Single Integrated Operational Plan 849180 225221886 2008-07-12T15:19:01Z 69.245.24.132 /* SIOP in Fiction */ The '''Single Integrated Operational Plan''' ('''SIOP''') is a blueprint which specifies how [[United States|American]] [[nuclear weapon]]s would be used in the event of [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]].<ref name=NSAEBB130>{{citation | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/ | title = The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 130 | editor = Burr, William | date = 13 July 2004 }}</ref> At a NATO level, an agreement to use nuclear weapons envisages the United Kingdom participating in the SIOP ([[#United Kingdom participation|see below]]). The plan integrates the nuclear capabilities of the "triad" composed of bombers with intercontinental range, land-based [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s (ICBM) and sea-based [[submarine-launched ballistic missiles]] (SLBM). The SIOP is a highly [[classified information|classified]] document, and has been one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security policy. [[Image:Trident C-4 montage.jpg|thumb|Montage of submerged submarine launch to the reentry of the [[multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]]s of a Trident missile]] The term SIOP has been replaced by one or more '''CONPLAN'''s (Contingency Plans), but the term SIOP is still widely used in strategic discussions. [[Image:B-2 Spirit original.jpg|thumb|[[B-2 Spirit]] "stealth" bomber]] [[Image:Minuteman3launch.jpg| thumb| Test launch of Minuteman III, the current U.S. ICBM]] == Preparation of alternatives == The SIOP is generated from a conceptual guide issued by the [[President of the United States|President]]. The guide is converted by the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] into the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) of basic targeting objectives, target lists and operational constraints. The NUWEP is then delivered to the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] (JCS) and emerges as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP is then converted into the actual targeting orders, timing, and weapon allocation that comprise the SIOP by the [[United States Strategic Command|STRATCOM]]. The entire process takes up to 18 months. Under President Clinton the SIOP held four major attack options, 65 limited attack options, and a number of generalised adaptive options for threats originating outside [[Russia]] or [[China]]. Nuclear strike targets are listed as the National Target Base (NTB), which is built from an intelligence list of 150,000+ sites across the world. The number of targets in the NTB has varied enormously - from around 16,000 in 1985, 12,500 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 2,500 in 1995 before rising to the current list of 3,000 targets. Around 75% of the current targets are in Russia; of these, 1,100 are nuclear weapons sites. ===Plan designations=== SIOP plans were named after the fiscal year in which they come into effect. This was first officially applied to SIOP-93; prior to that, plans used a two-character alphanumeric designation. A new SIOP is approved every year, although the plan may well be unchanged. The most recent plan (see below) involving general nuclear war is CONPLAN 8044. === United Kingdom participation === While the [[United Kingdom|United Kingdom's]] nuclear deterrent - four [[Trident missile|Trident]] [[Vanguard class submarine|''Vanguard'' class submarine]]s - are strictly under UK national control, they do have two distinct roles. The first is part of a UK-only retaliatory response to a nuclear attack, whether a full strategic strike involving all of the [[Royal Navy]]'s Trident submarines, or a limited tactical strike. The second role is one in which the Royal Navy participates in the SIOP, in effect becoming non-distinct from the U.S. Navy's Trident submarines. This role was to be part of a [[NATO]] response to a Soviet nuclear strike. The Royal Navy's contribution to the SIOP shows the power of the nuclear arsenal committed to the plan. The four ''Vanguard'' submarines could strike a maximum of 512 separate targets; this is equivalent to 7% of the total U.S. nuclear strike capacity. ==Effects of various strike options== The US nuclear arsenal holds around 7,000 individual warheads. A strong [[counterforce]] strike (military targets) using up to 1,500 warheads is estimated to cause approximately 120 million casualties; a limited [[countervalue]] strike (civilian targets) of 200 warheads is estimated to cause approximately 50 million casualties.