Phenomenology (philosophy)
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{{otheruses4|the philosophical movement|other uses|Phenomenology (disambiguation)}}
'''Phenomenology''' is the study of phenomena (from [[Greek]], meaning "that which appears") and how they appear to us from a first-person perspective. In modern times, it usually refers to the philosophy developed by [[Edmund Husserl]], which is primarily concerned with [[consciousness]] and its structures (the ways in which phenomena appear to us). Because consciousness is supposed to be that which everything shows itself to, and phenomenology is the study of consciousness, Husserl considered it to be a proper first philosophy. Husserl also sought to develop a "philosophy as rigid science".
Husserl's original account of phenomenology has through the years been criticised and developed, partly by Husserl himself, but also by [[Martin Heidegger]], who was his student and assistant, and many of the later existentialist thinkers such as [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]], [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], and [[Simone de Beauvoir]].
==What is Phenomenology?==
In its most basic form, phenomenology is the study of the consciousness from a first-person perspective, as opposed to, but not exclusive of, a third-person perspective like the neurological perspective. It is the attempt to reflect on pre-reflexive experience to determine certain properties of or structures in consciousness. Husserl considered it to be a proper ''first philosophy'', and wanted it to be philosophy as rigorous science.
Husserl derived many important concepts central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists [[Franz Brentano]] and [[Carl Stumpf]].<ref>{{citation
|first=Robin
|last=Rollinger
|title=Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano
|publisher=Kluwer
|place= Dordrecht / Boston / London
|year=1999
}}</ref>
An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano was [[intentionality]] (often described as "aboutness"), the notion that consciousness always is consciousness ''of'' something. The object of consciousness is called the ''intentional object'', and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through for instance [[perception]], [[memory]], [[protention]], [[retention]], signification, etc. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an object is still constituted as the same identical object; consciousness is directed at the same intentional object in direct perception as it is in the immediately following retention of this object and the eventual remembering of it.
It should be clarified right from the start that even though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is essentially anti-[[reductionism|reductionistic]]; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's ''essence'' or ''idea'', or when one details the constitution of an identical coherent thing by describing what one "really" sees as being only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: The ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand ''how'' these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the [[psychologism]] and [[physicalism]] of Husserl's time.
==Special terminology==
===Intuition===
Intuition in phenomenology refers to those cases where the intentional object is present in direct perception, where the intention is "filled," so to speak. For instance, having a cup of coffee in front of you, seeing it, feeling it - these are all filled intentions, and the object is then ''intuited''. If you don't have the object in direct perception, as when you remember it or if you fantasise about it, the object is not intuited, but still intended. This also goes for "theoretical" objects like mathematical objects. Filled intentions about these kinds of objects can be such things as thought and imagination.
===Lived-Body===
The lived-body is your own body as experienced by yourself, ''as'' yourself. Your own body manifests itself to you mainly as your possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your point of view. This helps you differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that you saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical).
===Empathy===
In phenomenology, [[empathy]] refers to the experience of another human body as another subjectivity: You see another body, but you immediately perceive another subject. In Husserl's original account, this was done by [[apperception]] built on the experiences of your own lived-body which you experience in a dual way, both as object (you can touch your own hand) and as your own subjectivity (you are being touched). This experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of [[intersubjectivity]].
==Husserl's ''Logische Untersuchungen'' (1900/1901)==
In the first edition of the ''Logical Investigations'', still under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "descriptive psychology." Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of mental acts and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects. The first volume of the ''Logical Investigations'', the ''Prolegomena to Pure Logic'', begins with a devastating critique of [[psychologism]], i.e., the attempt to subsume the ''a priori'' validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.<ref>On the ''Logical Investigations'', see
{{Citation
|editor-last= Zahavi
|editor-first= Dan
|editor2-last=Stjernfelt
|editor2-first= Frederik
|title= One Hundred Years of Phenomenology (Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited)
|place= Dordrecht / Boston / London
|publisher= Kluwer
|year=2002
}}; and
{{Citation
|editor-last= Mohanty
|editor-first= Jitendra Nath
|title= Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations
|place= Den Haag
|publisher= Nijhoff
|year=1977
}}
</ref>
==Transcendental phenomenology after the ''Ideen'' (1913)==
Some years after the publication of the ''Logical Investigations'', Husserl made some key elaborations which led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (''noesis'') and the phenomena at which it is directed (the ''noemata'').
