[Cold War]] there had been some warming of nuclear relations between the UK and US governments, which led to hopes of American cooperation. However these were quickly dashed by the arrest in early 1950 of [[Klaus Fuchs]], a [[USSR|Soviet]] [[spy]] working at Harwell. Plutonium production reactors were based at Windscale, later known as [[Sellafield]] in [[Cumberland, England|Cumberland]] (now in [[Cumbria]]) and construction began in September 1947, leading to the first plutonium metal ready in March 1952.
===First test and early systems===
{{main|Operation Hurricane|Blue Danube (nuclear weapon)|Blue Peacock}}
[[Image:Op hurricane.jpg|thumb|right|220px|The UK's first nuclear test, [[Operation Hurricane]], in 1952.]]
[[Image:Blue Danube Bomb.jpg|thumb|right|220px|A ''[[Blue Danube (nuclear weapon)|Blue Danube]]'' bomb. The airman that stood alongside to give the photograph some scale has been cropped from this picture. The girder from which the weapon is suspended would measure at least six feet from ground level. The first Blue Danube weapons issued to the RAF were of 10-12 kt yield, approx the same yield as the [[Little Boy|Hiroshima bomb]], although that was much smaller, being of a gun-type, whereas Blue Danube was of the implosion type similar to the [[Fat Man|Nagasaki bomb]]. This Blue Danube airframe design was used to house all the devices detonated at Christmas Island in the [[Operation Grapple]] tests.]]
The first UK weapon test, [[Operation Hurricane]], was detonated below the frigate [[HMS Plym (K271)|HMS ''Plym'']] anchored in the [[Monte Bello Islands, Western Australia|Monte Bello Islands]] on [[2 October]] [[1952]]. This led to the first deployed weapon, the [[Blue Danube (nuclear weapon)|Blue Danube]] free-fall bomb, in November 1953. It was very similar to the American Mark 4 weapon in having a 60 inch diameter, 32 lens implosion system with a levitated core suspended within a natural uranium tamper. The warhead was entombed within a bomb carcass measuring 62 inches dia and 24 feet long, and being so large, could only be carried by the [[V-Bomber]] fleet.
A nuclear landmine dubbed Brown Bunny, later Blue Bunny, and finally [[Blue Peacock]] that used the Blue Danube warhead was developed from 1954 with the goal of deployment in the [[Rhine]] area of [[Germany]]. The system would have been set to an eight-day timer in the case of invasion of Western Europe by the Soviets but was cancelled in February 1958 with only two built. It was judged that the risks posed by the [[nuclear fallout]] and the political aspects of preparing for destruction and contamination of allied territory were simply too high to justify. A more usual reason for cancellation revealed by numerous archived declassified documents was that the Army felt it was too unwieldy and diverted their efforts into a successor, Violet Vision, based on the smaller successor to Blue Danube, Red Beard. None were ever built, the Army instead receiving U.S. ADMs or [[Atomic Demolition Munitions]] under the established procedures for supply of NATO allies from U.S. stocks held in U.S. custody in Europe. A sea mine based on the Blue Danube warhead and codenamed Cudgel was also envisaged for delivery by midget submarines, referred to by naval sources as "sneak craft"; perhaps reflecting a belief that these craft were really rather ungentlemanly methods of waging war. None were built.
A gaseous diffusion plant was built at [[Capenhurst]], near [[Chester]] and started production in 1953 producing [[low enriched uranium]] (LEU). By 1957 it was capable of annually producing 125 kg of [[highly enriched uranium]] (HEU). The capacity was further increased and by 1959 it may have been producing as much as 1600 kg per year [http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKFacility.html]. At the end of 1961, having produced between 3.8 and 4.9 [[tonne]]s of HEU it was switched over to LEU production for civil use. Additional plutonium production was provided by eight electricity generating [[Magnox]] reactors at [[Calder Hall]] and [[Chapelcross]] which started operating in 1956 and 1959 respectively.
===Thermonuclear weaponry===
{{main|Operation Grapple|Yellow Sun|Blue Steel missile}}
The detonation by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union of thermonuclear devices alarmed the UK government of [[Winston Churchill]] and a decision was made on 27 July 1954 to begin development of a [[thermonuclear weapon|thermonuclear bomb]], making use of the more powerful [[nuclear fusion]] reaction rather than [[nuclear fission]]. There was little or no dissent in the House of Commons. {{cquote|'' '''The press, including those papers often most critical of the government, also supported the government's policy. The ''[[Manchester Guardian]]'' thought the decision sound, and believed that the government was right to build up a powerful deterrent, especially in the absence of a close partnership with the United States. The paper did, however, criticise the government for relying on developing bombers rather than missiles to carry the weapons.''' '' <ref> Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, the official history. Published 2001. Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-94742-8 and ISBN 0-312-23518-6 in North America, p65.</ref>}}
[[Image:Blue Danube release from Valiant bomber.jpg|thumb|right|220px|A Blue Danube bomb released from a [[Vickers Valiant|Valiant]] bomber at 500 knots at 45'000ft would accelerate to a terminal speed of 2'100 feet per sec (approx Mach 2.2). In this photo the fins are not yet extended to 1.6 times diameter to quickly stabilise the bomb into a predictable ballistic trajectory. [[fuze|Fuzing]] was by means of a barometric 'gate' to switch on the radar altimeter controlled firing circuit powered by 6-volt lead-acid accumulators. These bomb casings were used for all the air-drop tests at [[Kiritimati|Christmas Island]] and [[Maralinga]], Australia. Detonation was approx 52 seconds after release from the aircraft.]]