<ref name=NRDC2001>{{citation | url = http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp | title = The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change | author = National Resources Defense Council | date = June 2001 }}</ref> ===Blast effects=== These estimates are controversial and may be conservative. Ignoring hypothetical long-term effects such as [[nuclear winter]], many of the casualty estimates were based on blast effects alone. Even blast effects are highly dependent on burst altitude, weapon yield, and the geography of the target area. As opposed to the general experience with conventional explosives, the [[overpressure]] caused by an explosion is not a simple inverse cube relationship. Instead, the potential of superheated air produces two potential overpressure patterns from a weapon of a given yield, detonated at different altitudes, according to the Mach Effect. <ref name=Sublette05-04>{{citation | chapter = Chapter 5.0 Effects of Nuclear Explosions, section 5.4 Air Bursts and Surface Bursts | date =Version 2.14: 15 May 1997 | last = Sublette | first = Cary | title = Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions | url = http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html }}</ref> Essentially, exploiting the Mach effect allows a choice of a small area of very high overpressure, as might be needed for a hardened facility such as a missile silo or command post, or a much larger area of lower overpressure, which would still destroy civilian buildings and many military structures. [[Image:Blastcurves 1.png|thumb|Overpressure vs. burst height]] High overpressures are essential in counterforce attacks against what may be superhardened targets, while ordinary buildings and factories, the targets of countervalue attacks, would be destroyed by much lower overpressures. Geography and terrain would be factors. For example, the nuclear explosion at [[Nagasaki, Nagasaki|Nagasaki]] was in a valley, where hills partially protected adjacent areas. The main [[Hiroshima]] target area was flat and the pressure was roughly symmetrical from the Designated Ground Zero (DGZ) of the Aoki Bridge. ===Immediate ionizing radiation effects=== For these strategic targets, immediate radiation (i.e., straight-line radiation from the fireball) would produce a relatively small proportion of the casualties. Most people in range of lethal radiation would also be in lethal range of blast or thermal effects. While both thermal and ionizing radiation decrease according to an inverse square law, much of the ionization radiation is also attenuated by air. The "neutron bomb", or [[enhanced radiation weapon]] was intended as a tactical weapon that would not be used by the SIOP. Such devices, while still producing enormous blast and heat, produce relatively more immediate ionizing radiation than would the larger-yield weapons delivered as part of SIOP. Enhanced radiation was also a design objective of certain warheads on defensive weapons, intended to damage incoming strategic warheads with X-rays. <ref <ref name=Spartan>{{citation | url = http://www.nuclearabms.info/Spartan.html | title = Spartan | date = 27-Jan-2003}}</ref><ref name=Sublette04-04>{{citation | chapter = Chapter 4.0 Effects of Nuclear Explosions, section 4.4.4.2.1 Radiation Case | date =Version 2.14: 15 May 1997 | last = Sublette | first = Cary | title = Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions | url = http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-4.html }}</ref> ===Electromagnetic effects=== It is known that nuclear explosions produce varying intensities of [[electromagnetic pulse]] (EMP), which has the potential to damage electronic equipment. Effective power, coverage, and frequencies of the electromagnetic pulse are dependent, at a minimum, on the yield of the nuclear weapon and the altitude of the burst.<ref name=Sublette05-05>{{citation | chapter = Chapter 5.0 Engineering and Design of Nuclear Weapons, section 5.5 Electromagnetic Effects | date =Version 2.14: 15 May 1997 | last = Sublette | first = Cary | title = Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions | url = http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html }}</ref> [[Image:High altitude EMP2.GIF|left|thumb|Variables in ground EMP]] While general U.S. planning and engineering documents specify means of EMP protection, <ref name=MIL-STD-188-125-1>{{citation | id = MIL-STD-188-125-1 | date = 17 July 1998 | title = High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) protection for ground-based C4I facilities performing critical, time-urgent missions | author = [[United States Department of Defense]]}}</ref> no unclassified references suggest that any weapons, targeted under SIOP, are intended principally to produce EMP. [[Image:Bravo Fallout.jpg|thumb|Unexpectedly large fallout pattern from [[Castle Bravo]] thermonuclear bomb test]] ===Delayed radiation effects=== Delayed and continuing ionizing radiation comes from [[fallout]] products of the explosion. In general, the higher the burst altitude, the less fallout; the more surface material that comes in contact with the fireball, the more fallout. ===Thermal effects=== The casualty estimates in the start of this section did not consider thermal effects, which could cause massive [[firestorm]]s, killing all blast and immediate radiation survivors within the initial area of effect. <ref name=NSAEBB108>{{citation | title = "It Is Certain There Will be Many Firestorms": New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 108 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | editor = Burr, William | date = 14 January 2004 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB108/index.htm#1 }}</ref>. An analysis by Stanford University historian Lynn Eden uses the example of a 300-kiloton weapon bursting, on a clear day, 1500 feet above the Pentagon. Blast would destroy the Pentagon, which is not a hardened facility, and nearby buildings. According to Eden, a much larger area set ablaze by the fantastically high levels of thermal