Particular 23196 208938803 2008-04-29T05:52:48Z 98.209.55.235 Purely stylistic change from 'girl' to 'woman' wrt red-hair example, to tone down a vaguely sexist flavor. In [[metaphysics]], '''particulars''' are, one might say, identified by what they are not: they are not [[abstraction]]s, not [[multiple instantiation|multiply-instantiated]]--i.e. they are concrete. (There are, however, theories of ''[[abstract particulars]]'' or ''[[Trope (philosophy)|tropes]]''.) Hence, [[Socrates]] is a particular (there's only one Socrates-the-teacher-of-Plato and one cannot make copies of him, e.g., by cloning him, without introducing new, distinct particulars). Redness, by contrast, is not a particular, because (it is held by [[metaphysical realism|metaphysical realists]]) it is abstract and multiply-instantiated (my bicycle, this apple, and that woman's hair are all red). The fact of the matter is that all such terms are used by philosophers with a rough-and-ready idea of how they work. If there is confusion or lack of agreement about the specifics, that is a reflection of the fact that philosophers have many competing metaphysical theories that inform more precise, but idiosyncratic, accounts of the meanings of these terms. Hence, for example, for convenience in formulating a solution to the [[problem of universals]], 'particular' can be pressed into service in describing the ''particular'' instance of redness of a particular apple--even though redness (being [[Abstraction|abstract]]) is precisely the sort of thing that is ''not'' supposed to be particular. See [[philosophical jargon]]. [[Category:Metaphysics]] [[ja:特別]] [[no:Partikulare]] [[fi:Partikulaari]]