* "noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, etc.)
* "noematic" refers to the object or content (noema) which appears in the noetic acts (the believed, wanted, hated, and loved ...).
What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. Knowledge of [[essence]]s would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure Husserl called ''epoché''.
Husserl in a later period concentrated more on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego. Now (transcendental) phenomenology is the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness: this amounts in practice to the study of the noemata and the relations among them. The philosopher [[Theodor Adorno]] criticised Husserl's concept of phenomenological epistemology in his metacritique ''Against Epistemology'', which is anti-[[foundationalism|foundationalist]] in its stance.
Transcendental phenomenologists include [[Oskar Becker]], [[Aron Gurwitsch]], and [[Alfred Schutz]].
==Realist phenomenology==
After Husserl's publication of the ''Ideen'' in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of the [[Munich phenomenology|Munich group]] distanced themselves from his new [[transcendental phenomenology]] and preferred the earlier [[realist phenomenology]] of the first edition of the ''Logical Investigations''.
Realist phenomenologists include [[Adolf Reinach]], [[Alexander Pfänder]], [[Johannes Daubert]], [[Max Scheler]], [[Roman Ingarden]], [[Nicolai Hartmann]], and [[Hans Köchler]].
==Existential phenomenology==
[[Existential phenomenology]] differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the [[transcendental|transcendental ego]]. Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego's transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of conscious being as always already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point - transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of the [[ontology|ontological]] nature of the world.
While [[Husserl]] thought of philosophy as a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood as [[epistemology]], [[Heidegger]] held a radically different view. Heidegger himself states their differences this way:
:''For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the [[transcendental]] life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).''<ref name="heideproblems">{{citation
|first=Martin
|last=Heidegger
|author-link = Martin Heidegger
|title=The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
|publisher=Indiana University Press
|year=1975
|chapter= Introduction
|chapter-url= http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm
}}</ref>
According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.
Instead of taking phenomenology as ''[[prima philosophia]]'' or a foundational discipline, Heidegger took it as a metaphysical ontology: "''being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy''... this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being.".<ref name="heideproblems"/> Yet to confuse phenomenology and ontology is an obvious error. Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being. Neither are they appearances, for as Heidegger argues in ''[[Being and Time]]'', an appearance is "that which shows itself in something else," while a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself."
While for Husserl, in the epochè, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for Heidegger being is the starting point. While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality."<ref name="heideproblems"/>
However, ontological being and existential being are different categories, so Heidegger's conflation of these categories is, according to Husserl's view, the root of Heidegger's error. Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein, the only being for whom Being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology. To clarify, perhaps, by abstract anthropology, as a non-existentialist searching for essences, Husserl rejected the existentialism implicit in Heidegger's distinction between being (sein) as things in reality and Being (Da-sein) as the encounter with being, as when being becomes present to us, that is, is unconcealed. <ref> I have attempted to respond to the request for clarification of Heidegger's distinction between being and Being. My info source was http://www.uni.edu/boedeker/NNhHeidegger2.doc. It was not copied and pasted but rephrased for copyright reasons. </ref>
Existential phenomenologists include: [[Martin Heidegger]] ([[1889]] – [[1976]]), [[Hannah Arendt]] ([[1906]] – [[1975]]), [[Emmanuel Levinas]] ([[1906]] – [[1995]]), [[Gabriel Marcel]] ([[1889]] – [[1973]]), [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] ([[1905]] – [[1980]]), [[Paul Ricoeur]] ([[1913]] - [[2005]]) and [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]] ([[1908]] – [[1961]]).