''[[The Economist]]'', the ''[[New Statesman]]'' and many left-wing newspapers supported the government's policy of nuclear deterrence as a means of reducing the size of conventional forces. Their view (in 1954-55) is fairly summarised as being not opposed to nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, but in their view that of the United States would suffice, and that of the costs of the 'nuclear umbrella' was best left to be borne by the United States alone. Their attitudes to nuclear weapons have changed somewhat since then.<ref>A.J.R.Groom, ''"British thinking about nuclear weapons"'', pps 131-154. Published Frances Pinter 1974. ISBN 0-903804-01-8. (Note that this is an old 10 digit ISBN, as used at publication in 1974)</ref>
The first prototype, Short Granite, was detonated on [[15 May]] [[1957]] in [[Operation Grapple]], with disappointing results at 300 kt, when the target requirement was one megaton. A further test of Purple Granite yielded less at 200 kt. Further testing in 1958 got performance up to the requirement, but none were ever deployed, because the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]] intervened, making fully developed and Service engineered designs available more quickly, and more cheaply. The first of these was the U.S. Mk-28 weapon which was anglicised and manufactured in the UK as [[Red Snow]] and quickly deployed as [[Yellow Sun]] Mk.2 in the V-bomber fleet. Red Snow became the warhead of choice for the [[Blue Steel]] stand-off missile and some of the Skybolt missiles intended for carriage by the V-bombers. Under the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]] 5.4 tonnes of UK produced plutonium was sent to the U.S. in return for 6.7kg of [[tritium]] and 7.5 tonnes of [[highly enriched uranium|HEU]] over the period 1960-1979, replacing Capenhurst production, although much of the HEU was used not for weapons, but as fuel for the growing UK fleet of nuclear submarines, both of the Polaris variety and others numbering approx twelve.
Fifty-eight Blue Danube bombs were produced, although archived declassified files indicate that only a small proportion of these were ever serviceable at any one time. It remained in service until 1963, when it was replaced by [[Red Beard (nuclear weapon)|Red Beard]], a smaller tactical boosted-fission weapon that used the same fissile core as Blue Danube and was deployed on many smaller aircraft than the V-bombers, both ashore and at sea aboard five carriers. Stocks of Red Beard were maintained in [[Cyprus]], [[Singapore]], and a smaller number in the UK.
[[Image:Orange Herald warhead.jpg|thumb|right|220px|The Orange Herald spherical warhead seen here suspended inside the centre-section frame of a [[Blue Danube bomb]] casing. The Green Grass Interim Megaton Weapon would appear very similar when installed in [[Violet Club]]. The nose and tail of the bomb attached to the two circular frames. Blue Danube was very similar but a larger sphere.]]
After the detonation of U.S. and Soviet thermonuclear weapons the UK deployed an Interim Megaton Weapon in the V-bomber fleet until a true thermonuclear weapon could be devised from the Christmas Island tests. This never tested interim weapon derived from the [[Orange Herald]] warhead tested at Christmas Island on 31 May 1957 yielding 720 kt <ref>Lorna Arnold p147, ibid</ref> known as [[Green Grass]] was merely a very large unboosted pure fission weapon yielding 400 kt. It was the largest pure fission weapon ever deployed by any nuclear state. Green Grass was deployed first in a modified Blue Danube casing and known as [[Violet Club]]. A later variant was deployed in a [[Yellow Sun]] Mk.1 casing. A true thermonuclear device was planned for the later [[Yellow Sun]] Mk.2 bomb, and after the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]] the choice fell on a US Mk.28 warhead manufactured in the UK and known as [[Red Snow]]. This Red Snow warhead was also fitted in the [[Blue Steel missile|Blue Steel]], an air-launched stand-off missile which remained in service until Dec 1970. It was to have been replaced by [[Skybolt]] air-launched ballistic missiles purchased from the United States, and the UK consequently cancelled their Blue Steel extended range upgrade and [[Blue Streak missile|Blue Streak]] ballistic missile projects, because of changing military perceptions of the vulnerability of these Blue Streak land-based liquid-fuelled missiles that were so close to Soviet missile launch sites in Eastern Europe. Similar changed military perceptions led to the removal of Thor IRBM missiles in the UK; and Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey; although the Turkish sites were implicated in an alleged deal following the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. To consternation, and considerable protests, the incoming [[Kennedy administration]] cancelled Skybolt at the end of 1962 because it was believed by the US [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of State for Defense]], [[Robert McNamara]], that other delivery systems were progressing better than expected, and a further expensive system was surplus to U.S. requirements.
[[Image:Polaris-a1.jpg|thumb|right|220px|The [[UGM-27 Polaris|Polaris A1 or A2 missile]], seen here on a launch pad in [[Cape Canaveral]], was a [[submarine-launched ballistic missile]] purchased from the US. The UK purchased the A3T variant, the final production model, that incorporated hardened missile electronic components to resist ABM attack in the boost phase, although neither the three re-entry vehicles or UK-manufactured warheads were hardened, leading to the Chevaline programme.]]
