Virtue ethics 261873 225611087 2008-07-14T15:29:08Z Sardanaphalus 427947 updating link using [[Project:AutoWikiBrowser|AWB]] {{nofootnotes|date=June 2008}} {{Cleanup|date=September 2006}} '''Virtue theory''' is a branch of [[moral philosophy]] that emphasizes character, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking. In [[Western world|the West]] virtue ethics was the prevailing approach to ethical thinking in the [[ancient]] and [[medieval]] periods. The tradition suffered an eclipse during the [[early modern]] period, as [[Aristotelianism]] fell out of favour in the West. Virtue theory returned to prominence in Western philosophical thought in the twentieth century, and is today one of the three dominant approaches to normative theories (the other two being [[deontology]] and [[consequentialism]]). Although concern for virtue appears in several philosophical traditions, notably the [[Chinese philosophy|Chinese]], in the West the roots of the tradition lie in the work of [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], and even today the tradition’s key concepts derive from [[ancient Greek philosophy]]. These concepts include ''[[arete]]'' (excellence or virtue), ''[[phronesis]]'' (practical or moral wisdom), and ''[[eudaimonia]]'' (flourishing). == Distinctions from other ethical traditions== Virtue ethics offers a schema of the moral life that strongly differs from those offered by virtue theory's predominant rivals, [[deontological]] and [[consequentialist]] ethics. These systems aim to articulate principles or rules that provide an agent the ability to decide how to act in a given situation. Consequentialist and deontological theories often still employ the term 'virtue', but in a restricted sense, namely as a tendency or disposition to adhere to the system's principles or rules. These very different senses of what constitutes virtue, hidden behind the same word, are a potential source of confusion. This disagreement over the meaning of virtue points to a larger conflict between virtue theory and its philosophical rivals. A system of virtue theory is only intelligible if it is [[teleological]]: that is, if it includes an account of the purpose (''telos'') of human life, or in popular language, the [[meaning of life]]. Obviously, strong claims about the purpose of human life, or of what the good life for human beings is, will be highly controversial. Virtue theory's necessary commitment to a teleological account of human life thus puts the tradition in sharp tension with other dominant approaches to normative ethics, which, because they focus on actions, do not bear this burden. ==Achieving ''eudaimonia''== ''Eudaimonia'' is a state variously translated as "happiness" or "human flourishing". The latter translation is more accurate; ''eudaimonia'' is not a subjective, but an objective, state. It characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the person experiencing it. According to Aristotle, the most prominent exponent of ''eudaimonia'' in the Western philosophical tradition, ''eudaimonia'' is the proper goal of human life. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality -- [[reason]] -- as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of ''eudaimonia'' was an activity that could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community-- the ''[[polis]]'' or [[city-state]]. Although ''eudaimonia'' was first popularized by Aristotle, it now belongs to the tradition of virtue theories generally. For the virtue theorist, ''eudaimonia'' describes that state achieved by the person who lives the proper human life, an outcome which can be reached by practicing the virtues. A virtue is a habit or quality that allows the bearer to succeed at his, her, or its purpose. The virtue of a knife, for example, is sharpness; among the virtues of a racehorse is speed. Thus to identify the virtues for human beings, one must have an account of what the human purpose is. There is, and always has been, sharp disagreement on this question: thus, as [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] observed in ''[[After Virtue]]'', though thinkers as diverse as [[Homer]], Aristotle, the authors of the [[New Testament]], Thomas Aquinas, and [[Benjamin Franklin]] have all proposed lists of the virtues, these lists often fail to overlap. Aristotle categorized the virtues as moral and [[Intellectual virtues|intellectual]]. Aristotle identified nine intellectual virtues, the most important of which were ''sophia'' (theoretical wisdom) and ''phronesis'' (practical wisdom). The moral virtues included prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Aristotle argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean (see [[Golden mean (philosophy)|Golden Mean]]) between two corresponding vices. For example, the virtue of courage is a mean between the two vices of [[cowardice]] and [[foolhardiness]]. Where cowardice is the disposition to act more fearfully than the situation deserves, and foolhardiness is the disposition to show too little fear for the situation, courage is the mean between the two: the disposition to show the amount of fear appropriate to the situation. ==Historical origins and development== Like much of the Western tradition, virtue theory seems to have originated in ancient [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] philosophy. Discussion of what were known as the [[Four Cardinal Virtues]] - [[prudence]], [[justice]], [[fortitude]] and [[Temperance (virtue)|temperance]] - can be found in Plato's ''[[Republic (Plato)|Republic]]''. The virtues also figure prominently in Aristotle's moral theory (see below). The Greek idea of the virtues was later incorporated into [[Christian]] moral theology. During the scholastic period, the most comprehensive consideration of the virtues from a theological perspective was provided by St. [[Thomas Aquinas]] in his ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'' and his ''Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics''. The tradition was eclipsed in the Renaissance, and throughout the early modern period, when the Aristotelian synthesis of ethics and metaphysics fell into disfavour. Though the tradition receded into the background of European philosophical thought in these centuries, the term "virtue" remained current during this period, and in fact appears prominently in the tradition of [[classical republicanism]] or [[classical liberalism]]. This tradition was prominent in the intellectual life of sixteenth-century [[Italy]], as well as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and America; indeed the term "virtue" appears frequently in the work of [[Machiavelli]], [[Hume]], the republicans of the [[English Civil War]] period, the eighteenth-century English [[Whigs]], and the prominent figures among the [[Scottish Enlightenment]] and the [[American Founding]]. Despite this common term, classical republicanism should not be conflated with virtue theory, as the two philosophical traditions draw from different sources and often address different concerns. Where virtue theory traces its roots to Aristotle, classical republicanism draws primarily on [[Tacitus]]. Virtue theory emphases Aristotle's belief in the polis as the acme of political organization, and the role of the virtues in enabling human beings to flourish in that environment. Classical republicanism in contrast emphasizes Tacticus' concern that power and luxury can corrupt individuals and destroy liberty, as Tacitus perceived in the transformation of the [[Roman republic]] into an empire; virtue for classical republicans is a shield against this sort of corruption and preserve the good life one has, rather than a means by which to achieve the good life one does not yet have. Another way to put the distinction between the two traditions is that virtue ethics relies on Aristotle's fundamental distinction between the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-should-be, while classical republicanism relies on the Tacitean distinction of the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-is-at-risk-of-becoming.<ref>J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment</ref> ==Contemporary virtue theory== Although some [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] philosophers (e.g. [[David Hume|Hume]]) continued to emphasize the virtues, with the ascendancy of [[utilitarianism]] and [[deontology]], virtue theory moved to the margins of Western philosophy. The contemporary revival of virtue theory is frequently traced to the philosopher [[G. E. M. Anscombe]]'s 1958 essay, ''Modern Moral Philosophy'' and to [[Philippa Foot]], who published a collection of essays in 1978 entitled ''Virtues and Vices.'' Since the 1980s, in works like ''[[After Virtue]]'' and ''Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry'', philosopher [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] has made an effort to reconstruct a virtue-based theory in dialogue with the problems of modern and [[postmodernism|postmodern]] thought. In [[French philosophy]], [[Paul Ricoeur]] has accorded an important place to Aristotelian [[teleological ethics]] in his [[hermeneutical]] [[phenomenology]] of the subject, most notably in his book ''Oneself as Another''. Following [[Alasdair MacIntyre|MacIntyre]], [[United Methodist Church|American Methodist]] theologian [[Stanley Hauerwas]] has also found the language of virtue quite helpful in his own project. More recently, [[Rosalind Hursthouse]] has published ''On Virtue Ethics'' and [[Roger Crisp]] and [[Michael Slote]] have edited a collection of important essays titled ''Virtue Ethics'', while [[Martha Nussbaum]] and [[Amartya Sen]] have employed virtue theory in theorizing the [[capability approach]] to [[international development]]. ==Virtue theory outside the Western tradition== Non-Western moral and religious philosophies, such as [[Confucianism]], also incorporate ideas that may appear similar to those developed by the ancient Greeks. Like ancient Greek ethics, [[China|Chinese]] ethical thought makes an explicit connection between virtue and [[Public administration|statecraft]]. However, where the Greeks focused on the interior orientation of the soul, Confucianism's definition of virtue emphasizes interpersonal relations. Normally when the term virtue theory is used, it is in reference to the western conception of virtue theory, rather than any of the schools of East Asian ethical thought. ==Criticisms of virtue theory== Some criticise the theory in relation to the difficulty involved with establishing the nature of the virtues. Different people, cultures and societies often have vastly different opinions on what constitutes a virtue. For example, many would have once considered a virtuous woman to be quiet, servile, and industrious. This conception of female virtue no longer holds true in many modern societies (see