==Phenomenology and Eastern thought==
Some researchers in phenomenology (particularly in reference to [[Heidegger]]'s legacy) see possibilities of establishing dialogues with traditions of thought outside of the so-called [[Western philosophy]], particularly with respect to [[Eastern philosophy|East-Asian thinking]], and despite perceived differences between "Eastern" and "Western".<ref> See for instance references to Heidegger's "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer," in ''On the Way to Language'' (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Heidegger himself had contacts with some leading Japanese intellectuals, including members of the [[Kyoto School]], notably [[Hajime Tanabe]], [[Kuki Shūzō]] and [[Kiyoshi Miki]].</ref> Furthermore, it has been claimed that a number of elements within phenomenology (mainly Heidegger's thought) have some resonance with Eastern philosophical ideas, particularly with [[Zen Buddhism]] and [[Taoism]].<ref> An account given by Paul Hsao (in ''Heidegger and Asian Thought'') records a remark by Chang Chung-Yuan claiming that "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands but has intuitively grasped Taoist thought"</ref> According to [[Tomonubu Imamichi]], the concept of ''Dasein'' was inspired — although Heidegger remains silent on this — by [[Okakura Kakuzo]]'s concept of ''das-in-dem-Welt-sein'' (being in the world) expressed in ''[[The Book of Tea]]'' to describe [[Zhuangzi]]'s philosophy, which Imamichi's teacher had offered to Heidegger in 1919, after having studied with him the year before.<ref name=Imamichi>[[Tomonubu Imamichi]], ''In Search of Wisdom. One Philosopher's Journey'', Tokyo, International House of Japan, 2004 (quoted by Anne Fagot-Largeau during her [http://www.college-de-france.fr/default/EN/all/phi_sci/p1184676830986.htm lesson] at the [[Collège de France]] on December 7, 2006).</ref>
There are also recent signs of the reception of phenomenology (and Heidegger's thought in particular) within scholarly circles focused on studying the impetus of [[metaphysics]] in the history of ideas in [[Islam]] and [[Early Islamic philosophy]];<ref> See for instance: Nader El-Bizri, ''The Phenomenological Quest between [[Avicenna]] and Heidegger'' (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000) ISBN 1586840053</ref> perhaps under the indirect influence of the tradition of the French Orientalist and philosopher [[Henri Corbin]].<ref>A book-series under the title: ''Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue'' [http://www.springer.com/series/6137] has been recently established by [[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht) in association with the World Phenomenology Institute [http://www.phenomenology.org/]. This initiative has been initiated by the Polish phenomenologist [[Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka]], editor of ''Analecta Husserliana''.</ref>
==Criticisms of phenomenology==
{{Expand-section|date=April 2007}}
[[Daniel Dennett]] has criticized phenomenology on the basis that its explicitly first-person approach is incompatible with the ''scientific'' third-person approach, going so far as to coin the term "autophenomenology" to emphasize this aspect and to contrast it with his own alternative, which he calls [[heterophenomenology]]. Dennett's criticism reflects a more general attitude among analytic philosophers of mind. Phenomenologists, however, are often quick to point out that the relationship between phenomenological and natural scientific methods has been a major theme in phenomenology since at least Husserl [see The Crisis of the European Sciences], though Dennett makes no real attempt to engage with the work of phenomenologists on this issue. Many proponents of phenomenology argue that natural science can make sense only as a human activity, i.e., an activity which presupposes the fundamental structures of the 'first-person perspective.' While not hostile to the natural sciences per se, many thinkers in the Heideggerian tradition would regard criticisms such as Dennett's metaphysical rather than purely scientific claims, and thus susceptible to the usual criticisms directed at metaphysical theories of all kinds. Powerful defenses of the phenomenological approach against science-inspired reductive naturalism have been made by [[Hubert Dreyfus]] and [[Charles Taylor]] among others.
As part of an ongoing debate with [[Hubert Dreyfus]], [[John Searle]] has argued that much of the work done by phenomenologists on the philosophy of mind suffers from what he terms the 'Phenomenological Illusion'.<ref>http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf</ref> Searle defines the Phenomenological Illusion as the mistake of assuming that what is not phenomenologically present is not real, and that what is phenomenologically present is an adequate description of how things really are. According to Searle, this leads some phenomenologists to make mistaken claims about subjects such as meaning, social reality, functions, and causal self referentiality. Searle himself makes explicit that, defined as the examination of consciousness, he has no problem with phenomenology itself.
==Historical overview of the use of the term==
Phenomenology has at least three main meanings in [[philosophical]] history: one in the writings of [[G.W.F. Hegel]], another in the writings of [[Edmund Husserl]] in [[1920]], and a third, deriving from Husserl's work, in the writings of his former research assistant [[Martin Heidegger]] in [[1927]].