===Polaris===
{{main|Polaris Sales Agreement|UGM-27 Polaris|Chevaline|Resolution class submarine}}
After the cancellation of Skybolt, the UK purchased [[Polaris ballistic missile|Polaris]] missiles for use in UK-built ballistic missile submarines. The agreement between U.S. President [[John F. Kennedy]] and [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]] [[Harold Macmillan]], the [[Polaris Sales Agreement]], was announced on [[December 21]] [[1962]] and [[HMS Resolution (S22)|HMS Resolution]] sailed on her first Polaris-armed patrol on [[14 June]] [[1968]].<ref>[http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/187295524X Amazon.co.uk review], The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain's Seaborne Nuclear Deterrent, J.E. Moore.</ref> In the 1970s the UK Polaris RVs and warheads were vulnerable to the Soviet [[anti-ballistic missile|ABM]] screen concentrated around Moscow, and the UK developed a Polaris improved-front-end (IFE) codenamed [[Chevaline]], designed to counter this ABM defence which threatened to completely nullify an independent UK deterrent posture. When Chevaline became public knowledge in 1980, it generated huge controversy as it had been kept secret by the four governments of Wilson, Heath, Wilson (again) and Callaghan, whilst costs rocketed; admittedly during a period of high inflation; until disclosed by the [[Margaret Thatcher|Thatcher government]]. By the time it entered service in 1982 it had cost approx £1bn. The final Polaris/Chevaline patrol took place in 1996, two years after the first Trident-carrying submarine sailed on its first patrol.
As well as the establishment at Aldermaston, the UK nuclear weapons programme also has a factory at [[Burghfield]] nearby which assembled the weapons and is responsible for their maintenance, and had another in [[Cardiff]] which fabricated non-fissile components and a 2000 acre (8 km²) test range at [[Foulness]]. Since 1993 the sites have been managed by private consortia. The Foulness and Cardiff facilities closed in October 1996 and February 1997 respectively.
===Trident===
{{main|UK Trident programme}}
[[Image:Trident II missile image.jpg|thumb|right|220px|The UK's current delivery system, the [[Trident missile]], being launched from a submarine.]]
The UK currently has four [[Vanguard class submarine|''Vanguard'' class]] submarines based at [[HMNB Clyde]] in [[Scotland]], armed with nuclear-tipped [[Trident missile]]s. The principle of operation is based on maintaining deterrent effect by always having at least one submarine at sea, and was designed for the [[Cold War]] period. One submarine is normally undergoing maintenance and the remaining two in port or on training exercises. It has been suggested that the UK's ballistic missile submarine patrols are coordinated with those of the [[France and weapons of mass destruction|French]].<ref>[http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd01norris British nuclear forces, 2001], Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2001 pp. 78-79 (vol. 57, no. 06)</ref>
Each submarine carries 16 [[Trident II]] D-5 missiles, which can each carry up to twelve warheads. However, the UK government announced in 1998 that each submarine would carry only 48 warheads, an increase of 50% over the 32 warheads carried by Trident's predecessor, Chevaline, (halving the limit specified by the previous government), which is an average of three per missile. However one or two missiles per submarine are probably armed with fewer warheads for "sub-strategic" use causing others to be armed with more; but this is speculative.
The UK-designed warheads are thought to be selectable between 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt; the yields obtained using either the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package"; although it must be stressed that these yields and similar data are entirely speculative. The true position is unlikely to be known with certainty for many years; as was the case with the misplaced speculation about the earlier Chevaline programme; only now becoming publicly known. Although the UK designed, manufactured and owns the warheads, there is evidence that the warhead design is similar to, or even based on, the US [[W76]] warhead fitted in some US Navy Trident missiles, with design data being supplied by the United States through the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/britains_next_nuclear_era_1.php|title=Britain's Next Nuclear Era|publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]]|date=December 7, 2006|accessdate=2007-03-15}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/images/W76req.pdf|title=Stockpile Stewardship Plan: Second Annual Update (FY 1999)|publisher=[[U.S. Department of Energy]]|date=April 1998|accessdate=2007-03-15}}</ref> The United Kingdom owns 58 missiles which are shared in a joint pool with the [[United States government]] and these are exchanged when requiring maintenance with missiles from the [[United States Navy]]'s own pool and vice versa.
Until August 1998, the UK also retained the [[WE.177]] nuclear weapon manufactured in the 1960s, in air-dropped free-fall bomb and [[depth charge]] versions. This left the four ''Vanguard'' class submarines, which replaced the Polaris ones in the early 1990s, as the United Kingdom's only nuclear weapons platform. It has been estimated by the [[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] that the United Kingdom has built around 1,200 warheads since the first [[Operation Hurricane|Hurricane]] device of 1952. In terms of number of warheads, the UK arsenal was at its maximum size of about 350 in the 1970s, but this figure does not include the large numbers of US-owned warheads, bombs, nuclear depth bombs supplied from US stocks in Europe for use by NATO allies. At its peak, these numbered 327 for the [[British Army of the Rhine]] in Germany alone.
==Replacement for Trident==
{{main|British replacement of the Trident system}}
A decision on the replacement of Trident was made on the 4th December 2006.
[[Tony Blair]] ([[Prime Minister]] at that time) told MPs it would be "unwise and dangerous" for the UK to give up its nuclear weapons. He outlined plans to spend up to £20bn on a new generation of submarines for Trident missiles.
He said submarine numbers may be cut from four to three, while the number of nuclear warheads would be cut by 20% to 160.
Mr Blair said although the Cold War had ended, the UK needed nuclear weapons, as no-one could be sure another nuclear threat would not emerge in the future.
