Reason
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'''Reason''' is a way of [[thinking]] characterized by [[logic]], [[analysis]], and [[synthesis]]. It is often contrasted with [[emotionalism]], which is thinking driven by [[desire]], [[passion]], or [[prejudice]]. Reason attempts to discover what is [[truth|true]] and what is [[Ethic or philosophic good|best]]. Reason often follows a chain of [[cause and effect]], and the word "reason" can be a synonym for "cause".
The [[concept]] of reason is closely related to the concept of [[language]], as reflected in the meanings of the Greek word "[[logos]]", the root of [[logic]], which translated into [[Latin]] became "ratio" and then in [[French language|French]] "raison", from which the English word "reason" was derived.
Also see [[practical reason]] and [[speculative reason]].
==Reason and logic==
Reason is a type of [[thought]]. [[Logic]] is the attempt to make explicit the rules by which reason operates. The oldest surviving writing to explicitly and at length consider the rules by which reason operates are the works of the [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] [[philosopher]] [[Aristotle]], especially ''Prior Analysis'' and ''Posterior Analysis''.<ref>Aristotle, ''Complete Works'' (2 volumes), Princeton, 1995, ISBN 0691099502</ref> Although the Ancient Greeks had no separate word for logic as distinct from language and reason, Aristotle's [[neologism]] "[[syllogism]]" (syllogismos) identified logic clearly for the first time as a distinct field of study. When Aristotle referred to "the logical" (logos), he was referring more broadly to rational thought.
Reason and logic can be thought of as distinct, although logic is one important aspect of reason. Author [[Douglas Hofstadter]], in ''[[Gödel, Escher, Bach]]'', characterizes the distinction in this way. Logic is what is done "inside the system" by formal steps such as deduction. Reason is what is done "outside the system" by such informal methods as skipping steps, working backward, drawing diagrams, looking at examples, or seeing what happens if you change the rules of the system.<ref>Douglas Hofstadter, ''Gödel, Escher, Bach'', Vintage, 1979, ISBN 0394745027</ref> In [[Modern Times (history)|the present day]] there is an increasing tendency to use the terms interchangeably, or to see logic as the most pure or the defining form of reason.
Neurologist [[Terrence Deacon]], following the tradition of [[Charles Peirce]], has recently given a useful new description of what makes reason distinctive compared to logic, as well as the [[information processing]] of [[computers]] and at least most [[animals]], in [[modern]] terms. Like many philosophers in the English tradition, such as [[Hobbes]], [[Locke]], and [[Hume]], Peirce starts by distinguishing the type of thinking which is most essential to human reason as a type of [[Association (psychology)|associative thinking]]. Reason, by his account, requires associating [[perception]]s with [[icon]]s. For example, the mind may associate the [[image]] (or [[icon]]) of smoke with not only the [[image]] of fire, but may also associate the word "smoke", or indeed any made-up [[symbol]], with the image of fire.<ref>Terrence Deacon, ''The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain'', W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, ISBN 0393317544</ref>
== Reason, truth, and “first principles” ==
In western philosophy, '''reason''' has a twofold history. In [[classical]] times a conflict developed between the [[Platonism|Platonists]] and the [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelians]] concerning the role of reason in confirming [[truth]].
Both Aristotle and Plato considered this question. On the one hand, people use logic, [[deduction]], and [[inductive reasoning|induction]] to reach conclusions they think are true. Conclusions reached in this way are considered more certain than basic sense perceptions. On the other hand, if such reasoned conclusions are only built upon sense perceptions, then our most logical conclusions can never be said to be certain because they are built upon the very same fallible perceptions they seek to better.
This leads to the question of [[first principles]]. [[Empiricism]] (associated with Aristotle and, more recently, with [[Great Britain|British]] philosophers such as [[John Locke]] and [[David Hume]]) asserts that sensory impressions are primary. [[Idealism]], (associated with Plato and his school), claims that there is a "higher" reality, from which certain people can directly arrive at truth without the need of the senses, and that this higher reality is the primary source of truth.
In Greek, “[[first principles]]” are [[arche|arkhai]], starting points, and the faculty used to perceive them is sometimes referred to in Aristotle and Plato as “[[nous]]” which was close in meaning to “awareness” or “[[consciousness]]”.
Among those who would argue that reason can not be based upon experience alone, at least two major strands might be discerned. On the one hand, philosophers such as [[Plato]], [[Aristotle]], [[al-Farabi|Alfarabi]], [[Avicenna]], [[Averroes]], [[Maimonides]], [[Aquinas]] and [[Hegel]] are sometimes said to have argued that reason must be fixed and discoverable - perhaps by dialectic, analysis, or study. In the vision of these thinkers, reason is divine or at least has divine attributes. Such an approach allowed religious philosophers such as [[Thomas Aquinas]] and [[Étienne Gilson]] to try to show that reason and [[revelation]] are compatible.
On the other hand, since the [[Seventeenth Century]] rationalists, reason has often been taken to be a subjective faculty, or rather the unaided ability (pure reason) to form concepts. For [[Descartes]], [[Spinoza]] and [[Leibniz]], this was associated with significant developments in mathematics. [[Kant]] attempted to show that pure reason could form concepts (time and space) that are the conditions of experience. Kant made his argument in opposition to Hume, who denied that reason had any role to play in experience.