*For [[G.W.F. Hegel]], phenomenology is an approach to [[philosophy]] that begins with an exploration of [[phenomena]] (what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as a means to finally grasp the absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical Spirit that is behind phenomena. This has been called a "''dialectical phenomenology''".
*For [[Edmund Husserl]], phenomenology is "the reflective study of the [[essence]] of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."<ref>{{citation
|first=David Woodruff
|last=Smith
|title=Husserl
|publisher=Routledge
|place= London-New York
|year=2007
}}</ref> Phenomenology takes the intuitive experience of [[phenomena]] (what presents itself to us in phenomenological reflexion) as its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and the [[essence]] of what we experience. When generalized to the essential features of any possible experience, this has been called "''transcendental phenomenology''". [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl's]] view was based on aspects of the work of [[Franz Brentano]] and was developed further by philosophers such as [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]], [[Max Scheler]], [[Edith Stein]], [[Dietrich von Hildebrand]] and [[Emmanuel Levinas]].
*[[Martin Heidegger]] believed that [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl's]] approach overlooked basic structural features of both the subject and object of experience (what he called their "being"), and expanded phenomenological enquiry to encompass our understanding and experience of Being itself, thus making phenomenology the method (in the first phase of his career at least) of the study of being, [[ontology]].
The difference in approach between [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl]] and Heidegger influenced the development of [[existential phenomenology]] and [[existentialism]] in [[France]], as is seen in the work of [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] and [[Simone de Beauvoir]]. [[Munich phenomenology|Munich phenomenologists]] (Johannes Daubert, [[Adolf Reinach]], [[Alexander Pfänder]] in [[Germany]] and [[Alfred Schütz]] in Austria), and [[Paul Ricoeur]] have all been influenced. Readings of Husserl and Heidegger have also been crucial elements of the philosophies of [[Jacques Derrida]] and [[Bernard Stiegler]].
Although the term "phenomenology" was used occasionally in the [[history of philosophy]] before [[Husserl]], modern use ties it more explicitly to his particular method. Following is a list of thinkers in rough chronological order who used the term "phenomenology" in a variety of ways, with brief comments on their contributions:<ref>Partially based on
{{Citation
|last= Schuhmann
|first= Karl
|year= 2004
|chapter="Phänomenologie": Eine Begriffsgeschichtilche Reflexion
|editor-last= Leijenhorst
|editor-first= Cees
|editor2-last=Steenbakkers
|editor2-first= Piet
|title= Karl Schuhmann. Selected Papers on Phenomenology
|place= Dordrecht / Boston / London
|publisher= Kluwer
|pages= 1-33
}}</ref>
* [[Friedrich Christoph Oetinger]] (1702 - 1782) [[Germany|German]] [[pietist]], for the study of the "divine system of relations"<ref>Ernst Benz, Christian Kabbalah: Neglected Child of Theology</ref>
* [[David Hume]] (1711 – 1776) [[scottish people|Scottish]] [[philosopher]], called variably a [[skeptic]] or a common sense advocate. While this connection is somewhat tenuous, Hume, in [[A Treatise of Human Nature]], does seem to take a phenomenological or psychological approach by describing the process of reasoning causality in psychological terms. This is also the inspiration for the Kantian distinction between [[phenomenon|phenomenal]] and [[noumenon|noumenal]] reality.<ref>Ernest Campbell Mossner. The Life of David Hume. Oxford University Press, 1980.</ref>
* [[Johann Heinrich Lambert]] (1728–1777) ([[Mathematics|mathematician]], [[Physics|physician]] and [[Philosophy|philosopher]]) known for the theory of appearances underlying empirical knowledge.<ref>Lambert, Johann Heinrich (1772). Anmerkungen und Zusätze zur Entwerfung der Land- und Himmelscharten. Von J. H. Lambert (1772.) Hrsg. von A. Wangerin. Mit 21 Textfiguren. (xml). W. Engelmann, reprint 1894.</ref>
* [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804), in the [[Critique of Pure Reason]], distinguished between objects as [[phenomenon|phenomena]], which are objects as shaped and grasped by human sensibility and understanding, and objects as ''things-in-themselves'' or [[noumena]], which do not appear to us in space and time and about which we can make no legitimate judgments.
