Stump v. Sparkman
1173582
220965752
2008-06-22T12:52:19Z
Lyrl
408908
/* External links */ More specific category
{{SCOTUSCase
|Litigants=Stump v. Sparkman
|ArgueDate=January 10
|ArgueYear=1978
|DecideDate=March 28
|DecideYear=1978
|FullName=Harold D. Stump, et al. v. Linda Kay Sparkman and Leo Sparkman
|USVol=435
|USPage=349
|Citation=98 S. Ct. 1099; 55 L. Ed. 2d 331; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 74
|Prior=Civ.No. F-75-129 ([[U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana|N.D. Ind]]. [[May 13]], [[1976]])
552 F.2d 172 ([[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|7th Cir]]. [[1977]])<br />
Certiorari granted [[October 3]], 1977, 434 U.S. 815, 98 S.Ct. 51, 54 L.Ed.2d 70
|Subsequent=Rehearing Denied [[June 5]], [[1978]], 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2862, 56 L.Ed.2d 795
Remand 601 F.2nd 261 (7th Cir. [[1979]])
|Holding=A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. He will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
|SCOTUS=1975-1981
|Majority=White
|JoinMajority=Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens
|Dissent=Stewart
|JoinDissent=Marshall, Powell
|Dissent2=Powell
|NotParticipating=Brennan
|LawsApplied=[[42 U.S.C. § 1983]]
}}
<!-- Argued by: George E. Fruechtenicht, Fort Wayne, Indiana, for petitioners (Stump et al.)<br />
Richard H. Finley, Kendallville, Indiana, for respondents (Linda and Leo Sparkman) -->
[[Image:DeKalb_County_IN_Court_House.jpg|thumb|right|290px|DeKalb County Court House, Auburn, Indiana. The chambers of the Circuit Court judge are at upper left.]]
'''''Stump v. Sparkman''''', [[Case citation|435 U.S. 349]] ([[1978]]), is the leading [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] decision on [[judicial immunity]]. It involved an [[Indiana]] judge who was sued by a young woman whom he had ordered to be [[sterilization (surgical procedure)|sterilized]].
==Facts==
In [[1971]], Judge Harold D. Stump granted a mother's petition to have a [[tubal ligation]] performed on her 15-year-old daughter, whom the mother alleged was "somewhat [[Mental retardation|retarded]]." The petition was granted the same day that it was filed. The judge did not hold a [[hearing (law)|hearing]] to receive [[evidence (law)|evidence]] or appoint a [[lawyer]] to protect the daughter's interests. The daughter underwent the [[surgery]] a week later, having been told that she was to have her [[Vermiform appendix|appendix]] removed.
The daughter married two years later. Failing to become [[pregnant]], she learned that she had been sterilized during the 1971 operation. The daughter and her husband sued the judge and others associated with the sterilization in [[United States district court|federal district court]].
The district court found that the judge was immune from suit. The Seventh Circuit [[Court of Appeals]] reversed the decision, holding that the judge had lost his immunity because he failed to observe
"elementary principles of [[due process]]" when he ordered the sterilization. Finally, in [[1978]], the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, reversed the Court of Appeals, announcing a test for deciding when judicial immunity should apply and holding that the judge could not be sued.
==Background==
On [[July 9]], [[1971]], [[Ora Spitler McFarlin]] of [[Auburn, Indiana]], through her attorney [[Warren G. Sunday]], presented a petition to Judge [[Harold D. Stump]] of the [[DeKalb County, Indiana|DeKalb County]] Circuit Court asking to have her 15-year-old daughter, [[Linda Sparkman|Linda Spitler]], surgically sterilized. The petition alleged that the daughter was "somewhat retarded," was associating with "older youth and young men" and that it would be in the daughter's best interest to undergo a tubal ligation "to prevent unfortunate circumstances."
Judge Stump signed the requested order [[ex parte]] the same day that he received the petition. The daughter had no notice of it. No [[guardian ad litem]] was appointed to represent her interest, and no hearing was held. Neither the petition nor the order was filed with the clerk of the circuit court, nor did the order cite any [[statute|statutory]] authority for the action being taken.
On [[July 15]], Linda Spitler entered [[DeKalb Memorial Hospital]], just four blocks from her home. She was told that she was to have her appendix removed. The next day a tubal ligation was performed on her by Dr. [[John H. Hines]], M.D., assisted by Dr. [[Harry M. Covell]], M.D., and [[anesthesiologist]] Dr. [[John C. Harvey]], M.D.