== Reason, language and mimesis ==
The recent writings of Deacon and Donald fit into an older tradition which makes reason connected to [[language]], and [[mimesis]], but more specifically the ability to create [[language]] as part of an internal modelling of [[reality]] specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness, and [[imagination]] or [[fantasy]].
Thomas Hobbes describes the creation of “Markes, or Notes of remembrance” (''[[Leviathan (book)|Leviathan]]'' Ch.4) as “speech” (allowing by his definition that it is not necessarily a means of communication or speech in the normal sense; he was presumably thinking of "speech" as an English version of "[[logos]]" in this description). In the context of a language, these marks or notes are called "[[Sign]]es" by Hobbes.
[[David Hume]], following [[John Locke]] (and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]), who followed Hobbes, emphasized the importance of associative thinking.
Concerning mimesis and fantasy being important in defining reason, see for example Aristotle's [[Poetics (Aristotle)|Poetics]], [[De Anima]], [[On Dreams]], and [[On Memory|On Memory and Recollection]] (and for example the Introduction by Michael Davis, printed with the 2002 translation by him and [[Seth Benardete]] of the Poetics), Jacob Klein’s ''A Commentary on the Meno'' Ch.5, and [[Tolkien]]'s essay "On Fairy Stories".
In more recent times, important areas of research include the relationship between reason and language, especially in discussions of [[origin of language]]. Modern proponents of [[A priori and a posteriori (philosophy)|a priori]] reasoning, at least with regards to language, include [[Noam Chomsky]] and [[Steven Pinker]], to whom [[Merlin Donald]] and [[Terrence Deacon]] can be usefully contrasted.
== Reason and emotion or passion ==
In [[western literature]], reason is often opposed to [[emotions]] or [[feelings]] -- desires, fears, hates, drives, or passions. Even in everyday speech, westerners tend to say for example that their passions made them behave contrary to reason, or that their reason kept the passions under control. Many writers, such as [[Nikos Kazantzakis]], extol passion and disparage reason.
It is also common, particularly since [[Freud]], to describe reason as the servant of the passions - the means of sorting out our desires and then getting what we want, or perhaps even the slave of the passions - allowing us to pretend to reason to the object of our desire. Such feigned reason is called "[[rationalization]]".
Philosophers such as [[Plato]], [[Rousseau]], [[David Hume|Hume]], and [[Nietzsche]] have combined both views - making rational thinking not only a tool of desires, but also something privileged within the spectrum of desires, being itself desired, and not only because of its usefulness in satisfying other desires.
Modern [[psychology]] has much to say on the role of [[emotions]] in belief formation. Deeper philosophical questions about the relation between belief and reality are studied in the field of [[epistemology]], which forms part of the philosophical basis of [[science]], a branch of human activity that specifically aims to determine (certain types of) [[truth]] by methods that avoid dependence on the emotions of the researchers.
==[[Faith and rationality|Reason and faith]], especially in the “Greater West”==
In [[theology]], reason, as distinguished from [[faith]], is the human critical faculty exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. Some commentators have claimed that [[Western civilization]] can be almost defined by its serious testing of the limits of tension between “unaided” reason and [[faith]] in "[[revelation|revealed]]" truths - figuratively summarised as [[Athens]] and [[Jerusalem]], respectively. [[Leo Strauss]] spoke of a "Greater [[Western world|West]]" which included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek rationalism and [[Abrahamic]] revelation, including the [[Muslim]] lands. He was particularly influenced by the great [[Islamic philosophy|Muslim philosopher]] [[Farabi|Al-Farabi]]. In order to consider to what extent [[Eastern philosophy]] might have partaken of these important tensions, it is perhaps best to consider whether [[dharma]] or [[tao]] may be equivalent to [[Nature]] (by which we mean ''[[physis]]'' in Greek).
The limits within which reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern religion tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate ([[supernatural]]) truths of theology.
==References==
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==See also==
{{Wiktionary|reason}}
* [[Conscience]]
* [[Consciousness]]
* [[Deism]]
* [[Empiricism]]
* [[Epistemology]]
* [[Fideism]]
* [[Fantasy]]
* [[Foucault/Habermas debate]]
* [[Inquiry]]
* [[Logic]]
* [[Language]]
* [[Mimesis]]
* [[Mind]]
* [[Nous]]
* [[Rationality]]
* [[Reasoning]]
{{portalpar|Logic}}
{{enlightenment}}
{{Logic|state=collapsed}}
[[Category:Epistemology]]
[[Category:Belief]]
[[Category:Logic]]
[[Category:Thought]]
[[Category:Virtues]]
[[ar:عقل (فلسفة)]]
[[bg:Разум]]
[[ca:Raó]]
[[cs:Rozum]]
[[da:Ræsonnere]]
[[de:Vernunft]]
[[et:Mõistus]]
[[el:Λογική]]
[[es:Razón (filosofía)]]
[[eo:Racio]]
[[fa:عقل]]
[[fr:Raison]]
[[ko:이성]]
[[ia:Ration]]
[[it:Ragione]]
[[lv:Prāts]]
[[nl:Rede]]
[[ja:理性]]
[[pl:Rozum]]
[[pt:Razão]]
[[qu:Humu]]
[[ru:Разум]]
[[simple:Reason]]
[[sq:Arsyeja]]
[[sr:Разум]]
[[fi:Järki]]
[[sv:Förnuft]]
[[vi:Lý tính]]
[[yi:סברה]]