energy released by the bomb. "Within tens of minutes, the entire area, approximately 40 to 65 square miles--everything within 3.5 or 6.4 miles of the Pentagon--would be engulfed in a mass fire" that would "extinguish all life and destroy almost everything else." Since much of the thermal effect is from straight-line [[infrared]] radiation, clouds, rain, etc. could attenuate the thermal effect, but this has not been quantified in the open literature. In clear air, thermal energy decreases from the DGZ by an [[inverse square law]], and is not significantly attenuated by dry air. Another area of complexity would come from target areas that would have be struck by multiple weapons at different [[Designated Ground Zero]] (DGZ) points. For example, in an attack on Moscow, the [[Kremlin]] and the [[Special Purpose Command]] headquarters of the [[Russian Air Force]] might be targeted separately. A fire storm centered on each DGZ might eventually merge. ==History== SIOP, and its renamed successors, is most importantly an ''integrated'' plan that uses both Air Force and Navy delivery systems; it is "single" only in the sense that it comes out of one planning group. The "plan" actually contains multiple "attack options" that are themselves complex plans. ===Early targeting after the Second World War=== Strategic nuclear strike plans were developed during the immediate post-[[World War II]] period. By the 1950s around 5,500 targets were listed to receive [[Strategic Air Command|SAC]] bomber strikes; these targets consisted primarily of industrial sites but included [[counterforce]] targets. These plans, primarily by the Air Force, tended to use up the available weapons rather than consider the desired effects. <ref name=NSAEBB108-03>{{citation | url = http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB108/fire-3.pdf | title = "It Is Certain There Will be Many Firestorms": New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 108 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | contribution = Letter from Captain John H. Morse, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission | first = John H. | last = Moore | editor = Burr, William | date = 14 February 1957 | id = Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Records of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, box 17, Target Systems (1957-1961) }}</ref> From a 1957 letter from John H. Moore, former director of nuclear planning, air operations branch, [[United States European Command]], Air Force target planning methodology can be inferred "blast damage frame," with such references as "damage to concrete structures" and the requirement for a "high probability of cratering runways." He cited the "destructive and disruptive nature of nuclear weapons" with megaton yields: "the cumulative or ancillary effects may be as great or greater than primary damage." Specifically, he considered delayed radiation but not thermal effects, but called attention to the idea of "bonus" effects,<ref name=KahnMetaphors>{{citation |first = Herman | last = Kahn | authorlink = Herman Kahn |title=On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios | publisher= Penguin | year = 1968 }}</ref> in which the totality of weapons effects would allow lower-yield weapons to achieve the "desired destruction." In the letter to the head of the Atomic Energy Commission, [[Lewis Strauss]], Moore noted that the Pentagon "rigorously suppressed" this study and destroyed all copies. Prior to the development of SIOP and survivable command & control, [[President]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] predelegated nuclear release authority to certain senior commanders. <ref name=NSAEBB45>{{citation | title = First Declassification of Eisenhower's Instructions to Commanders Predelegating Nuclear Weapons Use, 1959-1960 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB45/ | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 45 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | editor = Burr, William | date = 18 May 2001}}</ref> There have continued to be Continuity of Nuclear Operations Plans (COOP), which designated enough subordinates who, in the event of the NCA and immediate successors being killed in a "decapitation" attack, could still retaliate. While the details have never been made public, Eisenhower's predelegation, and a Federation of American Scientists summary, give a framework: <blockquote>Presidential Decision Directive 67 (PDD 67), issued 21 October 1998, relates to enduring constitutional government, continuity of operations (COOP) planning, and continuity of government (COG) operations. The purpose of Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG), Continuity of Government (COG), and Continuity of Operations (COOP) is to ensure survival of a constitutional form of government and the continuity of essential Federal functions. Presidential Decision Directive 67 replaced the Bush Administration's NSD 69 "Enduring Constitutional Government" of 02 June 1992, which in turn succeeded NSD 37 "Enduring Constitutional Government" of 18 April 1990 and NSDD 55 "Enduring National Leadership" of 14 September 1982.