==Timeline==
The timeline below shows the development of warheads, nuclear delivery systems and nuclear infrastructure in the UK between 1940 and 2006. Delivery systems are charted to indicate when they were in active service. This does not include development time or decommissioning. Similarly, power plants are charted from when they became active, rather than the date of commissioning or construction. At the end of 1961, the Capenhurst reactor was switched back to [[low enriched uranium]] production for civil use. The Magnox electricity producing power stations could produce Plutonium for use in the UK military nuclear programme. Seven other [[Magnox]] reactors came online between 1964 and 1971 (see [[Magnox#List of Magnox reactors in the UK|List of Magnox reactors in the UK]]), although these weren't necessarily used to generate material for warheads.
[[ROF Cardiff]] was used as part of the nuclear programme from 1961 until its closure in 1997. The [[ROF Burghfield]] site was built in 1941 and used for the nuclear programme from the early 1950s to this day. It is now called AWE Burghfield rather than ROF Burghfield.
{{uk nuclear timeline}}
==Deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons==
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
Until 1992 UK forces also deployed [[United States|U.S.]] tactical nuclear weapons as part of a U.S.-UK dual-key [[NATO]] [[nuclear sharing]] role.<ref>[http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1993-06-22/Orals-1.html#Orals-1_spnew9 Nuclear Weapons - Mr. Hanley], Hansard, 22 June 1993 : Column 154</ref><ref>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/osp11.pdf#page=11 Operational Selection Policy OSP 11, Nuclear Weapons Policy 1967-1998], [[The National Archives]], November 2005</ref> The weapons deployed included [[nuclear artillery]], nuclear demolition mines and warheads for Corporal and [[MGM-52 Lance|Lance missile]]s in [[Germany]]; theatre nuclear weapons on [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] aircraft;<ref>[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/70124-0012.htm#st_10 Lord Garden], Lords Hansard, 24 Jan 2007 : Column 1179</ref> [[Mk-101 Lulu NDB (Nuclear Depth Bomb)|Mark 101]] [[nuclear depth bomb]]s on RAF [[Avro Shackleton|Shackleton]] maritime patrol aircraft, later replaced by a modern successor, the [[B57 nuclear bomb|B-57]] deployed on RAF [[Hawker-Siddeley Nimrod|Nimrod]] aircraft. The Lance missiles were purchased in 1975,<ref>[http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/lance/chronologyb.html Lance Chronology], Redstone Arsenal Historical Information</ref> to replace [[Honest John]] missiles which had been bought in 1960;<ref>[http://members.aol.com/missilereg/Pagerole.htm Carrying The Lance], Tim Royall, 50 Missile Regiment Web Site</ref> and were themselves a replacement for the U.S. [[Corporal missile]]s deployed in Germany by the [[Royal Artillery]]. Not generally recognised is the fact that the Royal Artillery deployed a numerically greater quantity of US nuclear weapons than the RAF and Royal Navy combined, peaking at 277 in 1976-78; with a further 50 ADMs deployed with another [[British Army]] unit, the [[Royal Engineers]], peaking in 1971-81.<ref>Norris, Burrows, Fieldhouse. Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol 5. British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p63. Published Westview Press, Oxford, 1994. ISBN 0-8133-1611-1</ref>
The UK continues to permit the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons from its territory, the first having arrived in 1954.<ref>{{Citation | url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/04-51.htm | title=History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977 | author=Hans M. Kristensen | date=February 1978 | publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defence]] | accessdate=2006-05-23}}</ref> During the 1980s nuclear armed USAF [[Ground Launched Cruise Missile]]s were deployed at [[RAF Greenham Common]] and [[RAF Molesworth]]. As of 2005 it is believed that about 110 tactical [[B61 nuclear bomb]]s are stored at [[RAF Lakenheath]] for deployment by [[USAF]] [[F-15E]] aircraft.<ref name=nrdc>{{Citation | title=U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe | url=http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf | author=Hans M. Kristensen | date=February 2005 | publisher=[[Natural Resources Defense Council]] | accessdate=2006-05-23}}</ref>
==Research and development facilities==
===Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston===
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
{{main|Atomic Weapons Establishment}}
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston (formerly the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston) is situated just 7 miles north of [[Basingstoke]] and approximately 14 miles south-west of [[Reading, Berkshire]], near a village called [[Aldermaston]], bordering with [[Tadley]]. It was built in 1949 on the site of a former [[World War II]] [[Royal Air Force]] base and converted to nuclear weapons research, design and development in the 1950s. Although some early test devices were probably assembled on this site, final assembly of Service-engineered weapons takes place at the nearby site of Burghfield.
===Royal Ordnance Factories, Cardiff and Burghfield===
{{main|Royal Ordnance Factory|ROF Burghfield|ROF Cardiff}}
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
Other nuclear weapons sites could be found in [[Cardiff]] and [[Burghfield]] near [[Reading, Berkshire]]. These were the only two [[Royal Ordnance Factories]] (ROFs) not [[privatization|privatised]] in the 1980s.