* [[G.W.F. Hegel]] (1770–1831) challenged Kant's doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself, and declared that by knowing phenomena more fully we can gradually arrive at a consciousness of the absolute and spiritual truth of Divinity. Hegel's ''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'', published in 1807, prompted many opposing views, including the existential work of [[Søren Kierkegaard]], [[Martin Heidegger]], and [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], as well as the materialist work of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and his many followers.
* [[Franz Brentano]] (1838-1917) seems to have used the term in some of his lectures at [[Vienna]], where [[Edmund Husserl]] studied with him and came under his influence.
* [[Carl Stumpf]] (1848-1936), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used "phenomenology" to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.
* [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) established phenomenology at first as a kind of "descriptive psychology" and later as a transcendental and [[eidetic]] science of consciousness. He is considered to be the founder of contemporary phenomenology.
* [[Max Scheler]] (1874-1928) developed further the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and extended it to include also a reduction of the [[scientific method]]. He influenced the thinking of [[Pope John Paul II]] and [[Edith Stein]].
* [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) criticized Husserl's theory of phenomenology and attempted to develop a theory of [[ontology]] that led him to his original theory of [[Dasein]], the non-dualistic human being.
* [[Alfred Schütz]] (1899-1959) developed a phenomenology of the social world on the basis of everyday experience which has influenced major sociologists such as [[Harold Garfinkel]], [[Peter Berger]], and [[Thomas Luckmann]].
Later usage is mostly based on or (critically) related to Husserl's introduction and use of the term. This branch of philosophy differs from others in that it tends to be more "descriptive" than "[[Prescription and description|prescriptive]]".
==List of phenomenologists and phenomenology-derived theorists==
{{col-begin}}
{{col-4}}
* [[Peter Berger]]
* [[Maurice Blanchot]]
* [[Hans Blumenberg]]
* [[Stanley Cavell]]
* [[Jacques Derrida]]
* [[Mikel Dufrenne]]
* [[Hubert Dreyfus]]
* [[James M. Edie]]
* [[Lester Embree]]
* [[Shepard Fairey]]
* [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]]
* [[Shaun Gallagher]]
{{col-4}}
* [[Amedeo Giorgi]]
* [[Aron Gurwitsch]]
* [[Martin Heidegger]]
* [[Michel Henry]]
* [[Edmund Husserl]]
* [[Roman Ingarden]]
* [[Michael Jackson (anthropology)]]
* [[Karl Jaspers]]
* [[Ludwig Landgrebe]]
* [[Richard Lanigan]]
* [[Emmanuel Levinas]]
* [[Thomas Luckmann]]
{{col-4}}
* [[Gabriel Marcel]]
* [[Abraham Maslow]]
* [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]]
* [[Eugene Minkowski]]
* [[Christian Norberg-Schulz]]
* [[Jose Ortega y Gasset]]
* [[Jan Patočka]]
* [[Alexander Pfänder]]
* [[Georges Poulet]]
* [[Adolf Reinach]]
* [[Paul Ricoeur]]
* [[Jean-Paul Sartre]]
{{col-4}}
* [[Max Scheler]]
* [[Alfred Schütz]]
* [[Herbert Spiegelberg]]
* [[Edith Stein]]
* [[Pierre Thevenaz]]
* [[Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka]]
* [[Herman Van Breda]]
* [[Pope John Paul II#Teachings|Karol Wojtyła]]
* [[Dan Zahavi]]
* [[Felix Kalinowski]]
* [[Robert Sokolowski]]
{{col-end}}
==See also==
{{col-begin}}
{{col-2}}
* [[Phenomenology of religion]]
* [[Hermeneutics]]
* [[Geneva School]]
* [[Structuralism]]
* [[Poststructuralism]]
* [[Social constructionism]]
* [[Gestalt therapy]]
* [[Philosophical Anthropology]]
{{col-2}}
* [[Existentialism]]
* [[Deconstruction]]
* [[Phenomenography]]
* [[Philosophy of technology]]
* [[Emergy]]
* [[Personhood Theory]]
* [[Phenomenology (psychology)]]
* [[List of publications in psychology#Phenomenology|Important publications in phenomenological psychology]]
{{col-end}}
==Further reading==
*The [http://iap.li/default.php IAP LIBRARY] offers very fine sources for Phenomenology.