<ref name=>{{citation | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-67.htm | title = Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations (U) | date = 21 October 1998 | id = Presidential Decision Directive PDD-NSC-67 | publisher = Federation of American Scientists}}</ref></blockquote> ===Presidential involvement and start of civilian policy direction=== In 1958, [[George Kistiakowsky]], a key [[Manhattan Project]] scientist and [[Science Advisor]] in the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower Administration]], suggested to the President that inspection of foreign military facilities was not sufficient to control their nuclear weapons. Kistiakowsky, in particular, was concerned with the difficulty of verifying the number, type, and deployment of nuclear-armed missiles on missile submarines, and proposed that the arms control strategy focus on disarmament rather than inspections.<ref>{{Citation | contribution = Space Policy Project (summary of Foreign Relations of the US, text not online) | year = 1961 | title = Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 | volume = National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III | place= Washington, DC | publisher = US Department of State (summary by Federation of American Scientists) | url = http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html | id = FRUS58 }}</ref> He was also concerned with the short warning times available from [[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]] (ICBM) launches, which took away the lengthy decision time available when the nuclear threat came exclusively from manned bombers. [[Image:Atlas missile launch.jpg|left|thumb|Atlas, a first-generation ICBM]] Eisenhower sent Kistiakowsky to [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) headquarters at [[Offutt Air Force Base]] in [[Nebraska]], where he was, at first, rebuffed. At the same time as the early nuclear arms control work, the [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], [[General]] [[Nathan F. Twining]], [[United States Air Force | USAF]], sent a memorandum<ref name=NSAEBB130-02>{{citation | last = Twining | first = Nathan F. | authorlink = Nathan F. Twining | coauthors = | contribution = Document 2: J.C.S. 2056/131, Notes by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosing memorandum from JCS Chairman Nathan Twining to Secretary of Defense, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," | title = The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | work =National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 130 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | date = 20 August 1959 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/SIOP-2.pdf | accessdate = 2007-09-22 }}</ref> in August 1959, to the [[Secretary of Defense]], [[Neil McElroy]], which suggested that the [[Strategic Air Command]] be formally assigned responsibility to prepare the national nuclear target list, and a single plan for nuclear operations. Up to that point, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had done their own target planning. That had led to individual targets being multiply targeted by the different services. The separate service plans were not mutually supporting, as, for example, by the Navy destroying an air defense facility on the route of an Air Force bomber going to a target deeper inland. While Twining had sent the memo to McElroy, the members of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] disagreed on the policy during early 1960. <ref name=NSAEBB130-3a>{{citation | last = Twining | first = Nathan F. | authorlink = Nathan F. Twining | contribution = Document 3A: JCS 2056/143, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 October 1959, enclosing Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," | title = The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | volume= Electronic Briefing Book No. 130 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | date = 5 October 1959 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/SIOP-3A.pdf | accessdate = 2007-09-22 }}</ref><ref name=NSAEBB130-3B>{{citation | last = Burke | first = Arleigh | authorlink = Arleigh Burke | contribution = Document 3B: attached memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations | title = The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 130 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | date = 30 September 1959 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/SIOP-3A.pdf | accessdate = 2007-09-22 }}</ref> [[Thomas Gates]], who succeeded McElroy, asked [[President]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to decide the policy.<ref name=McKinzie2001>{{Citation | last = McKinzie | first = Matthew G. | last2 = Cochran | first2 = Thomas B. | coauthors = Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin | title = The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change | publisher = National Resources Defense Council | year = 2001 | contribution = Chapter Two: The Single Integrated Operational Plan and U.S. Nuclear Forces | url = http://holtz.org/Library/Social%20Science/Political%20Science/US%20Nuclear%20War%20Plan%20-%20NRDC%202001.pdf }}</ref> Eisenhower said he would not "leave his successor with the monstrosity" of the uncoordinated and non-integrated forces that then existed. When Kistiakowsky was not given access, Eisenhower sent him back, with a much stronger set of orders, that gave SAC officers the choice to cooperate with Kistiakowsky, or