In [[1973]], Linda Spitler married [[Leo Sparkman]]. Failing to become pregnant, she learned from Dr. Hines in [[1975]] that she had been sterilized. The Sparkmans then brought an action for damages under [[42 U.S.C. § 1983]] and [[42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)]] for alleged deprivation of Linda Sparkman's civil rights against Ora McFarlin, her attorney, Judge Stump, the doctors who performed the operation and the hospital where it was performed. Leo Sparkman asserted a [[pendent jurisdiction|pendent]] claim under state law for loss of potential fatherhood. Linda Sparkman also asserted pendent state claims for assault and battery and medical malpractice. The case was filed in the [[U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana]].
===The case below===
The district court judge, [[Jesse E. Eschbach]], dismissed the case, holding that the only state action, which was necessary to the federal claims, was Judge Stump's approval of the petition and that he was "clothed with absolute judicial immunity," thereby cutting off the claims against the other defendants as well. The Sparkmans appealed to the [[United States Court of Appeals|U.S. Court of Appeals]] for the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|Seventh Circuit]], which reversed the dismissal.
Applying the doctrine of judicial immunity adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in ''[[Bradley v. Fisher]]''<ref>[[Case citation|13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646]]</ref> in [[1871]] and held applicable to § 1983 actions in ''[[Pierson v. Ray]]''<ref>[[Case citation|386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 1288]]</ref> in [[1967]], Judge [[Luther M. Swygert]], writing for himself and Judges [[Harlington Wood., Jr.]], and [[William G. East]], found that immunity is available only when a judge has [[jurisdiction]] over the [[Subject-matter jurisdiction|subject-matter]] of a case and that it is not available when he acts in "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Although Indiana statute law permitted the sterilization of institutionalized persons under certain circumstances, it provided for the right to notice, the opportunity to defend and the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals found no basis in statutory or common law for a court to order the sterilization of a minor child simply upon a parent's petition. It also held that Judge Stump's action could not be justified as a valid exercise of the power of courts to fashion new common law. Concluding, Judge Swygert wrote:
<blockquote>Even if defendant Stump had not been foreclosed under the Indiana statutory scheme from fashioning a new common law remedy in this case, we would still find his action to be an illegitimate exercise of his common law power because of his failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural due process. Here a juvenile was ordered sterilized without the taking of the slightest steps to ensure that her rights were protected. Not only was the plaintiff not given representation, she was not even told what was happening to her. She was afforded no opportunity to contest the validity of her mother's allegations or to have a higher court examine whether the substance of those allegations, even if true, warranted her sterilization. Finally, the petition and order were never filed in court. This kind of purported justice does not fall within the categories of cases at law or in equity.<ref>[[Case citation|552 F.2d 172, 176]]</ref></blockquote>
Judge Stump and his co-defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted [[certiorari]] and reversed the Court of Appeals.
==The holding==
Associate Justice [[Byron White]], writing for the five-member majority, disagreed with the determination by the Court of Appeals that there was a "clear absence of all jurisdiction" for Judge Stump to consider Ora McFarlin's petition, noting that Indiana law gave circuit courts "original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity" and jurisdiction over "all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or officer." Justice White acknowledged an intervening decision of the [[Indiana Court of Appeals]]<ref>''A.L. v. G.H.R.'', [[Case citation|163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501]]</ref> in [[1975]] that held that a parent has no common-law right to have a minor child sterilized; but he reasoned that when presented with a petition like Ora McFarlin's, an Indiana circuit judge "should deny it on its merits rather than dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction."<ref>[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 360]]</ref> Noting that Judge Swygert found no Indiana law that authorized Judge Stump's action, Justice White observed:
<blockquote>...[I]t is more significant that there was no Indiana statute and no case law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of [[general jurisdiction]], from considering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump.<ref name="supreme359">[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 359]]</ref></blockquote>
Addressing Judge Swygert's assertion that even if Judge Stump had jurisdiction he was deprived of immunity because of his failure to observe elementary principles of procedural due process, Justice White countered:
<blockquote>A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. The Court made this point clear in Bradley, [[Case citation|13 Wall., at 357]], where it stated "[T]his erroneous matter in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not make it any less a judicial act; nor did it render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever....<ref name="supreme359" /></blockquote>
===Test of a "judicial act"===
The majority opinion went on to decide that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a judicial act "relate to the nature of the act itself":
#whether it is a function normally performed by a judge; and<p>
#whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.<ref>[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 363]]</ref>
In the view of the majority, Judge Stump's action passed this test. Even if his decision was erroneous, it was within his jurisdiction to consider Ora McFarlin's petition. Moreover, the parties dealt with Judge Stump in his capacity as a judge, not as a private individual. Accordingly, he could not be held liable for the consequences of his actions, even if they were arguably tragic.
