Universal prescriptivism 977567 220333559 2008-06-19T10:25:44Z 65.0.252.5 [[Image:RMHare.jpg|thumb|right|R. M. Hare]] '''Universal prescriptivism''', often simply called '''prescriptivism''', is a [[Meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] theory about the [[Semantics|semantic]] content of moral statements. It holds that moral statements function similarly to [[imperative]]s which are [[universalizability|universalizable]] — whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts obtain. Since the concept was introduced by philosopher [[R. M. Hare]] in his 1952 book ''The Language of Morals'', it has been compared to [[emotivism]] and to the [[categorical imperative]] of [[Immanuel Kant]].<ref>Brandt, ''Theory'', 221: "[''The Language of Morals''] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"</ref><ref>Brandt, ''Theory'', 224: "Hare's [universalizability] proposal is reminiscent of Kant's view that an act is morally permissible if and only if the maxim in terms of which the agent thinks of it could possibly serve as a universal rule of conduct, and if the agent is prepared to accept it as such."</ref> For example, take the moral proposition "Murder is wrong". According to an [[emotivism|emotivist]], such a statement merely expresses an attitude of the speaker. It only means something like "Boo on murder!" However, according to prescriptivism, the statement "Murder is wrong" means something more like "Do not murder". What it expresses is not primarily an emotion, it is an ''imperative''. A value-judgment might also have [[Descriptivist theory of names|descriptive]] and emotive meanings, but these are not its primary meaning. Hare would allow utilitarian considerations to enter into such a formulation, but he would not base the formula or his ethical theory solely on a principle of utility. Hare believed that all of our ethical propositions ought to conform with logic. [[Peter Singer]] has expressed sympathy with Hare's position,<ref>Singer, Peter, ''Practical ethics'', second edition 1993, Preface</ref> though he is more strictly representative of the [[preference utilitarianism|preference]] [[utilitarian]] school. ==Notes== {{reflist}} ==References== * {{cite book |last=Brandt |first=Richard |authorlink=Richard Brandt |title=[[Ethical Theory]] |year=1959 |location=[[Englewood Cliffs]] |publisher=[[Prentice Hall]] |id={{LCCN|59|010|075}} |chapter=Noncognitivism: The Job of Ethical Sentences Is Not to State Facts }} ==External links== *[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/ Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism] in the [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] * [http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/prescriptivism.php Prescriptivism] at PhilosophyProfessor.com [[Category:Meta-ethics]] {{philo-stub}} [[ja:指令説 (哲学)]] [[fi:Universaalipreskriptivismi]]