resign. Kistiaknowsky's report, presented on November 29, described uncoordinated plans with huge numbers of targets, many of which would be attacked by multiple forces, resulting in [[overkill]]. Eisenhower was shocked by the plans, and focused not just on the creation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), but on the entire process of picking targets, generating requirements, and planning for nuclear war operations. Separate operational plans from the Air Force and the Navy were combined to form the foundation of the SIOP. ===The first SIOP=== The first plan, following the White House policy guidance, was developed in 1960, consisting of a list of targets (the National Strategic Target List, or NSTL) and the assets to be used against each target. This first SIOP was extensively revised by a team at the [[RAND|RAND Corporation]] to become SIOP-62, a massive strike with the entire US arsenal of 3,200 warheads against the USSR, China and Soviet-aligned states. In 1963 the Kennedy administration ordered [[Robert McNamara]] to revise this plan, resulting in SIOP-63 &mdash; a strong counterforce strategy with a number of options. It was with SIOP-63 that the '[[no first use]]' policy became implicit. The counterforce approach recognized three missions, sometimes called Alpha, Bravo, and Romeo after the phonetic alphabet symbols for the different goals. The specific plans included options for combining the missions:<ref name=ABR>{{citation | title = A History of the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center 1943-1982 | url = http://www.usace.army.mil/usace-docs/misc/un19/c-3.pdf | contribution = Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Engineering, 1953-1960 | publisher = U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center | first = William C. | last = Baldwin }}</ref> :*Alpha: neutralize the enemy's capability to conduct an '''atomic''' attack :*Bravo: '''blunt''' the enemy's ability to produce materials to support military operations :*Romeo: '''retard''' the enemy's ability to move into friendly territory, primarily Western Europe An early SIOP, however, had little flexibility, treating all Communist countries as a uniform bloc. Document JCS 2056/220 expressed the concerns of [[United States Marine Corps | U.S. Marine ]] Commandant [[David Shoup]] that the 1961 draft was inconsistent with an 1959 NSC policy guidance paper approved by Eisenhower. <ref name=NSAEBB130-25>{{citation | last = Shoup | first = David | authorlink = David Shoup | contribution = Document 25: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and Related Policy Guidance, JCS 2056/220, | title = The Creation of SIOP-62: More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill | work = Electronic Briefing Book No. 130 | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive | date = 11 February 1961 | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/SIOP-25.pdf }}</ref> Shoup was especially concerned with language in the draft SIOP that said <blockquote>The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR--and as necessary in Communist China, European Bloc and non-European bloc countries--to attain the above objectives. Military targets in Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary.</blockquote> The National Security Archive commentary reports that Marine Commandant David Shoup asked USAF/SAC Commander [[Thomas Power]] "...what would happen if Beijing was not fighting; was there an option to leave Chinese targets out of the attack plan? Power was reported to have said that he hoped no one would think of that "because it would really screw up the plan"--that is, the plan was supposed to be executed as a whole. Apparently Shoup then observed that "any plan that kills millions of Chinese when it isn't even their war is not a good plan. This is not the American way."" ===Counterforce migrates to deterrence and warfighting=== Counterforce dominated SIOP plans until SIOP-5 in 1976 when the plan became a model for deterrence based on [[Richard M. Nixon|Nixon]]'s NSDM-242 (sometimes called the 'Schlesinger Doctrine' after then-Secretary of Defense, [[James Schlesinger]]).<ref name=Cimbala1984>{{citation | journal = Air University Review | date = September-October 1984 | title = War-Fighting Deterrence and Alliance Cohesiveness | first = Stephen J. | last = Cimbala | url = http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/sep-oct/cimbala.html }}</ref> The ever-expanding target lists were split into classes of targets, with a wider range of plans matching strikes to political intentions from counterforce to countervalue, or any mix/withhold strategy to control escalation. Schlesinger described the doctrine as having three main aspects: :#The National Command Authority or its successors should have many choices about the use of weapons, always having an option to escalate. :#Targeting should make it very explicit that the first requisite is selective retaliation against the enemy's military (i.e., tailored counterforce). :#Some targets and target classes should not be struck, at least at first, to give the opponent a rational reason to terminate the conflict. Reduced collateral damage was another benefit of this "withhold" method. The SIOP policy was further modified during the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] presidency