also [[cultural relativism]]). Proponents of virtue theory sometimes respond to this objection by arguing that a central feature of a virtue is its ''universal applicability''. In other words, any character trait defined as a virtue must reasonably be universally regarded as a virtue for all sentient beings. According to this view, it is inconsistent to claim for example servility as a female virtue, while at the same time not proposing it as a male one. Other proponents of virtue theory, notably [[Alasdair MacIntyre]], respond to this objection by arguing that any account of the virtues must indeed be generated out of the community in which those virtues are to be practiced: the very word 'ethics' implies 'ethos'. That is to say that the virtues are, and necessarily must be, grounded in a particular time and place. What counts as virtue in fourth-century Athens would be a ludicrous guide to proper behaviour in twenty-first-century Toronto, and vice-versa. To take this view does not necessarily commit one to the argument that accounts of the virtues must therefore be static: moral activity-- that is, attempts to contemplate and practice the virtues-- can provide the cultural resources that allow people to change, albeit slowly, the ethos of their own societies. [[Alasdair MacIntyre|MacIntyre]] appears to take this position in his seminal work on virtue ethics, ''[[After Virtue]]''. One might cite (though [[Alasdair MacIntyre|MacIntyre]] does not) the rapid emergence of [[abolitionist]] thought in the [[slave]]-holding societies of the eighteenth-century [[Atlantic world]] as an example of this sort of change: over a relatively short period of time, perhaps 1760 to 1800, in Britain, France, and British America, slave-holding, previously thought to be morally neutral or even virtuous, rapidly became seen as vicious among wide swathes of society. While the emergence of abolitionist thought derived from many sources, the work of [[David Brion Davis]], among others, has established that one source was the rapid, internal evolution of moral theory among certain sectors of these societies, notably the [[Quakers]]. Another objection to virtue theory is that the school does not focus on what ''sorts of actions'' are morally permitted and which ones are not, but rather on what sort of qualities someone ought to foster in order to become a good person. In other words, while some virtue theorists may not condemn, for example, murder as an inherently immoral or impermissible sort of action, they may argue that someone who commits a murder is severely lacking in several important virtues, such as [[compassion]] and [[fairness]]. Still, antagonists of the theory often object that this particular feature of the theory makes virtue ethics useless as a universal norm of acceptable conduct suitable as a base for [[legislation]]. Some virtue theorists concede this point, but respond by opposing the very notion of legitimate legislative [[authority]] instead, effectively advocating some form of [[anarchism]] as the political ideal. Others argue that laws should be made by virtuous legislators. Still others argue that it is possible to base a judicial system on the moral notion of virtues rather than rules. Some virtue theorists might respond to this overall objection with the notion of a "bad act" also being an act characteristic of [[vice]]{{Fact|date=January 2008}}. That is to say that those acts which do not aim at virtue, or stray from virtue, would constitute our conception of "bad behavior". Although not all virtue ethicists agree to this notion, this is one way the virtue ethicist can re-introduce the concept of the "morally impermissible". One could raise objection with Foot that she is committing an [[argument from ignorance]] by postulating that what is not virtuous is unvirtuous. In other words, just because an action or person 'lacks of evidence' for virtue does not, [[ceteris paribus|all else constant]], imply that said action or person is unvirtuous. ==See also== * [[Seven virtues]] * [[Virtue]] * [[Virtue jurisprudence]] * [[Aretaic turn]] * [[Stoicism]] * [[Cynics|Cynicism]] ==Further reading== * [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8221%28199804%2948%3A2%3C323%3AVCAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle] by [[Jiyuan Yu]] ==External links== * [http://macintyreanphilosophy.googlepages.com/home International Society for MacIntyrean Philosophy] * {{sep entry|ethics-virtue|Virtue Ethics}}, entry by [[Rosalind Hursthouse]]; * {{sep entry|moral-character|Moral Character}}, entry by Marcia Homiak. * [http://www.rsrevision.com/Alevel/ethics/virtue_ethics/ Virtue Ethics - summary, criticisms and how to apply the theory] * [http://www.google.de/url?sa=U&start=3&q=http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2003_11_01_lsolum_archive.html&e=1102 Legal theory lexicon: Virtue ethics]by Larry Solum. * [http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/virtue.htm Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Ethics] * [http://www.virtuescience.com/virtuelist.html A clickable list of Virtues with definitions and famous quotes.] * [http://www.thefourvirtues.com The Four Virtues] {{Philosophy topics}} [[Category:History of philosophy]] [[Category:Normative ethics]] [[Category:Virtue ethics]] [[de:Tugendethik]] [[fr:Éthique de la vertu]] [[hr:Etika vrlina]] [[is:Dygðasiðfræði]] [[ja:徳倫理学]] [[nl:Deugdethiek]] [[fi:Hyve-etiikka]] [[sv:Dygdetik]]