[[ROF Cardiff]], which closed in 1997, was involved in nuclear weapons programmes since 1961. The site was used for the task of recycling old nuclear weapons and precisely shaping [[uranium 235]] (U235) and metallic [[beryllium]] components for the boosted fission devices used as primaries or 'triggers' in modern thermonuclear weapons.<ref>How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made, Scilla McClean (ed), Oxford Research Group, 1984, [ISBN 0-333-40583-8], p. 120</ref> [[ROF Burghfield]] was a former [[Filling Factories|Filling Factory]], opened in 1942, and run as an ''Agency Factory'', by [[Imperial Tobacco]], to fill [[Oerlikon 20 mm cannon|Oerlikon 20 mm]] ammunition.<ref name = cocroft>Cocroft, Wayne D. (2000). ''Dangerous Energy: The archaeology of gunpowder and military explosives manufacture''. Swindon; [[English Heritage]]. ISBN 1-85074-718-0.</ref>
==Politics, decision making and nuclear posture==
===Nuclear posture===
UK nuclear posture during the cold war was informed by interdependence with the United States. Operational control of the UK Polaris force was assigned to SACLANT, while targeting policy for its missiles was determined, as for the V-bomber force before it, by NATO's SACEUR, while maintaining an independent wholly-UK targeting policy for some circumstances when a critical national emergency required it to be used alone, without the UK's NATO allies.<ref>PRO, London, DEFE 25/335, E93 classified until 2010, obtained Jan 2006 using the FOI Act.</ref><ref>PRO, London, T225/3280, E32.</ref> In these circumstances, the '[[Moscow criterion]]' referred to the ability of the UK to strike back at the highly-centralised Soviet decision-making apparatus concentrated in the Moscow area, intended to destroy the ability of the Soviet leadership to remain in control of a Soviet Union otherwise untouched. The early beginnings of studies to increase the likelihood of successful penetration of the Polaris warheads to Moscow can be traced back to 1964, <ref>Kate Pyne, The AWRE Contribution to Chevaline. Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society Symposium on Chevaline, 2004. Published 2005 as ISBN 1-85768-109-6</ref>before the Polaris system was deployed, in order to preserve this capability in the face of anti-ballistic missile batteries around Moscow. These studies later materialised as Chevaline. <ref>PRO, London, DEFE 25/335, E44 Annex A, 'Unacceptable Damage', plus maps. Classified until 2010, and obtained Jan 2006 using the FOI Act.</ref><ref>British Nuclear Doctrine: The 'Moscow Criterion' and the Polaris Improvement Programme, John Baylis, Contemporary British History, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp.53-65</ref>
The UK has relaxed its nuclear posture since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour]] government's 1998 [[Strategic Defence Review]] made a number of reductions from the plans announced by the previous [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative]] government:<ref>http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyes/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf</ref>
*The stockpile of ''"operationally available warheads"'' was reduced from 300 to ''"less than 200"''
*The final batch of missile bodies would not be purchased, limiting the fleet to 58.
*A submarine's load of warheads were reduced from 96 to 48. This reduced the explosive power of the warheads on a Vanguard class Trident submarine to ''"one third less than a Polaris submarine armed with Chevaline."'' However 48 warheads per Trident submarine represents a 50% increase on the 32 warheads per submarine of Chevaline. Total explosive power has been in decline for decades as the accuracy of missiles has improved, therefore requiring less power to destroy each target. Trident can destroy 48 targets per submarine, as opposed to 32 targets that could be destroyed by Chevaline.
*Submarines missiles would not be targeted, but rather at several days "notice to fire."
*Although one submarine would always be on patrol it will operate on a "reduced day-to-day alert state". A major factor in maintaining a constant patrol is to avoid ''"misunderstanding or escalation if a Trident submarine were to sail during a period of crisis."''
Current UK posture as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998<ref>http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyre/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E/0?sdr1998_complete.pdf</ref> is as it has been for many years. Only the delivery methods have changed. Trident SLBMs still provide the long-range strategic element as they have done for some years. Until 1998 the free-fall WE.177A, WE.177B and WE.177C bombs provided an aircraft-delivered sub-strategic option in addition to their designed function of tactical battlefield weapons. With the retirement of WE.177, a sub-strategic warhead is stated by Ministers to be incorporated into some (but not all) Trident missiles deployed. The exact mix of weapons on each submarine is unknown as is the numbers and warhead yield. Current UK thinking{{Fact|date=February 2007}} is that the capacity to launch a very limited strike is a more credible deterrent in the current world situation than use of a MIRVed strategic system.