under [[s:Index:Carter Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.djvu|Presidential Directive 59]], a key section of which stated <blockquote>The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time, from general guidelines established in advance. (S)<ref name=classmark>In U.S. classified documents, paragraphs and titles may have classification markings such as (S) for SECRET, (U) for UNCLASSIFIED, (C) for CONFIDENTIAL, and (TS) for TOP SECRET. Any of these letters may be followed with one or more control markings (e.g., EYES ONLY, HANDLE THROUGH COMINT CHANNELS ONLY) or code words/nicknamesd (e.g., UMBRA, POLO STEP)</ref><ref name=FASPD59>{{citation | title =Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy | date=1980 | first = Jimmy | last = Carter | publisher = The White House | url=http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd59.pdf}}</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving countervailing strategy. To meet these requirements, improvements should be made to our forces, their supporting C3 and intelligence, and their employment plans and planning apparatus, to achieve a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions. The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements. (S)</blockquote> In other words, PD59 explored a "warfighting" doctrine that suggested that nuclear plans might change during a war, and that nuclear weapons were to be used in combination with conventional weapons. Carter's [[Secretary of Defense]], [[Harold Brown]], emphasized selective counterforce, but also explicitly threatened the Soviet leadership themselves. Major improvements in U.S. command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), including making elements survivable during a nuclear war, were instituted to make the PD-59 doctrine feasible.<ref name=Cimbala1984> ===Return to counterforce, with strategic defense=== During the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration, there was a return to a strong counterforce strategy through NSDD-13. This included development of strategic weapons systems that were more accurate, more survivable, or both. Some of these systems eventually took the role of [[bargaining chips]] in arms control negotiations, although some, such as the [[B-2]] "stealth" bomber remained highly classified as potential surprises in war. The B-2 was also seen as a counter to Soviet deployment of mobile missiles, which only a manned bomber could find and attack. In 1983, President Reagan gave a speech proposing, at the least, research and development into non-nuclear defense systems against nuclear-armed missiles.<ref name=Cimbala1984>{{citation | journal = Air University Review | date = January-March 1987 | title = US Strategic Nuclear Deterrence: Technical and Policy Challenges | first = Stephen J. | last = Cimbala | url = http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/sep-oct/cimbala.html }}</ref> The idea of effective strategic defense was a potential disruption to the existing balance of [[Mutual Assured Destruction]], even with its "warfighting" refinements. ===Renaming and refocusing=== On 1 March 2003, the SIOP was renamed "OPLAN 8022", and later CONPLAN (contingency plan) 8022.<ref name=NIP-guidance>{{citation | url = http://www.nukestrat.com/us/guidance.htm | title = U.S. Nuclear Weapons Guidance | publisher = The Nuclear Information Project (joint with Federation of American Scientists) | date = 3 January 2008 }}</ref> It went into deployment in July 2004, but it was reported cancelled in July 2007. It may have been superseded by an expanded CONPLAN 8044 (see below). Another set of "Global Strike" plans include a jointly coordinated a nuclear option, intended for other than the general nuclear war situations, principally with Russia but possibly also with China, postulated in OPLAN 8022. Global Strike plans are codified in CONPLAN 8044. <ref name=FAS-GlobalStrike>{{citation | url = http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf | title = Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan | first = Hans M. | last = Kristensen | date = 15 March 2006 | publisher = Federation of American Scientists }}</ref> == Executing the SIOP == In the United States, the decision to use nuclear weapons is vested in the [[National Command Authority]] (NCA), composed of the [[President of the United States]] and the [[United States Secretary of Defense]] or their successors. The President alone cannot order an attack. The ordering of use, communication of orders, and the release of nuclear weapons is governed by the [[two-man rule]] at all times.