*The [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/ London Philosophy Study Guide] offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Phenomenology.htm Phenomenology]
* Dermot Moran, ''Introduction to Phenomenology'' (Oxford: Routledge, 2000) - Charting phenomenology from Brentano, through Husserl and Heidegger, to Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.
* Robert Sokolowski, "Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) - An excellent non-historical introduction to phenomenology.
* [[Herbert Spiegelberg]], "The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction," 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). The most comprehensive source on the development of the phenomenological movement.
* David Stewart and Algis Mickunas, "Exploring Phenomenology: A Guide to the Field and its Literature" (Athens: Ohio University Press 1990)
* Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth, and Russell Kent, "Understanding Phenomenology" (Oxford: Blackwell 1995)
* Christopher Macann, ''Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty'' (New York: Routledge: 1993)
* [[Jan Patočka]], "Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?" In: ''Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?'', ed. and trans. E. Abrams (Grenoble: J. Millon 1988), pp. 263–302. An answer to the question, What is phenomenology?, from a student of both Husserl and Heidegger and one of the most important phenomenologists of the latter half of the twentieth century.
* William A. Luijpen and Henry J. Koren, "A First Introduction to Existential Phenomenology" (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1969)
* Richard M. Zaner, "The Way of Phenomenology" (Indianapolis: Pegasus 1970)
* [[Hans Köchler]], ''Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus''. (Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain, 1974) (German)
* [[Hans Köchler]], ''Phenomenological Realism: Selected Essays'' (Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Peter Lang, 1986)
* [[Mark Jarzombek]], ''The Psychologizing of Modernity'' (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
* Pierre Thévenaz, "What is Phenomenology?" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1962)
* ed. James M. Edie, "An Invitation to Phenomenology" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1965) - A collection of seminal phenomenological essays.
* ed. R. O. Elveton, "The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings" (Seattle: Noesis Press 2000) - Key essays about Husserl's phenomenology.
* ed. Laura Doyle, ''Bodies of Resistance: New Phenomenologies of Politics, Agency, and Culture''. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
* eds. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and Existentialism" (New York: Putnam 1973) - Contains many key essays in existential phenomenology.
* [[Albert Borgmann]] and his work in philosophy of technology.
* eds. Natalie Depraz, [[Francisco Varela]], Pierre Vermersch, ''On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing'' (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2003) - searches for the sources and the means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
* Don Idhe, "Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction" (Albany, NY: SUNY Press)
*Sara Ahmed, "Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects Others" (Durham: Duke University Press 2006)
* [[Michael Jackson (anthropology)|Michael Jackson]], ''Existential Anthropology''
*{{cite book|title=Being and Nothingness |first=Jean-Paul |last=Sartre }}
* [[Shaun Gallagher]] and [[Dan Zahavi]],''The Phenomenological Mind''. London: Routledge, 2007.
==External links==
* [http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/phenom.htm What is Phenomenology?]
* [http://www.husserlpage.com/ About Edmund Husserl]
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]
* [http://www.o-p-o.net/ Organization of Phenomenology Organizations]
* [http://www.phenomenology.ro Romanian Society for Phenomenology]
* [http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/ Phenomenology Online]
* [http://www.thenewdialectics.org Dialectical Phenomenology]
* [http://www.thenewphenomenology.org The New Phenomenology]
===Journals===
* [http://popups.ulg.ac.be/bap.htm Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique]
* [http://www.janushead.org Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts]
* [http://www.britishphenomenology.com Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology]
* [http://www.brill.nl/m_catalogue_sub6_id9390.htm Research in Phenomenology]
* [http://www.phenomenology.ro/newsletter/newsletter_all.htm Newsletter of Phenomenology] (online-newsletter)
* [http://www.studia-phaenomenologica.com/ Studia Phaenomenologica] {{ISSN|1582-5647}}
* [http://www.ipjp.org/ Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology]
* [http://www.roman-ingarden.phils.uj.edu.pl/ang/index.php The Roman Ingarden Philosophical Research Centre]
* [http://www.springerlink.com/content/l72094330k84/?p=9bef6e3ba33343b9af966c582b7117b5&pi=0 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences]
{{Wiktionary}}
==References==
{{reflist}}
{{Philosophy topics}}
[[Category:20th century philosophy]]
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