===Nuclear weapons control===
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
The details of exactly how a British Prime Minister would authorise a nuclear strike is still secret but the principles of the Trident control system is believed to be based on the plan set up for Polaris in 1968 which has now been declassified. A closed-circuit television system was set up between 10 Downing St and the Polaris Control Officer at the Northwood headquarters of the Royal Navy. Both the Prime Minister and the Polaris Control Officer would be able to see eachother on their monitors when the command was given. If the link failed – for instance during a nuclear attack or when the PM was away from Downing St – the Prime Minister would send an authentication code which could be verified at Northwood. The Commander in Chief would then broadcast a firing order to the Polaris submarines via the Very Low Frequency radio station at Rugby. The UK has not deployed control equipment requiring codes to be sent before weapons can be used, such as the U.S. [[Permissive Action Link]], to preclude the possibility that military officers could launch British nuclear weapons without authorisation. Until 1998 when it was withdrawn the WE.177 was armed with a simple cylinder bicycle lock key and an allen key was used to set yield and burst height. Currently British Trident commanders can launch without authorisation while their American colleagues cannot. At the end of the Cold War the US Fail Safe Commission recommended installing devices to prevent rogue commanders persuading their crews to launch unauthorised nuclear attacks. This was endorsed by the Nuclear Posture Review and Trident Coded Control Devices were fitted to all US SSBNs by 1997. These devices prevented an attack until a launch code had been sent by the Chiefs of Staff on behalf of the President. The UK took a decision not to install Trident CCDs or their equivalent on the grounds that an aggressor might be able to wipe out the British chain of command before a launch order had been sent. <ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/7097121.stm|title=Nuclear weapons security - MoD statement|author=[[Ministry of Defence (UK)]]|date=15 November 2007|publisher=[[BBC]] [[Newsnight]]|accessdate=2008-05-19}}</ref><ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/avdb/news/uk/video/133000/bb/133417_16x9_bb.asx British nuclear weapon control] (streaming video), [[Susan Watts]], [[BBC]] [[Newsnight]], November 2007</ref> <ref>[http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/11_november/15/newsnight.shtml BBC press release November 2007 </ref>
===The special relationship===
{{main|Special relationship}}
{{Expand-section|date=June 2008}}
The 1958 'Agreement For Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes' also known as the 'Mutual Defence Agreement' was renewed in 1994 and again in 2005.<ref>US-UK nuclear weapons collaboration under the Mutual Defence Agreement, Nigel Chamberlain, Nicola Butler and Dave Andrews, British American Security Council, June 2004</ref>
===Parliament and civil society===
{{seealso|Politics of the UK}}
The UK's possession of nuclear weapons has appeared essential for successive governments in order to maintain the UK's diplomatic influence abroad; and this policy has had continuous majority support in the population, despite a large number of people opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons. For thirteen years from 1945 until 1958, four years after the first US thermonuclear test in 1952, there was no significant opposition to nuclear weapons in the UK. All significant parts of the Press representing all shades of opinion supported the government's policy, and continued to do so when in 1954 the [[UK government]] decided to develop and test a thermonuclear weapon. One newspaper, the Guardian, not noted for its support for the then government, or of nuclear weapons in later years, urged the government to go further and develop ballistic missiles, rather than rely on bombers for delivery.<ref>Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb. The official history, p65. Published 2001 by Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-94742-8 in North America. ISBN 0-312-23518-6 elsewhere.</ref> Only in 1958 did the Committee of 100 initiate the first large scale protest with its Aldermaston March. Successive Labour governments, while paying lip-service to nuclear disarmament issues have resolutely maintained and renewed the UK's nuclear forces, with majority popular support. Polaris, Chevaline and the early planning for Trident conducted by the Callaghan Labour government are testament to that. Callaghan went further; he ensured that his government's planning papers for Trident were made available ostensibly 'on national security grounds' to the successor Thatcher government. A most unusual departure from the usual Civil Service procedure. A later [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] leader, Neil Kinnock, although a supporter of unilateral nuclear disarmament, changed his stance after the arrival of the Gorbachev regime, on the grounds that a negotiated reduction in nuclear arms was then possible. Perhaps Kinnock also had understood the reality; that a unilateralist Labour Party would never be elected to government. The New Labour administration of Tony Blair also recognised that reality. In the near future, decisions about the replacement of Trident will need to be made (because of the long lead time before a replacement could enter service). It seems that the current Labour government will decide to replace Trident - although some believe that there may be some legal issues relating to the [[non-proliferation treaty]]. More likely, because the [[1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement]] often referred to as the 1958 Bi-lateral, is still in force (and renewed 2005) and pre-dates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it will be used to justify further legal purchases from the U.S., and further exchanges of data.
The current Trident system cost £12.6bn (at 1996 prices) and costs £280m a year to maintain. Options for replacing Trident range from £5bn for the missiles alone to £20-30bn for missiles, submarines and research facilities. At minimum, for the system to continue safely after around 2020, the missiles will need to be replaced.[http://www.newstatesman.com/Economy/200506130008]
==Legality==
:''See also [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]]''
The [[Her Majesty's Government|Government of the United Kingdom]] has announced plans to renew the UK's only nuclear weapon, the [[British Trident system|Trident missile system]].<ref>[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/ucwhite/ucmemo.htm Memoranda on the Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterent: the White Paper] to the House of Commons Defence Committee</ref>. They have published a [[white paper]] ''The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent'' in which they state that the renewal is fully compatible with the United Kingdom's treaty commitments and international law.<ref>[http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/White%20Paper%20Nuclear%20Deterrent.pdf The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent](pdf) December 2006:</ref> These arguments are summarised in a question and answer briefing published by [[Conference on Disarmament|UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament]]<ref>[http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1163677931589 Britain's Nuclear Deterrent] by [[Conference on Disarmament|UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament]]</ref>
{{quotation|
*Is Trident replacement legal under the [[Non Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT)? Renewal of the Trident system is fully consistent with our international obligations, including those on disarmament. ...
* Is retaining the deterrent incompatible with NPT Article VI? The NPT does not establish any timetable for nuclear disarmament. Nor does it prohibit maintenance or renewal of existing capabilities. Renewing the current Trident system is fully consistent with the NPT and with all our international legal obligations. ...