[[Image:Minuteman launch key.jpg|left|thumb|Deputy silo commander key in Minuteman ICBM silo. Commander's key is too far away to be turned by the same person]] No one person ever can take such an action. All military personnel that participate in loading, arming, or firing weapons, as well as transmitting launch orders, are subject to the [[Personnel Reliability Program]] (PRP). If the NCA decides that the United States must launch nuclear weapons, they will direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to do so. At the NCA/JCS level, the orders will be to execute SIOP strike options, broken into Major Attack Options (MAOs), Selected Attack Options (SAOs), and Limited Attack Options (LAOs). Individual countries or regions can be included in or withheld from nuclear attacks depending on circumstances. The CJCS in turn will direct the general officer on duty in addition to one other officer on duty in the [[National Military Command Center]] (NMCC) at the Pentagon to release an [[Emergency Action Message]] (EAM) to all nuclear forces; another officer will validate that order. <ref name=NMCC>{{citation | url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/nmcc.htm | title = National Military Command Center | first = John | last = Pike | authorlink = John E. Pike | publisher = globalsecurity.org }}</ref> Additionally, the message will go to the [[Site R|Alternate National Military Command Center]] (ANMCC),<ref name=ANMCC>{{citation | url = http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001203mag-gifford.html | title = Alternate National Military Command Center | journal = New York Times }}</ref> located in Raven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, and also to an airborne command post, either the presidential National Airborne Operations Center ([[Boeing E-4B|NAOC]]) or the military [[E-6]] [[TACAMO]] If the NMCC is destroyed by a first strike, either the ANMCC, NAOC or TACAMO can issue the orders to execute the SIOP. [[Image:US Navy E-6 Mercury.jpg|thumb|E-6 Mercury [[TACAMO]] aircraft]] As the orders go down the chain of command, always subject to the two-man rule, intermediate headquarters, and eventually the nuclear delivery platforms themselves, will receive [[Emergency Action Messages]] (EAM) to arm or launch weapons. For most modern weapons, the EAM will also include code(s) for [[Permissive Action Links]] (PAL). At a minimum, a PAL code will actually arm a weapon for release. The circuitry controlling the PAL is deliberately positioned inside the warhead such that it cannot be reached without disabling the weapon, at a minimum, to a level that would require a full factory-level rebuild. There may be separate PAL codes for arming and launch. Some weapons have "dial-a-yield" functions that allow the power of the nuclear explosion to be adjusted from minimum to maximum yield. Most weapons have additional arming circuitry that, even if a valid launch code is entered, will not arm the warhead unless the weapon senses that it has been released on an expected delivery path. For example, the first steps of the final arming process for a ballistic missile depend on physical characteristics of the weapon release, such as the acceleration of a rocket launch, zero-gravity coasting, and various physical aspects of [[hypersonic]] reentry into the atmosphere. A gravity bomb dropped from an aircraft will detect the altitude of release and the decreasing altitude as it falls. ==SIOP in Fiction== * In Dale Brown's novel "Plan of Attack", it is revealed that [[Patrick McLanahan]] is one of the most highly valued personnel in the U.S. military because of his involvement in classified projects and knowledge of the American SIOP. However, because of McLanahan's involvement in controversial highly-classified military actions, President Thorn largely ignores this fact and the warning of an imminent Russian attack until the Russia launches a nuclear campaign against the [[United States of America]]. * In Eric L. Harry's novel "Arc Light", the President decides to execute "SIOP 6-C" in a [[counterforce]] strike against Russia after a Russian general gained control of the nuclear codes and launched a massive attack against the United States. In the book, "SIOP 6-C" had six thousand nuclear warheads assigned to be used, some of which were held in reserve. * In William Prochnau's novel "Trinity's Child", a Soviet nuclear sneak attack triggers US retaliation. There is discussion of SIOP among the unnamed US President, the military commander codenamed Alice on board the SAC Looking Glass aircraft who is advising the President, a newly sworn-in President aboard Air Force One, and his primary military advisor. After the destruction of cities on both sides, Alice and the original President battle those on board Air Force One for control of the American missile submarine fleet. At stake is the expectation that launch of the Tridents, plus Soviet retaliation, will raise the total death toll into the billions. * In "[[What Ifs? of American History]]", which was edited by [[Robert Cowley]], one essay ("[[The Cuban Missile Crisis: Second Holocaust]]", by Robert L. O'Connell) outlines a scenario where the Cuban Missile Crisis leads, via miscalculations, incompetence and trigger-happiness on both sides, to a two-day thermonuclear war, with horrific results in terms of both overkill and long-term effects on the world. ==References== {{reflist | 2}} ==See also== * [[625th Strategic Operations Squadron (United States)|625th Strategic Operations Squadron]] * [[Nuclear strategy]] * [[Nuclear posture review]] * [[Mutual assured destruction|Mutual assured destruction (MAD)]] * [[Nuclear utilization target selection|Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS)]] * [[Nuclear Football]] ==External links== *[http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ja01/ja01lortie.html A Do-It-Yourself SIOP] *[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/swps.htm Strategic War Planning System] [[Category:Nuclear strategies]] [[ja:単一統合作戦計画]]