==The dissent==
===Justice Stewart's dissent===
Associate Justice [[Potter Stewart]] entered a vigorous dissent. Agreeing that judges of general jurisdiction enjoy absolute immunity for their judicial acts, he wrote, "...what Judge Stump did...was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act."<ref name="supreme366">[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 366]]</ref> Stating that it was "factually untrue"<ref name="supreme366" /> that what Judge Stump did was an act "normally performed by a judge," he wrote. "...there is no reason to believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other Indiana judge, either before or since."<ref name="supreme368">[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 368]]</ref>
Justice Stewart also denounced it as "legally unsound" to rule that Judge Stump had acted in a "judicial capacity".<ref name="supreme368" /> "A judge is not free, like a loose cannon," he wrote, "to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity."<ref name="supreme368" />
Concluding, Justice Stewart argued that the majority misapplied the law of the Pierson case:
<blockquote>
Not one of the considerations...summarized in the Pierson opinion was present here. There was no "case," controversial or otherwise. There were no litigants. There was and could be no appeal. And there was not even the pretext of principled decisionmaking. The total absence of any of these normal attributes of a judicial proceeding convinces me that the conduct complained of in this case was not a judicial act.<ref>[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 369370]]</ref></blockquote>
===Justice Powell's dissent===
Joining in Justice Stewart's opinion, Justice [[Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr.|Lewis Powell]] filed a separate dissent that emphasized what he called "...the central feature of this case - Judge Stump's preclusion of any possibility for the vindication of respondents' rights elsewhere in the judicial system."<ref>[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 370]]</ref> Continuing, he wrote:
<blockquote>Underlying the Bradley immunity...is the notion that private rights can be sacrificied in some degree to the achievement of the greater public good deriving from a completely independent judiciary, because there exist alternative forums and methods for vindicating those rights.
<p>But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies that otherwise would be available, the underlying assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative.<ref>[[Case citation|435 U.S. 349, 371]]</ref>
</blockquote>
==Notes==
<references />
==See also==
*[[Buck v. Bell]]
*[[Skinner v. Oklahoma]]
*[[Compulsory sterilization]]
*[[List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 435]]
==Law review articles==
*J. Randolph Block, ''Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity,'' Duke L.J. 879, No. 5 (1980);
*Irene Merker Rosenberg, ''Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity,'' 64 Virginia L.Rev. 833 (1978)
==Books==
*Jamie Renae Coleman and Paula Bateman Headley, ''The Blanket She Carried'', Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2003 ISBN 1-4033-8119-4 contains Linda Sparkman's recollections of her childhood, although it does not directly address this case.
*Joel D. Joseph, ''Black Mondays: Worst Decisions of the Supreme Court'', Bethesda, MD: National Press, 1987, pp. 247-257. ISBN 0-915765-65-9
==External links==
*[http://laws.findlaw.com/us/435/349.html Full text of the decision courtesy of Findlaw.com]
*[http://www.jurisearch.com/newroot/caselink.asp?series=F.2d&citationno=552+F.2d+172 Full text of ''Sparkman v. McFarlin'', 552 Fd. 172 (7th Cir. 1977), courtesy of Jurisearch.com]
*[http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/journalgazette/17072206.htm ''The Journal-Gazette'', Fort Wayne, Indiana, April 13, 2007]
*[http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070413/LOCAL/704130513 ''Indianapolis Star'', Indianapolis, Indiana, April 13, 2007]
*[http://www.bioethics.iupui.edu/Eugenics/index.htm Indiana Eugenics: History and Legacy, 1907-2007]
*[http://kobescent.com/eugenics Eugenics in Indiana]
*[http://www.statelib.lib.in.us/www/ihb/markers/numbered/4920071.html Indiana Eugenics Law historical marker dedication, April 12, 2007]
[[Category:United States Supreme Court cases|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:1978 in law|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:United States civil rights case law|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:United States children rights case law|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:Disability rights|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:Disability case law|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:DeKalb County, Indiana]]
[[Category:Auburn, Indiana|Stump v. Sparkman]]
[[Category:United States reproductive rights case law|Stump v. Sparkman]]