}}
==Against==
The white paper ''The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent'' stands in contrast to two [[legal opinion]]s. The first, commissioned by [[Peacerights]]<ref>[http://www.peacerights.org/aboutus.php Peacerights] [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/ucwhite/ucm1002.htm Memorandum from Peacerights]</ref>, was handed down on [[19 December]] [[2005]] by [[Rabinder Singh (lawyer)|Rabinder Singh]] [[QC]] and [[Professor]] [[Christine Chinkin]] of Matrix Chambers. It addressed '...whether Trident or a likely replacement to Trident breaches [[customary international law]]'<ref name="peacerights195"> Singh, Rabinder; and Chinkin, Christine; [http://www.peacerights.org/reports/195 The Maintenance and Possible Replacement of the Trident Nuclear Missile System Introduction and Summary of Advice] for Peacerights (paragraph 1 and 2)</ref>
Drawing on the [[International Court of Justice]] (ICJ) [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons|opinion]], Singh and Chinkin found that:
{{quotation|The use of the Trident system would breach customary international law, in particular because it would infringe the "intransgressible" [principles of international customary law] requirement that a distinction must be drawn between combatants and non-combatants.<ref name="peacerights195" />}}
The second legal opinion was commissioned by [[Greenpeace]]<ref>Greenpeace [http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/contentlookup.cfm?&ucidparam=20061123104513 Trident replacement may be illegal under international law]</ref> and handed down by [[Philippe Sands]] [[QC]] and [[Helen Law]], also of [[Matrix Chambers]], on [[13 November]] [[2006]].<ref>Sands, Philippe; and Law, Helen; [http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/8072.pdf The United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent:Current and future issies of legality] (see [[#References|References]])</ref> The opinion addressed
{{quotation|The compatibility with international law, in particular the [[jus ad bellum]], [[international humanitarian law]] (‘IHL’) and Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘NPT’), of the current UK strategy on the use of Trident...The compatibility with IHL of deploying the current Trident system...[and] the compatibility with IHL and Article VI NPT of the following options for replacing or upgrading Trident: (a) Enhanced targeting capability; (b) Increased yield flexibility; (c) Renewal of the current capability over a longer period.<ref>Sands, Philippe; and Law, Helen; [[#References|References]], paragraph 1</ref>}}
With regards to the ''jus ad bellum'', Sands and Law found that
{{quotation|Given the devastating consequences inherent in the use of the UK’s current nuclear weapons, we are of the view that the [[proportionality (law)|proportionality]] test is unlikely to be met except where there is a threat to the very survival of the state. In our view, the ‘vital interests’ of the UK as defined in the [[Strategic Defence Review]] are considerably broader than those whose destruction threaten the survival of the state. The use of nuclear weapons to protect such interests is likely to be disproportionate and therefore unlawful under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.<ref>Sands, Philippe; and Law, Helen; [[#References|References]], paragraph 4(i)</ref>}}
The phrase "very survival of the state" is a direct quote from paragraph 97 of the ICJ ruling. With regards to international humanitarian law, they found that
{{quotation|it [is] hard to envisage any scenario in which the use of Trident, as currently constituted, could be consistent with the IHL prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks and unnecessary suffering. Further, such use would be highly likely to result in a violation of the principle of neutrality.<ref>Sands, Philippe; and Law, Helen; [[#References|References]], paragraph 4(iii)</ref>}}
Finally, with reference to the NPT, Sands and Law found that
{{quotation|A broadening of the deterrence policy to incorporate prevention of nonnuclear attacks so as to justify replacing or upgrading Trident would appear to be inconsistent with Article VI; b) Attempts to justify Trident upgrade or replacement as an insurance against unascertainable future threats would appear to be inconsistent with Article VI; c) Enhancing the targeting capability or yield flexibility of the Trident system is likely to be inconsistent with Article VI; d) Renewal or replacement of Trident at the same capability is likely to be inconsistent with Article VI; and e) In each case such inconsistency could give rise to a material breach of the NPT.<ref>Sands, Philippe; and Law, Helen; [[#References|References]], paragraph 4(iv)</ref>}}
==Government Defence==
At the start of the [[British House of Commons|House of Commons]] debate to authorize the replacement of Trident,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2007-03-14c.298.0|date=[[14 March]] [[2007]]|title=Trident|publisher=Hansard}}</ref> [[Margaret Beckett]] stated:
{{quotation|Article VI of the NPT imposes an obligation on all states: “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament". The NPT Review Conference held in 2000 agreed, by consensus, [[13 steps|13 practical steps]] towards nuclear disarmament. The UK remains committed to these steps and is making progress on them. We have been disarming. Since the Cold War ended, we have withdrawn and dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne nuclear capabilities. We have terminated our nuclear capable Lance missiles and artillery. We have the smallest nuclear capability of any recognised nuclear weapon state accounting for less than one per cent of the global inventory. And we are the only nuclear weapon state that relies on a single nuclear system.}}
The subsequent vote was won overwhelmingly, including unanimous support from the opposition [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6448173.stm|publisher=BBC NEWS|title=Trident plan wins Commons support|date=[[15 March]] [[2007]]}}</ref>
The Government position remains that it is abiding by the NPT legally in renewing Trident and Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons, a position reiterated by [[Tony Blair]] in PMQs on February 21 2007.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd84/84news01.htm|publisher=Disarmament Diplomacy| title=Blair wins Trident vote after telling UK Parliament that the NPT gives Britain the Right to have nuclear weapons|date=Spring [[2007]]}}</ref>.
In contrast, the report by Sands was commissioned solely by [[Greenpeace]] and the report by Singh and Chinkin by the [[Peace Rights]] group,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,11026,1671191,00.html|title=Use of Trident 'would be illegal'|publisher=The Guardian|date=[[20 December]] [[2005]]|first=Richard|last=Norton-Taylor}}</ref> both notable groups in opposition to renewal, use or proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the British Government and NATO do not recognise advisory opinion of the ICJ,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf?PHPSESSID=9272f93615543b6fc6d7703ca7b34811|
title=Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons|publisher=International Court of Justice| date=[[8 July]] [[1996]]}}</ref> as interpreter of IHL and referred to by Sands et.al, (see [[Advisory Opinion]]) with regard to use of nuclear weaponry as legally binding.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/6103398.stm|publisher=BBC NEWS|title=Q&A: Nuclear disarmament|date=[[11 December]] [[2006]]}}</ref>
This position is held in common with all 5 nuclear states as defined in the NPT.{{Fact|date=March 2008}} However, only the United Kingdom has expressed its opposition to the establishment of a new legally binding treaty to prevent the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states<ref name="UN_ARES5377_page42">{{UN document |docid=A-RES-53-77 |type=Resolution |body=General Assembly |session=53 |resolution_number=77 |highlight=rect_103,562_917,645 |page=42 |accessdate=2008-03-11|title=Operative Paragraph 17, Resolution Y}}</ref> by its vote in the [[United Nations General Assembly]] in [[1998]].<ref>{{ UN document |docid=A-53-PV.79 |body=General Assembly |type=Verbotim Report |session=53 |meeting=79 |page=27 |anchor=pg027-bk01 |date=[[4 December]] [[1998]] |accessdate=2008-03-11 }}</ref>
This legal position is further discussed in the article [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]].
==See also==
*[[Nuclear testing]]
*[[Nuclear disarmament]]
*[[United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction]]
*''[[Threads]]'' (A fictional film about the effects of nuclear war on the United Kingdom)
*''[[The War Game]]'' (An earlier, documentary-style, TV film, also dealing with the effects of nuclear attack on the United Kingdom, that was made in 1965 and banned from being broadcast until the mid 1980's)
*[http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf Government White Paper Cm 6994 ''The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent'' (December 2006)]
*[[Global Security Institute]]
*[[Anti-nuclear movement in the United Kingdom]]
==References==
{{reflist|2}}
==Further reading==
* [[Lorna Arnold|Arnold, Lorna]] (2001). ''Britain and the H-Bomb. The official history up to the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement''. Copyright MoD. Published Palgrave. ISBN 0-312-23518-6 in North America, ISBN 0-333-94742-8 outside North America.
* [[Margaret Gowing|Gowing, Margaret]] and [[Lorna Arnold|Arnold, Lorna]] (1974). Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. Volume 1: Policy Making. London: The Macmillan Press. ISBN 0-333-15781-8.
* [[Margaret Gowing|Gowing, Margaret]] and [[Lorna Arnold|Arnold, Lorna]] (1974). Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. Volume 2: Policy Execution. London: The Macmillan Press. ISBN 0-333-16695-7.
* Wynne, Humphrey (1997). ''RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, their origins, roles and deployment, 1946-69. The documentary history.'' Copyright MoD. Published by The Stationery Office. ISBN 0-11-772833-0.
* Paul Rogers, "Possible Nuclear Attack Scenarios on Britain", ''Proceedings of the Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, Implications and Policy Options for the 1980s'', International Standing Conference on Conflict and Peace Studies, London, 1982.
* Roy Dommet, "The Blue Streak Weapon". ''Prospero'', refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
* George Hicks and Roy Dommet, "History of the RAE [Farnborough] and Nuclear Weapons". ''Prospero'', refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
* Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Symposium on [[Chevaline]] 2004, ISBN 1-85768-109-6. See note on sources at [[Talk:Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom]]
* Dr Peter Jones, Director AWE (Ret), "The Chevaline Technical Programme". ''Prospero'', the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
* [[Peter Nailor]], ''The Nassau Connection: the organisation and management of the British POLARIS project, London: H.M.S.O, (1988).
* Dr Frank Panton, "The Unveiling of Chevaline". ''Prospero'', the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005.
* Dr Frank Panton, "Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline Programme". ''Prospero'', the refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2004.
==External links==
* [http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/UK_Policy/main.htm British Nuclear Policy], BASIC
* [http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/nukes.htm Table of UK Nuclear Weapons models]
*[http://www.newstatesman.com/Economy/200506130008 Trident: the done deal], Robert Fox, ''[[New Statesman]]'', [[13 June]] [[2005]]
*[http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/1998007.htm Text of the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998]
*[http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd01norris Nuclear Notebook: British nuclear forces, 2001], [[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]], Nov/Dec 2001.
*[http://www.mod.uk/publications/nuclear_weapons/ The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Programme], [[UK Ministry of Defence]], [[4 September]] [[2001]]
*[http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd05norris British Nuclear Forces, 2005], by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]],'' November/December 2005.
*[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2081514,00.html Britain's secret nuclear blueprint] ''[[The Sunday Times (UK)|The Sunday Times]]'', [[March 12]], [[2006]]
*[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2081800,00.html Revealed: UK develops secret nuclear warhead] by Michael Smith, ''The Sunday Times'', [[March 12]], [[2006]]
*http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/nuclear_history/glossary.pdf
*http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/
[[Category:Nuclear history of the United Kingdom| ]]
[[Category:Nuclear weapons programme of the United Kingdom| ]]